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Major economies in the world have witnessed a period of low and stable inflation
for more than a decade. Many observers of central bank policy acknowledge that
this success is mainly due to an important institutional change in monetary policy
associated with more political support for central bank independence with clearly
defined goals. In other words monetary policy making has become more respon-
sible by committing to long-term price stability, a strategy that is insulated from
short-term political control and thus improves the credibility of low-inflation pol-
icy. A very visible evidence of this move is the recent adoption of explicit inflation
targeting among a number of major central banks around the world, including the
Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank
of Canada and the Reserve Bank of Australia.
Nevertheless, the achievement of low average inflation does not necessarily mean
that the art and science of monetary policy has ceased to be interesting. Even
when the average rate of inflation is low, control of the economy is not a trivial
matter and at best imperfect for several reasons, including data and model uncer-
tainty, asymmetric information about market sentiments, and uncertainty in the
transmission lag from policy instruments to final targets, with exogenous shocks
intervening in between. To be sure, the transmission channel of monetary policy
to the economy remains a complicated one. Thus, even in an era of stable prices,
central banking continues to be what Alan Greenspan, the current chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board of the U.S., recently called ”a risk management activity.”
In this regard, recent policy discussions on central banking commonly speak about
new challenges in the conduct of monetary policy. Among other things, the man-
agement of private sector expectations stands out to be prominent. As Blinder
(1998) points out, monetary policy has important macroeconomic effects only to
the extent that it moves financial market prices that really matter like long-term
interest rates, stock prices and exchange rates, variables which, by their nature, are
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
forward-looking. Similarly, Svensson (2003b) remarks by saying that ”central banks
control the output gap and inflation mostly through the private-sector expectations
they give rise”. Thus ”central banks take account of private-sector expectations
and treat them very much as independent state variables that they monitor and
respond to.” In his commentary to Svensson, titled ”How Should Monetary Policy
Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability?”, Woodford (1999) also discusses the
importance of market expectations in the transmission mechanism: ”One of the
most important issues in the conduct of monetary policy, that should attain par-
ticular significance in an era of price stability, is the need to take account of the
effects of the central bank’s conduct upon private-sector expectations.” Moreover,
on the role of expectations about future (monetary) policy plans, Woodford says:
”... there is every reason to believe that the aspects of economic behavior that are
central to the transmission mechanism for monetary policy are critically dependent
upon people’s expectations, including their expectations regarding future policy.”
In practice, the role of forward-looking expectations has also surfaced in the recent
policy proposals aimed at getting Japan out of its problems of deflation and liq-
uidity trap. Due to the zero lower bound constraint for the nominal interest rate,
these proposals emphasize the need for monetary policy to manipulate private sec-
tor inflation expectations by committing to future inflationary policy, including a
commitment to keep short-term interest rates very low (nearly zero) for a substan-
tial time in the future.1, 2
At the same time, however, there has been a recent surge of interest, perhaps
ironically, on bounded (limited) rationality and learning in macroeconomics and
its implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The notion of bounded ra-
tionality is used to describe behavior when decision makers face a new economic
environment in which previous experience is not that helpful. In essence, it is
weaker than the assumption of full-information, rational expectations, which was
the hallmark of macroeconomics in the 1970s, and more so in the 1980s. This
strand of literature maintains that decision makers are far from knowing the true
mechanics of economic activity, and contrary to rational expectations, postulates
the absence of a commonly understood economic environment. Sargent (1993) says
that the goal of macroeconomics based on bounded rationality is to ”create the-
ories of transitional dynamics, partly to understand the properties of equilibrium
dynamics themselves, and partly to create new dynamics of systems that do not
settle down.”3 Specific questions raised in this respect are related to the design
1See for e.g. Svensson (2003a).
2The emphasis on forward-looking expectations is also observed in other relevant issues of mon-
etary policy design, for example, in discussions of the stability properties of simple policy rules
that respond to forward-looking private sector expectations (see for e.g. Evans and Honkapohja,
2002). Some economists also suggest that the smooth behavior of the short-term interest rate
observed in practice is linked to the ability of central banks to exploit the forward-looking be-
havior of markets as a way to affect the long-term interest rates relevant for investment decisions
(Goodfriend, 1998).
3Clarida et al. (1999) conclude their survey on new developments in monetary policy by
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of simple monetary policy rules when the private sector is (adaptively) learning
about the economy or about monetary policy rules (e.g. Bullard and Mitra, 2002;
Evans and Honkapohja, 2002; Honkapohja and Mitra, 2002). On the other hand,
central banks lack complete knowledge of the economic model, including private
sector expectations, and have to learn about them based on past policy outcomes.4
Against this background, the thesis is organized around two themes that, broadly
speaking, emphasize monetary policy making under uncertainty. The first part
(chapters 2, 3 and 4) has an institutional nature: it looks at the role of trans-
parency and communication in monetary policy when central banks have private
information about the state of the economy and its future developments. The
second part of the book (chapters 5 and 6) deals with a technical issue, namely,
optimal policy when central banks take account of the degree of uncertainty in
the transmission mechanism. To be specific, monetary authorities face uncertainty
from lack of perfect knowledge of currently prevailing private sector expectations.
It is commonly understood that expectations depend on the performance of the
economy, say the rate of inflation, and with asymmetric information the policy-
maker’s problem translates in to one with parameter uncertainty. The question is
then how monetary policy reacts optimally to this sort of uncertainty.
The fact that one should recognize that monetary policy is conducted under un-
certainty is not new. Dating back to the 1950s and 1960s, monetary economists
were aware that any economy at some point or another can suffer from some events
(shocks) beyond the control of the central bank. Milton Friedman had emphasized
the ”long and variable” lags in monetary policy transmission that create difficulties
for achieving policy objectives. Moreover, already in the 1950s, Herbert Simon and
Henri Theil developed the principle of certainty equivalence that had been central
to the study of economic decision making under (additive) uncertainty and later
extended by Brainard (1967) to include parameter uncertainty and its impact on
optimal policy.
What is new in the recent revival of the role of uncertainty is the explicit consider-
ation of infinite horizon problems with dynamic models, including game-theoretic
aspects, which affect the optimal policy choice, and that central banks can take
actions now that improves their learning opportunity in the future. Undeniably,
these issues make the policy setting more realistic but at the same time the algebra
of the optimization problem are usually more demanding and in some cases a resort
to numerical approximation is unavoidable.
pointing out the significance of further work on adaptive learning and transition dynamics.
4Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) among others discuss in detail the role
of adaptive learning in macroeconomics. In their book, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) treat the
learning approach more systematically and present a number of applications.
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1.2 Overview of the Chapters
Throughout the book, asymmetric information and forward-looking expectations
play central roles in the determination of macroeconomic outcomes– inflation and
aggregate output (or employment). The papers on transparency are based on the
microfounded New Keynesian framework, which has become a popular work-horse
model for monetary policy analysis.5 In this framework private sector expectations
of future inflation are crucial in determining current period inflation and aggre-
gate output. On the one hand, price setting firms are forward-looking because
of imperfect price adjustments. On the other hand, intertemporal consumption
(and saving) decisions of households imply that expectations of future output are
important for current period aggregate demand. The New Keynesian framework
is thus ideal for addressing questions of transparency because forward-looking be-
havior induces monetary policy to care about the effect of future shocks on current
inflation and aggregate output via the expectations channel.
Overview of the Chapters
Model Chapters on Chapters on
Features Transparency Learning and Control















Passive learning - - -
√ √
Active learning - - - -
√












The chapters that deal with learning and control also have models featuring private
sector expectations as part of the transmission mechanism. They are extensions
of the popular backward-looking macro model of Svensson (1997). The extension
uses the term structure of interest rates, an arbitrage relationship between short-
term and long-term interest rates, part of which are forward-looking expectations
of the long-term interest rate. The model then becomes more elaborate with long-
term rates determining aggregate demand and ultimately inflation. Interestingly,
the term structure cum backward-looking has forward-looking properties similar
to the New Keynesian model. In particular, in both models, private agents are
5Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000) discuss in detail the New Keynesian paradigm.
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forward-looking so that future monetary policy decisions are crucial for determin-
ing current period policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
1.2.1 Central Bank Forecasts and Communication (ch. 2,
3 and 4)
In recent times an increasing number of central banks have taken steps towards
a more transparent monetary policy. The list includes inflation targeting cen-
tral banks of the UK, Canada, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
Among other things, inflation targeting central banks frequently publish what is
commonly known as Inflation Reports, one of the official documents used as inputs
in policy making and intended to communicate policy objectives and decisions to
the public.
There are obvious benefits to the public from truthfully disclosing internal central
bank forecasts. Blinder (1998) argues that openness and communication with the
public improve the effectiveness of monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilizer
because ”central banks generally control only the overnight interest rate, an interest
rate that is relevant to virtually no economically interesting transactions.” Mishkin
(2004) also points out that, not only can transparency help household and business
decision makers get a more accurate picture of future developments of the economy,
but disclosure of internal forecasts can also help the public understand central
bank actions. In other words, immediate release would increase the transparency
of central bank policy by showing more of what lies behind its decisions. This
could in turn have the advantage of reducing the volatility of financial markets
that is associated with speculation about policy motives, as indicated by (Romer
and Romer, 2000). One would then expect markets to incorporate the disclosed
forecasts in their expectations if they know that these forecasts are more accurate
than commercial forecasts. However, despite these benefits, Romer and Romer
(2000) cite possible complications in implementing the immediate disclosure of
forecasts, saying that immediate disclosure could change the information content
of the forecasts since they would attract a lot of attention from the public.
Sparked by the observed trend towards more disclosure of central bank forecasts,
a number of recent papers have examined whether there is a theoretical case for
transparency. The literature has explored the effects of disclosure in the context
of private information about shocks to current inflation and output but results
are inconclusive. It turns out that what drive the results are (1) the presence
(or lack thereof) of credibility problems and (2) the presence (or lack thereof) of
forward-looking expectations. Abstracting from credibility issues and using models
with static expectations, Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2003) find disclosure
to be harmful, while by introducing reputation concerns within the same class of
models, Geraats (2001) finds disclosure to be beneficial. On the other hand, Jensen
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(2000) uses a forward-looking model and gets inconclusive results when central bank
credibility plays a role.
The chapters on transparency follow these theoretical discussions. Chapter 2 and
chapter 3 deal with the issue of forecast disclosure in the presence of private in-
formation about future shocks, as opposed to current period shocks, noting that
information about future shocks are relevant in a world of forward-looking price
setting firms. Following Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2003), the analysis in
chapter 2 abstracts from credibility issues. In this case, the main result is that with
full credibility and common knowledge of central bank targets, advance disclosure
of future shocks makes the central bank worse off. As such a credible central bank
with private information has the incentive to delay disclosure until after private
sector expectations are formed.
Chapter 3 modifies the analysis of chapter 2 in the spirit of Faust and Svensson
(2001) and Jensen (2000). First, the model includes unobserved shifts in the central
bank’s output target. This introduces an inflation bias as the output target can
differ from the natural rate. In addition, the timing of events is such that the central
bank chooses its policy before private sector inflation expectations are set. In
principle, this changes the nature and outcomes of the game since the private sector
can infer the output target from observed central bank actions. These modifications
turns out to have important consequences since the relevance of disclosing forecasts
of future shocks is not clear cut and depends on specific assumptions about the
unobserved output target. Specifically, the central bank is better off by withholding
its private information about future shocks if the random shift in the output target
is directly revealed at the time the future shocks are realized. Otherwise, if the
output target has to be indirectly inferred from observed policy decisions of the
central bank, then disclosure policy is harmless.
A common result of chapter 2 and chapter 3 is that unlike current period shocks,
there is no inherent desire to offset the forecasts of future shocks because these
shocks do not have a direct impact on current inflation. This implies that even if
current actions of the central bank are observed, say in terms of the current interest
rate choice, the public can not infer the central bank’s forecasts.
Chapter 4 deviates from the previous two chapters by emphasizing mutual un-
certainty between the central bank and the private sector. To motivate mutual
uncertainty is not that difficult since in practice central banks spend considerable
resources in order to understand prevailing market sentiments and how expecta-
tions react to policy and random shocks. This is attested by the collection and
dissemination of information by central banks about market sentiments based on
different sources, including surveys of commercial forecasters and data from fu-
tures markets. However, the transparency literature generally ignores uncertainty
on the part of the central bank since the presumption is that the central bank
observes private sector expectations and decisions while the private sector is at a
disadvantage as a result of not knowing the central bank’s preferences and lacking
information about the state of shocks. This over simplification is pervasive despite
6
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concerns that central bank forecasts of market expectations may have substantial
errors (Tarkka and Mayes, 1999; Evans and Honkapohja, 2002).
As such, a more plausible assumption would be that a central bank depends to
a large extent on its internal staff forecasts (Honkapohja and Mitra, 2002).6 At
the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the private sector can not perfectly
observe the forecasts of the central bank unless the central bank publishes them. If
it wishes the central bank can disclose its forecasting procedures and thereby make
it easier for the public to infer the judgment errors implied by the forecasting rule.
Chapter 4 aims to shed light on the implications of this symmetric uncertainty and
communication by the central bank for stabilization policy. The main result in this
respect is that communication of assessment errors improves output stabilization
at the expense of instability in inflation, thus leading to a variability tradeoff.
This tradeoff also has normative implications for policy: a central bank that is
sufficiently conservative (in the sense of Rogoff, 1985) improves society’s welfare by
communicating its assessments. Chapter 4 also gives results for a more general loss
function that includes interest rate stabilization and discusses the tradeoff between
communication and conservativeness.
1.2.2 Learning, Control and Inflation-Forecast Targeting
(ch. 5 and 6)
Chapter 5 and chapter 6 analyze imperfect information and learning about the
term structure of interest rates which is embedded in an inflation forecast target-
ing framework popularized by Svensson (1997).7 Limited information concerning
private sector expectations of the long-term interest rates translates the central
bank’s problem into one with parameter uncertainty, specifically uncertainty about
the degree of persistence in output and inflation. The main question we address
is the performance of alternative monetary policy rules when the central bank is
faced with the difficult task of simultaneously controlling inflation and estimating
(learning) the impact of policy actions.
Introducing imperfect information makes our model similar to some recent studies
that deal with the issue of optimal response to an uncertain but possibly learnable
economic system. The opportunities for learning about unknown parameters de-
pend on the use of monetary policy instruments to generate data that can speed
6Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) argue that due to potentially large errors in observing market
expectations, an interest rate rule that responds to surveys of market expectations can lead to
large welfare losses.
7Svensson remarks that in a more elaborate model, a term structure can be incorporated
leading to a richer version of the transmission mechanism. Doing so makes the model more
realistic as monetary policy is conventionally viewed as running from short-term interest rates
managed by central banks to longer term rates that influence aggregate demand (Goodfriend,




up learning and eventually improve control of the system.8 Three policy options
can be differentiated: the familiar certainty equivalence, myopic policy and dynam-
ically optimal policy. The first two separate the estimation and control part of an
intertemporal problem. Both are categorized under passive learning in the sense of
disregarding the dynamic link between current decisions and future beliefs about
the unknown parameters. The third policy option combines estimation and control
and thus represents an active learning policy.
The models of chapter 5 and chapter 6 differ from most of the literature in two
respects.9 First, the structural equations in our model are dynamic even if there
was no learning by the central bank. This is due to some inertia in the structural
model used in inflation forecast targeting, where future economic conditions depend
in part on the current conditions. Second, while the literature typically studies
uncertainty about a policy multiplier, the nature of information symmetry in our
term structure equation implies it is the persistence parameter in the linear process
that is unknown to the central bank.
The literature on learning and control typically constructs the problem around a
simple reduced form model where the explanatory variable is the policy instrument
(i.e., control variable) whose coefficient has to be estimated at the same time that
decisions have to be made about the appropriate level of the instrument variable
(say interest rate) that minimize the expected current and future losses from the
variability of the dependent variable (say inflation) around a desired target level.
In the presence of policy multiplier uncertainty, a number of papers show that
policy under active learning is associated with a more aggressive policy response
to new information (higher variability of the policy instrument) compared to the
myopic one (e.g Bertocchi and Spagat, 1993; Balvers and Casimano, 1994; Wieland,
1998). The intuition is that, even if there are costs in terms of short-term volatility
in the target variable, by actively generating information that improves estimation,
policy can recoup the short-run losses by a better control of the economy in the
medium to long run. However, this result has been challenged by Ellison and Valla
(2001) who call for a less aggressive response by appealing to strategic interactions
between the central bank and the private sector, in which case a higher volatility
in the policy instrument can lead to volatile inflation expectations, which in turn
hinder central bank control of inflation and output.
Chapter 5 introduces the nature of information asymmetry and solves the passive
learning problem of a strict inflation targeting central bank. Under strict infla-
tion targeting, monetary policy completely stabilizes predictable fluctuations in
inflation, while observable fluctuations are only due to the initial impact of unpre-
dictable shocks and forecast errors. Moreover, the dynamically optimal monetary
policy under learning does not deviate from the certainty equivalent and myopic
8Such an analysis follows the computationally-oriented dual control literature first popularized
in control engineering.
9Exceptions are Wieland (1998) and Beck and Wieland (2002). See below.
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policies. Thus optimal policy separates estimation and control.
Chapter 6 extends the analysis of chapter 5 to a general case where on the one hand
monetary policy faces a tradeoff in stabilizing inflation as well as the rate of interest,
the policy instrument, and on the other, the central bank internalizes the effects
of current policy choices on its learning possibilities about an unknown degree of
persistence in the economy. When variability in the rate of interest enters the
loss function, optimal policy deviates from the passive learning rules. This shows
that the need for policy to generate higher relative variability in wt+1 (measured by
coefficient of variation) depends on the state wt. When the next period’s state wt+1
deviates a lot from the target due to an unpredictable shock, and thus generates
data on its own, optimal policy takes this in to account and thus does not need
to actively generate data wt+1, while it does so when the economy is hit by a
very small shock. On the other hand, the myopic rule only takes account of the
additional source of uncertainty in the persistence parameter, the effect of which
is compounded by the magnitude of the state variable wt. It does not internalize
the future benefits in terms of parameter precision because of large deviations of w
from the target. Thus it responds linearly and more aggressively than the certainty
equivalence rule.
This feature of the myopic rule differs from what one might find when the source
of parameter uncertainty lies with the policy multiplier. In that case, policy under
the myopic rule tends to be less aggressive than certainty equivalence. Uncertainty
about the policy multiplier forces the central bank to be cautious about using its
policy instrument freely to stabilize inflation. In our case, the analogous expla-
nation is that, with uncertainty in the persistence parameter, the central bank
would like to see less variability in the next period’s state variable. Under the
myopic rule, this can be achieved only if the policy rate responds aggressively to
new information about the state of shocks.
The incentive to deviate from the certainty equivalence policy diminishes for a
central bank that gives more attention to inflation stabilization. In that case, the
instrument rate can be set optimally to stabilize inflation without much concern
about current and future volatilities in the rate of interest. In the limit of strict
inflation targeting optimal policy is not affected by uncertainty in the persistence
parameter. Thus there is more tendency to probe for a relatively large discount









Central Bank Forecasts and
Disclosure Policy
In a simple macro model with forward-looking inflation expectations, this chapter
looks into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future
cost-push shocks that potentially disrupt future inflation. It uses a benchmark case
where the preferences of the central bank are common knowledge. The basic result
is that, as long as the central bank cares about output stabilization, advance dis-
closure of forecasts of future shocks is harmful to welfare. The intuition behind this
negative result is that the public understands that cost-push shocks are not fully
stabilized by the central bank because of concerns for output. Thus future inflation
is expected to be affected by future shocks. Any advance disclosure of information
can destabilize forward-looking inflation expectations and in turn current inflation
via the Phillips curve.
2.1 Introduction1
In practice, central banks and the private sector spend a lot of resources in their
forecasting activities and in assessing the views and forecasts of each other. For
some reasons though, central bank forecasts outperform those of the private sector,
an indication perhaps of the central bank’s superior information about the future
state of the economy, including the state of shocks affecting economic activity. In
their empirical analysis on differences between commercial and Federal Reserve
(Fed for short) forecasts, Romer and Romer (2000) conclude that ”the most im-
portant finding ... is that the Federal Reserve appears to possess information about
the future state of the economy that is not known to market participants.” (p.455),
1An earlier version of chapter 2 and chapter 3 has already been published as a CEPR Discussion
Paper (co-authored by Sylvester Eijffinger).
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(emphasis ours).2
While surveys of private sector (commercial) forecasts, such as the Fed’s ”Beige
Book” and the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, are frequently released,
some central banks are reluctant to disclose without delay their own internal fore-
casts.3 Recently, some theoretical research has been done on the welfare effects of
disclosing in advance central bank information about the state of the economy.4
The literature has explored this issue in the context of private information about
shocks to current inflation and output, with mixed results.
This chapter also considers disclosure policy regarding central bank forecasts of
shocks. But it deviates from the literature by introducing forecasts of future shocks.
Information on future shocks is important when expectations are forward-looking.
The model used to analyze future shocks is based on the New Keynesian view
of the macroeconomy Clarida et al. (see for e.g. 1999); King (see for e.g. 2000);
McCallum and Nelson (see for e.g. 2000), where forward-looking inflation expecta-
tions influence current period outcomes of inflation. In this case, given the central
bank’s policy, high variability in inflation expectations (which are conditional on
forecasts of future shocks) also implies high variability in current inflation. This
makes disclosure policy regarding forecasts of future shocks an interesting issue to
study.
Following Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2003), the analysis in this chapter
abstracts from credibility issues, which are dealt with in chapter 3. The main
result is that when the central bank does not suffer from a credibility problem or
it’s targets are common knowledge, advance disclosure of future shocks makes the
central bank worse off. As such the central bank may have the incentive to delay
disclosure until after private sector expectations are formed.5 In turn this may
improve stabilization of current inflation and output. This negative result accords
with that of Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2003), which are based on static
inflation expectations and decisions are made in a one-shot game.6
2In the case of the Federal Reserve, Romer and Romer (2000) discuss some of the reasons
for higher quality forecasts, including inside information about future monetary policy, access to
official and unofficial data, and enormous devotion of resources.
3In this case, for instance, the Beige Book, which summarizes information gathered by each
Federal Reserve Bank through reports from Bank and Branch directors and interviews with key
business contacts, market experts and other sources, is published immediately. However, the
Fed does not disclose immediately its staff forecasts of the U.S. economy, reported in the ”Green
Book”. The Green Book is made public only with a lag of five years.
4In the terminology of Geraats (2001), the release of internal forecasts is part of what she calls
economic transparency. She discusses several aspects of transparency including political (formal
goals, numerical targets), economic (data, models, forecasts), operational (control errors, trans-
mission shocks), procedural (minutes of meeting, voting), and policy (statements, inclination).
See also de Haan et al. (2005).
5For this result to hold, it must be common knowledge that the central bank has better quality
signals about future shocks.
6This negative result holds for alternative monetary transmission mechanisms, one of which
is a Lucas-type aggregate supply relationship where short run output movements are due to the
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The analysis also shows that immediate disclosure of these shocks can have im-
plications different from forecasts of current shocks. In contrast to forecasts of
current period shocks, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public
by current policy choices because the central bank refrains from responding to its
own forecasts. The central bank may withhold its information about future shocks
and imitate the less informed public without the fear of revealing that information
by its current actions.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model environment
for the New Keynesian transmission mechanism, where inflation and output are
determined by forward-looking inflation expectations. In section 2.3 we analyze
optimal monetary policy under discretion, with and without disclosure of infor-
mation. Moreover, the effects of secrecy on the behavior of the nominal rate of
interest is discussed. In this benchmark case, we show that transparency about
future shocks makes the central bank worse off as long as monetary policy aims
at other goals besides price stability. In this case adverse supply shocks affect
all goal variables, and knowing this, expected movements in future supply shocks
make private sector inflation expectations to be more volatile. This effect transmits
to current prices through expectations of future inflation. It may thus be better
from the perspective of the central bank to wait until the information about future
supply shocks does not have any value to the private sector. This ensures that
public expectations of future shocks are less volatile than when a more accurate
information about future shocks is available.7
The benchmark case is then modified in some ways. First, instead of discretionary
policy, the central bank is assumed to commit credibly to some state contingent
rule (Section 2.4). However, this modification does not change the negative result
found under the benchmark case. This is then followed by a discussion of policy
implementation in terms of targeting rules versus instrument rules. Moreover we
raise the practical issue of observability of private sector expectations. In section
2.6, the question of forecast disclosure is analyzed within an alternative transmis-
sion mechanism based on Svensson (1997). Concluding remarks are given in section
2.7.8
central bank’s ability to create surprise inflation. The other variant is the backward-looking
macro model (Svensson, 1997) with its main feature of time lags from the policy instrument (the
rate of interest) to policy goals (output and inflation). Actually, in the backward-looking model,
transparency is bad for welfare only when the central bank cares about interest rate stabilization,
on top of inflation and employment. Otherwise transparency does not matter if only inflation
and employment are the goals of monetary policy.
7In this sense, this paper agrees with the remark by Mishkin (2004) that even if openness is
a virtue, for example when central banks are transparent about their long-term inflation goals,
some types of transparency may not further social objectives.
8In the next chapter, the significance of uncertainty about central bank output target is ex-
plored in a multi-period New Keynesian framework with signaling, closely following the work of
Jensen (2000).
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2.2 Forward-looking Inflation Expectations
As we indicated in the introduction, the New Keynesian view of the macroeconomy
gives a prominent role to private sector expectations of future inflation and output
in the determination of current inflation and output. A detailed description of
the workhorse model can be found, for example, in Clarida et al. (1999) and King
(2000).




t πt+1 + λxt + ut (2.1)
where π is the inflation rate, x is the output gap, and u is a zero-mean stochastic
shock to inflation. The shocks are assumed to come from a white noise process,
a specification that is common in the transparency literature.9 The parameters
β and λ satisfy 0 < β < 1 and λ > 0 . Ept πt+1 stands for private sector expec-
tations of next period’s inflation conditional on available information at time t.
Thus inflation depends on forward-looking private sector expectations, the output
gap and inflation shock. When prices are sticky, meaning that not all firms can
reset their prices in every period, expectations about future prices (and therefore
inflation) play an important role in determining the current level of inflation. It is
the link between current inflation and expectations of future inflation that differen-
tiates the New Keynesian Phillips curve from the Lucas-type Phillips curve where
non-neutrality of monetary policy comes from unexpected (surprise) inflation.
Likewise the dynamics of output demand is governed by a simplified version of the
so called intertemporal IS equation:
xt = −φ(it − Ept πt+1) + vt (2.2)
where i is the nominal interest rate and v is an i.i.d shock to aggregate demand.
The parameter φ satisfies φ > 0.
The central bank chooses a sequence of current and future short-term nominal
interest rates to minimize the expected value of current and future losses arising





9The recent literature on discretion and commitment in a New Keynesian framework sometimes
assumes an i.i.d specification (for instance Woodford, 1999).
10The intertemporal objective function (2.3) is commonly used in monetary policy analyses.
Woodford (1999) has shown that (2.3) represents a second-order approximation to the negative
of the utility of a representative agent.
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with α denoting the weight the central bank places on output stabilization goal
relative to inflation stabilization. For simplicity the target rate of inflation is nor-
malized to zero. Moreover since the central bank targets the equilibrium level of
output, we also normalize the output gap target to zero.
For β → 1, one can scale the loss function (2.3) by (1 − β), which can then be
approximated by the unconditional expected value of period t loss (2.4) (see for




βtLt ≈ E(Lt) = σ2π + ασ2x (2.5)
where σ2π and σ
2
x are, respectively, the unconditional variances of inflation and the
output gap. We will use (2.5) to evaluate the welfare losses arising from the regimes
of transparency and non-transparency.
In the model of this section the central bank is assumed to have a more accurate
forecast of the cost-push shock ut+1 so that the it can can track the shock’s devel-
opment better than the private sector. For simplicity, the central bank has perfect
information about the shocks while the private sector receives a noisy signal, st,
of the shock. Endowing the central bank with full knowledge of the shock is only
meant for convenience, and is innocuous to our qualitative result. All we need is
for the central bank to do better than the private sector in tracking the movement
of future shocks.
Except for information asymmetry regarding ut+1, there is common knowledge of
the central bank’s loss function, including the targets for inflation and output and
the preference parameter α. For the moment we abstract from inflation bias con-
siderations, as the central bank targets equilibrium output, which is not unrealistic
given the widely accepted assertions about the prestige of major central banks.11
2.3 Disclosure Policy under Discretion
Since the transparency regime is first announced, private sector expectations will
be conditional on the announced regime. If ut+1 is communicated, this will be
11For some forceful arguments against the literature on inflationary bias, see McCallum (1995)
and Blinder (1998). In the case of the Fed, Bernanke (2003) and Romer and Romer (2000) discuss
the reputation that the Fed has gained over the past two decades. Credibility issues are discussed
in chapter 3.
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incorporated in the formation of expectations. Otherwise, expectations are formed
with knowledge of only the signal st:
st = ut+1 + εt (2.6)
where εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) is noise that contaminates the signal, and is independent





ε ). It is important, for future reference, to realize the fact that the
variance of kst, given by k








Thus, the variance of private sector expectations of the shock based on the signal
is less than what it would be if there was full information about the shock. This
is the essence in which the central bank might have an incentive not to reveal its
information about the true value of the shock.
We proceed by deriving the equilibrium outcomes under each regime and then
compare the resulting losses from each regime. Thus, we can think of the central
bank first deciding on revealing its private information, and then the game is played
where private sector expectations are formed and the central bank chooses policy
taking private sector expectations as given (see Cukierman (2001) for a similar
setup with Lucas-type transmission mechanism):
The timing in period t is:
• ut realizes and is commonly known
• The central bank decides to reveal ut+1 or not.
• Ept πt+1 is formed conditional on the disclosure policy of the central bank.
• The central bank chooses the pair {xt, πt}.
Under discretionary policy, the central bank minimizes (2.3) period-by-period given
private sector expectations, thus the term Ept πt+1 in the Phillips equation (2.1) is
taken as a fixed parameter.12 Since the central bank takes private sector expec-





12Thus the timing of events is such that the central bank chooses its interest rate policy for the
current period after observing private sector inflation expectations, and current and next period
shocks; see for e.g. Cukierman (2001).
13For convenience the problem is solved in two steps. Once the optimal paths for inflation and
output are known in the first step, the optimal instrument path for the nominal rate can be found
from the IS equation (2.2).
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According to (2.8), in each period, the central bank contracts (expands) current
output in response to a higher (lower) rate of current inflation. In essence, the
central bank is reacting to any variable that directly or indirectly affects current
inflation. For example if for some reasons inflation expectations increase, given
the level of output, current inflation goes up. The optimality rule ensures that
this situation does not materialize because the central bank is willing and able
to reduce current output to ease the burden of the shock on the current rate of
inflation. The above optimality condition is related to what Lars Svensson calls
a ”targeting rule”, a rule expressed in terms of the goal variables (inflation and
output), and derived from a well-defined objective function. It differs from an
”instrument rule” that describes a reaction function for the nominal rate of interest
(the instrument of monetary policy).14 The next step is to determine private sector
inflation expectations. Since the private sector correctly anticipates the targeting








This equation shows clearly that the evolution of actual inflation depends on cur-
rently held private sector expectations about future inflation and on the current
realization of the exogenous shock ut. In this setting, private sector expectations of
πt+1 are ultimately determined by their forecasts of ut+1. Thus the role of forecasts
of the shocks is clear, and any information that improves the private sector’s fore-
cast accuracy with respect to these shocks is valuable. The mechanism by which
any private information about forecasts of future shocks affect current inflation
outcomes can be shown easily for the simple case where the shocks are white noise
with mean zero and finite standard deviation.
Disclosing ut+1 → Ept πt+1 = f(ut+1) → πt = g(ut+1)
Withholding ut+1 → Ept πt+1 = f(st) → πt = g(st)
With this idea in mind, we can now solve the model for Ept πt+1 and derive the
rational expectations equilibrium. We first derive equilibrium inflation and output
under a non-transparent regime where knowlede of ut+1 is withheld by the central
bank.
2.3.1 Equilibrium under a Non-transparent Regime
Under a non-transparent regime, the relevant state variables are ut and st. Using
the commonly used method of undetermined coefficients,15 we start from equation
14See for e.g. Svensson (2003b).
15McCallum (1983) emphasizes on solving the model using only the fundamentals of the econ-
omy (in this case ut and st), avoiding bubble solutions. McCallum calls this the Minimal State
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(2.9) and guess that
πt = θ1ut + θ2st = θ1ut + θ2(ut+1 + εt) (2.10)
where the coefficient are yet to be determined. Without full disclosure of ut+1, the
private sector resorts to its signal in forming expectations of ut+1. Thus inflation
expectations are given by:
Ept πt+1 = θ1E
p
t ut+1 = θ1kst (2.11)





















We can now compare the resulting inflation expectations of the two parties:
Ect πt+1 = θ
∗
1ut+1 (2.14)





It is easy to see, taking account of equation (2.7), that private sector inflation
expectations have less variability compared to that of the central bank.
2.3.2 Equilibrium under a Transparent Regime
Next consider the case of transparency about ut+1, which means that both parties
have identical information set. We note that under full disclosure, the relevant
state variables are ut and ut+1. The conjecture takes the form:
πt = θ1ut + θ2ut+1 (2.15)
Variables (MSV) method.
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where again the coefficients are determined later. With full disclosure of ut+1,
rational expectations imply
Ept πt+1 = θ1E
p
t ut+1 = θ1ut+1 (2.16)
It is easy to show that the equilibrium levels of inflation and output have the same
form as their counterparts under a non-transparent regime, except that now ut+1















We can easily see that current inflation and output levels are affected not only by
current period shocks, but also by future shocks that are released to the public.
Thus releasing information regarding ut+1 makes current inflation and output more
volatile. Formally, the welfare effects of disclosure policy is evaluated by substitut-
ing the equilibrium levels of inflation and output into the loss function and taking
the expected value of the function. 16
It is straightforward to show that the above negative result also holds when the cen-
tral bank’s loss function includes additional goals, such as concerns for instability
in interest rates (see Cukierman (2001), Goodhart (1998) and Woodford (1999a),
among others, for discussions of interest rate stabilization).
Summarizing, the solutions for inflation and output depend on the degree of trans-
parency about ut+1. The main culprit for the increased volatility under trans-
parency is the variation in private sector inflation expectations. The central bank
would like the private sector to expect that prices will be stable while the cen-
tral bank knows about upcoming non zero cost-push shocks to prices. The central
bank knows the current error in private sector forecasts but is not willing to disclose
any information before period t + 1 arrives or, equivalently, before private sector
expectations are set and policy actions taken.
2.3.3 Equilibrium Interest Rate
As it was indicated in the introduction, the transparency literature focuses on
disclosure of current shocks. An implication of this is that current policy choices
may partly reveal to the public the central bank’s private information. In the New
Keynesian framework with private information on future shocks, current period
action does not give a signal of the central bank’s private information for two
16In equilibrium, private sector and central bank inflation expectations are Ept πt+1 = Ect πt+1 =
θ∗1ut+1, which differs from the case of secrecy as far as private sector expectations are concerned.
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reasons. First, as the Phillips and IS equations show, optimal policy reacts to
private sector expectations of inflation and output, which under secrecy do not
depend on the central bank’s information about ut+1. Second, unlike ut, which
directly affects current inflation irrespective of private sector expectations, the
central bank does not need to react to ut+1. As can be seen from the case of
secrecy (see (2.12) and (2.13)), the information advantage of the central bank with
respect to ut+1 is not revealed even ex post. Intuitively, under no disclosure policy,
the private sector does not know the realization of ut+1, although it knows that
the central bank has that information. The best it can do is therefore to set
expectations based on its signals.
To see the implications for the nominal interest rate of not releasing the forecasts
of ut+1, use the equilibrium solution for output and private sector expectations in
the IS equation and solve for the interest rate rule that implements optimal policy.








Thus, in equilibrium, the rate of interest ultimately depends on current shocks and
private sector signals of next period shocks. Even if the central bank announces its
interest rate target for period t, there is no way that the central bank can reveal
its private information by its current actions. This is true even if the private sector
knows as much as the central bank about the latter’s loss function, including the
targets for inflation and output and the relative weight on output stabilization.
In this respect, Svensson (2003b) argues that the best way to make the central
bank’s forecasts observable to the public is by revealing the central bank’s model,
information, assumptions and judgments. In previous studies on transparency
of current shocks, knowledge of the loss function enables the private sector to
infer ex post the central bank’s private information. In our case, revelation of
its loss function may not help the public at all to infer the central bank’s private
information about future shocks.
2.4 Disclosure Policy under Limited Commitment
The classic theory of time-inconsistency in monetary policy rationalizes the high
inflation period of the 1970s by the discretionary behavior of central banks. The
term ”inflation bias” was coined to underscore the implication of the theory that
absent rules based monetary policy, equilibrium inflation turns out to be above the
17Observe that the demand shock does not give rise to a tradeoff in stabilizing inflation and
output since the implied adjustment in interest rates to changes in demand shock moves out-
put and inflation in the same direction. That is why in equilibrium, output and inflation are
independent of the demand shock.
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socially optimal level. The reason lies in the temptation of monetary authorities
(due to unrealistic output or employment target) to renege on their plans once pri-
vate sector expectations are set. With forward-looking expectations emphasized by
the New Keynesian view of the macroeconomy, we may have not only an inflation
bias, but also a ”stabilization bias” as a result of discretionary policy. Even with-
out the inflation bias problem, monetary authorities would like the private sector
to believe that policy will be strongly anti-inflationary in the sense of stabilizing
inflation but once private sector inflation expectations are manipulated this way,
the authorities will have an incentive (if they are free to do so) not to stabilize
inflation strongly, contrary to their plans. Knowing this fact, the private sector
will set inflation expectations such that the discretionary equilibrium is the only
result.
If the central bank can not credibly commit to keep inflation variability low in the
future, thereby loses power to anchor inflation expectations, then policy ends up
being discretionary, optimizing period by period, given expectations. The crucial
observation we made in the case of discretionary policy is that the central bank
would like to see that fluctuations in private sector inflation expectations are min-
imized. In this situation the central bank will do anything that makes inflation
expectations less variable. If it has private information about future developments
of the economy, it will refrain from disclosing those information to the public, as
we have shown in the case of cost-push shocks.
This section shows that the undesirable property of transparency about future
shocks is not unique to discretionary policy. Even if the central bank were to
follow a policy based on some rules, it would still favor secrecy. The reason lies
in the fact that transparency always impairs the central bank’s ability to stabilize
current inflation and output because private sector expectations add volatility to
current inflation irrespective of the policy regime.
2.4.1 Commitment for a Transparent Central Bank
A simple way to appreciate the gains from some form of commitment would be to
consider a transparent regime about the shock ut+1. The question is then, can the
central bank improve stabilization policy if it has the ability to commit to a given
policy rule? The answer is, yes. To make it specific, suppose the central bank
can commit credibly to a simple policy rule that takes the same form as (2.18).
Although this is a sort of limited commitment, as we have constrained the central
bank to follow a rule that has a particular form, it serves to show the benefits
from commitment. The idea is to see if a transparent central bank can improve
welfare by committing to a simple rule within the same class of rules derived under
discretion. Thus consider a commitment to the following rule
xt = −Aut −But+1 (2.19)
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where the weights A and B are to be chosen optimally by the central bank. Then
from (2.19) (and see Appendix) private sector expectations for output and inflation
follow
Ept xt+1 = −Aut+1 Ept πt+1 = (1− λA)ut+1
These expressions show clearly that the central bank’s choice of a particular value
for A will directly affect private sector inflation and output expectations, and via
the Phillips and IS equations, current inflation and output. Using the expression
for Ept πt+1 in the Phillips equation (2.1) the reduced form expression for inflation,
under commitment to the simple rule, will be
πt = (1− λA)ut + (β(1− λA)− λB)ut+1 (2.20)
Given the choices for the values of A and B, the dynamics of output and inflation
is governed by (2.19) and (2.20), respectively. We can now express the expected
loss as a function of the parameters A and B
ELt = ((1− λA)2 + αA2 + (β(1− λA)− λB)2 + αB2)σ2u (2.21)
The central bank minimizes (2.21) with respect to A and B with the optimal values
given by
A∗ =
λ[λ2 + α(1 + β2)]










αλ2β2 + (α + λ2)2
The first observation is that both of these coefficients differ from their counterparts
under discretion with transparency (see equation (2.18)), showing the central bank
could improve up on the discretionary equilibrium by following a simple state-
contingent rule that takes the same form as the discretionary solution but with
different weights placed on the current versus forecasted shocks. Moreover, as long
as α 6= 0, that is the central bank cares about output stabilization as well as
inflation stabilization, A∗ is larger than its corresponding coefficient while B∗ is
smaller than its corresponding coefficient. This means that under commitment to
the simple target rule (2.19) policy responds more aggressively to current shock
realizations ut but less aggressively to upcoming shock innovations ut+1. The in-
tuition for this result is that with partial commitment, a more aggressive policy
in terms of contracting aggregate demand in reaction to current shocks leads the
private sector to expect aggressive policy in the next period, thus lowering their
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inflation expectations. This in turn dampens the effect of future shocks on current
inflation. Thus the central bank can afford to be less aggressive with respect to
future shocks because the private sector does part of the job by adjusting its ex-





ut+1 H ≡ 1− αβ
2λ2
αβ2λ2 + (α + λ2)2
Since H satisfies 0 < H < 1, private sector inflation expectations respond less
strongly to future shocks than is the case under discretion. This outcome arises
from the central bank’s commitment to react more strongly to current shocks. If
this commitment is credible, the private sector expects a strong reaction to next
period shocks when the time arrives. This in turn lowers inflation expectations and
current inflation.
For equilibrium inflation we have
πt =
α
(α + λ2) + (α + λ2)−1αβ2λ2
ut +
α2β
(α + λ2)2 + αβ2λ2
ut+1 (2.22)
Note that, compared to discretion, a policy of limited commitment results in less
variability in the dynamics of inflation (compare (2.17) and (2.22)). This be-
havior contrasts with output, which is more volatile with respect to the current
shock but responds less strongly to next period’s shocks. Although this might
make one conclude that the net effect of limited commitment on central bank
loss function is not clear, it should be obvious that limited commitment improves
welfare. Why else would the central bank choose different coefficients under lim-
ited commitment although the simple rule (2.19) falls under the class of rules
derived from the discretionary solution? For the sake of completeness, however, we
compare the expected losses in both regimes. Let T stand for transparency and







α2(1 + β2) + αλ2
(α + λ2)2 + αβ2λ2
QTd ≡
α(α2β2 + (α + λ2)2)
(α + λ2)3







(α(1 + β2) + λ2)(α + λ2)3
> 1
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2.4.2 The Gains from Secrecy under Limited Commitment
What we have shown so far is that given its decision to release internal forecasts,
especially about ut+1, to the public, the central bank is able to improve macroeco-
nomic outcomes by credibly committing to a simple rule that reacts to those shocks.
But, can the central bank do even better by not releasing information about ut+1
and committing to a simpler rule? We can easily show that this is possible. For
instance, the central bank will gain by not releasing ut+1 and simply announcing
the following policy rule:
xt = −Aut (2.23)
To see this, take private sector expectations of next period output:
Ept xt+1 = −AEpt ut+1 = −Akst
Moreover, private sector inflation expectations are given by (see Appendix):
Ept πt+1 = (1− λA)Ept ut+1 = (1− λA)kst
Given private sector expectations of inflation and output and the simple rule (2.23)
followed by the central bank, inflation will take the form
πt = (1− λA)(βkst + ut)
Expressing the expected loss as a function of A
ELt = [(1 + β
2k)(1− λA)2 + αA2]σ2u (2.24)
and minimizing (2.24) with respect to A, it is easy to show that the optimal value
of A is λ/[(1 + β2k)−1α + λ2]. The central bank prefers this outcome to the case
with commitment and information disclosure of ut+1. Thus if the central bank
is ever to commit to a simple rule, it will choose not to include ut+1 and not be
transparent about its realization, showing that the gains from not releasing private
information about ut+1 is not particular to discretionary settings.
It is possible to generalize the commitment case by considering the unconstrained
commitment solution; that is the optimal policy rule under commitment is not
constrained to take the functional form of the rule under limited commitment. In
that case, it can be shown that the targeting rule is
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which looks similar to the discretionary case, except that now there is an additional
lagged term, xt−1, indicating history dependence (the notion of ’timeless perspec-
tive’ is discussed by Woodford (1999a)). The desirability of secrecy about ut+1
holds true also under unconstrained commitment.18
2.5 Implementation Issues
Hitherto, our analysis has been based on the presumption that the central bank can
target private sector expectations if these forecasts are observable at the time or
just before the central bank decides about the current target for the rate of interest.
Thus, even if it forms its own (internal) forecasts which are better at tracking the
path of future shocks to inflation, the central bank does not actually use them
for decision making. This result can be put into perspective by noting that there
is a debate about the usefulness of internal central bank forecasts versus private
sector forecasts (see for e.g. Hall and Mankiw, 1994; Evans and Honkapohja, 2002;
Svensson, 1997).
It is important to understand the central bank’s incentives and what it is aiming
at. There are two sources of fluctuations in inflation–the exogenous cost–push
shocks and private sector inflation expectations, which is influenced in part by
central bank policy. Given any policy path followed, the central bank would like to
see very small fluctuations in these variables. Of course, the cost-push shocks are
exogenous; nothing can be done to prevent their realization, although the central
bank may try to neutralize some of the effects of these shocks. With respect to
private sector expectations, the problem is more subtle.
2.5.1 Targeting Rules and Real Equilibrium Determinacy
The analysis in the previous sections was in terms of inflation and output and did
not involve the question of how optimal policy is implemented using the rate of
interest. From practical point of view, the question of policy implementation is
very crucial as it raises issues of determinacy of rational expectations equilibria for
inflation and output. In particular our interest lies in a situation where private
sector inflation expectations might potentially change for no fundamental reason
(what is usually referred to as sunspot driven changes in expectations) and how
monetary policy responds to this situation. Following Taylor (1993), there has been
a lot of discussion on the properties of simple interest rate rules that respond to
inflation and output. As summarized by Woodford (1999), to ensure determinacy,
the nominal rate must respond more than one-to-one to changes in inflation, a
property dubbed as the ” Taylor principle ” by Woodford. If the Taylor principle
18It is also interesting to see that when α = λ the above rule is identical to a rule that is derived
from a discretionary policy that targets the nominal income growth. For a thorough discussion
of nominal income targeting, see Hall and Mankiw (1994).
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is fulfilled, then any expectations driven increases (decreases) in inflation is followed
by a contractive (expansive) monetary policy, ensuring that such sunspot driven
expectations are not realized.
The problem of real indeterminacy arises from the possibility that the central bank
fails to respond strongly to variations in private sector expectations that are not
related to fundamentals of the economy (see Jensen (2002) for a detailed analysis).
Suppose we are in a steady state of zero inflation and output-gap and consider an
increase in private sector inflation expectations for no fundamental reason. This is
usually referred to as sun-spot driven expectations because by assumption nothing
has changed in the fundamental variables (for example new information about
future cost-push shocks) that justifies changes in expectations. What happens
next to the dynamics of inflation and output depends a lot on how the central
bank responds, which in turn is related to its reaction function for the rate of
interest. In our case, the central bank is optimizing period by period to ensure
that the targeting rule (2.8) is satisfied in every period. Since the private sector
knows the targeting rule, it expects the central bank to adjust the rate of interest
in every period such that the targeting rule holds. With this idea in mind, the
effects of sun-spot driven private sector inflation expectations, other things equal,
are felt first on current inflation and output, as we can read from the Phillips
and IS equations. But, according to the targeting rule, the central bank responds
optimally by contracting current output, where the magnitude of the contraction
depends partly on the central bank’s preference parameter α. To implement its
contractionary policy, the central bank pushes the nominal rate of interest up
immediately and with sufficient force. It turns out then that the hypothesized
changes in expectations are not fulfilled.
The relevance of this example has been emphasized in recent discussions of the
properties of simple monetary policy rules. It has been shown that interest rate
rules that respond only to fundamental variables, in our case cost-push and demand
shocks, suffer from real equilibrium indeterminacy as they fail to respond to sun-
spot driven expectations. In other words, fundamentals based rules assume that
expectations are formed based on available information about fundamental shocks,
and thus respond to expectations only indirectly (via these shocks). This occurs
because the private sector is assumed to follow the rational expectations equilibrium
that is derived based on the fundamental shocks only (the MSV method). Thus
these rules do not account for out-of-equilibrium changes in expectations. In our
case, the targeting rule is key in avoiding indeterminacy from sun-spot driven
expectations.
2.5.2 Observability of Private Sector Expectations
Another potential problem relates to the observability of private sector expecta-
tions. This issue has been part of the subject of recent discussions in the design of
monetary policy rules. For example, in their investigation of determinacy and sta-
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bility of macroeconomic systems under private sector learning, Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2002) strongly suggest for incorporating private sector forecasts of inflation
and output into Taylor-type interest rate rules. However, the authors wonder
about whether there are large errors in measuring these expectations. They say
that ”while private forecasts by different institutions are regularly published, it is
not self-evident that these published numbers accurately represent the expectations
of the private sector that are relevant for the key private economic decisions.”(p.3)
In our case, it is common knowledge that the central bank has a better forecast
than the private sector about future shocks. The central bank also observes the
current rate of inflation and output, thus it can set the interest rate such that the
targeting rule is satisfied in every period. Even though the central bank may not
observe private sector expectations, this is not needed as long as it can observe the
changes in the current levels of inflation and output. In deciding not to release its
forecasts, all the central bank needs to know is that it has a better forecast of the
shocks than the private sector. The question is then, which assumption is stronger,
observability of current private sector expectations or observability of current infla-
tion and output? The more severe problem for the central bank is unobservability
of current inflation and output, because in that case these variables would be more
variable owing to unobservable shocks to the central bank at the time it makes
decisions on optimal interest rates. The problem is of course exacerbated if private
sector expectations are also unobserved or there are large observation errors.
2.6 Forward-Looking Interest Rate Expectations
In this section, we analyze the question of releasing forecasts in a modified ver-
sion of what Cukierman (2001) called the Neo-Keynesian transmission mechanism,
referring to the backward-looking model of Svensson (1997). We add a term struc-
ture equation to that framework, thereby introducing forward-looking expectations
about the level of the long-term real interest rates, which affect aggregate demand
and with some lag the rate of inflation.19 Notwithstanding notational differences,
the Neo-Keynesian model that Cukierman (2001) analyzes is given by
πt+1 = λxt + ut+1 (2.25)
xt+1 = −βRt + vt (2.26)
where we have modified the demand equation by using the long-term real rate Rt
instead of the short-term real rate rt. Moreover, in the spirit of Svensson (1997),
there is a one-period lag from changes in interest rates to changes in aggregate
demand, and a two-period lag between policy actions and actual inflation. The long
19Using a slightly different setup, Eijffinger et al. (2004) explore the role of learning in optimal
monetary policy.
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and short-term interest rates are related by the expectations hypothesis of term
structure (see Eijffinger et al. (2004) for details of the term structure equation)
Rt = (1− k)rt + kEpt Rt+1 + εt (2.27)
Ept Rt+1 is private sector’s expectation of the long real rate in period t + 1 and εt
represents a term-premium.
The loss function depends on inflation and interest rate variability. Including out-
put in the loss function does not change the qualitative results, so we leave it out
in order to simplify the algebra. Moreover, what we intend to show is that under
full credibility, the non-optimality of disclosing future shocks goes through insofar






with α represents the degree of central bank concern about interest rate stabiliza-
tion relative to inflation stabilization.
Suppose as in Cukierman (2001) the central bank has perfect advance information
about the three relevant shocks, ut+2, vt+1 and εt, assumed to be white noise.
Moreover, in line with our issue of interest, assume also that ut+3 and vt+2 are
known only to the central bank.20 The first order condition for minimizing the loss
function subject to the model constraints is given by
Et{[−βλ(1− k)rt − βλkEpt Rt+1 − βλεt +
+λvt+1 + ut+2](−βλ(1− k)) + αrt} = 0 (2.29)
The reaction function for rt is then
rt = AE
p
t Rt+1 + Bεt + Cvt+1 + Dut+2 (2.30)
where
A = − β
2λ2k(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2 B = −
β2λ2(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2
C =
βλ2(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2 D =
βλ(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2
20For simplicity, we ignore knowledge of εt+1 by both parties. The analysis can easily be
extended to include this effect but it does not add new insights.
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With this reaction function and given private sector expectations, we can see that
actual inflation will be
πt+1 = A1E
p
t Rt+1 + B1εt + C1vt+1 + D1ut+2 (2.31)
where
A1 = − β
2λ2k(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2 B1 = −
β2λ2(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2
C1 =
βλ2(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2 D1 =
βλ(1− k)
α + β2λ2(1− k)2
Importantly the short rate responds to private sector expectations of the long-real
rate. One can observe that instability in private sector expectations induces short
rate volatility and the central bank does not fully offset the effects of expectations
on inflation two-periods ahead because of its concerns about stabilization of the
short-term rate. Ideally, of course, the central bank would like to see stable private
sector expectations.
The next step is to solve for private sector expectations of the long rate for the
next period. This brings us again to the issue of the release of forecasts by the
central bank. In this respect, the similarity to the New Keynesian framework is
clear. To see this, use the reaction function (2.30) in the term structure to get an
expression for Rt as a function of private sector expectations and the three shocks.
Rt = A2E
p
t Rt+1 + B2εt + C2vt+1 + D2ut+2 (2.32)
In deriving the rational expectations equilibrium, the relevant state variables de-
pend on whether the central bank releases its information or not. As before, we use
the method of undetermined coefficients; first, given that it is common knowledge
that the central bank has private information, we guess that
Rt = θ0εt + θ1vt+1 + θ2vt+2 + θ3ut+2 + θ4ut+3 (2.33)
where, to anticipate our results, the final values for the coefficients θ2 and θ4 de-
pend on disclosure policy of the central bank. In particular, under secrecy these
coefficients will be identically zero. The other coefficients will have non-zero values
under secrecy or transparency, as they disrupt the economy irrespective of private
sector expectations. the state variables are εt, vt+1 and ut+2. Then the release
of information about vt+1 and ut+2 only and private sector rational expectations
imply
Ept Rt+1 = θ1E
p
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Based on disclosure policy of the central bank, we have either Ept Rt+1 = 0, reflecting
the fact that the private sector take the expected value of the i.i.d shocks when
no information is provided by the central bank, or Ept Rt+1 = θ1vt+2 + θ3ut+3 when
information is released. Note that, as in the case of the New Keynesian model,
the release of vt+1 and ut+2, to which the central bank is offsetting in period t, is
irrelevant as these do not help the private sector in forecasting the future. This
is exactly the sort of problem we encountered under the New Keynesian model.
Replacing the resulting private sector expectations under secrecy, the actual law of
motion of Rt become simply
Rt = B2εt + C2vt+1 + D2ut+2 (2.35)
which is independent of the shocks vt+2 and ut+3. Moreover, as can be seen from
(2.30) and (2.31), the short-term real rate and inflation are not affected by these
shocks. Thus release of future shocks can only destabilize inflation and the rate of
interest.
2.7 Summary and Conclusion
Some central banks do not disclose their internal forecasts to the public in a timely
manner, and even if they did, it is not clear if they would report their true forecasts,
or if they adjust them so as to simply follow the markets, as Romer and Romer
(2000) indicated in their study of the Federal Reserve of the U.S. where forecasts are
published only with a long time lag so that the value of the published information
becomes negligible.
Recent theory on transparency has not settled the question about welfare gains
from advance disclosure of central bank forecasts. Existing research has analyzed
this question assuming private information about current shocks, as these shocks
have direct impact on current economic variables, such as inflation and output,
that a central bank is interested in stabilizing. Based on this notion of private
information, a few empirical studies on transparency lend support to the argument
that disclosure of central bank forecasts can enhance the reputation and flexibility
of monetary policy.
This chapter explores the significance of private information on future shocks as
forecasts of future shocks are crucial when inflation expectations are forward-
looking. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks
does not improve welfare, and in some cases not desirable as it impairs stabilization
of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when there is no credibility
problem or the central bank’s output target is common knowledge. Another im-
plication of the model is that, in contrast to forecasts of current period shocks
emphasized by the literature, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the
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public by current policy choices because the central bank refrains from respond-
ing to its own forecasts. Thus with respect to the signaling role of current policy
actions, private information about future shocks has a different policy implication
than that of current shocks. While current shocks may be revealed by current cen-
tral bank actions, this may not be true for forecasts of future shocks. The intuition
is that forecasts of future shocks do not influence the setting of current policy if the
public is not aware of them; the central bank responds to current shocks only. If it
can observe (or infer about) market expectations, the central bank finds it optimal
to announce only what the markets already know.
Even though disclosing information seems counter-intuitive, as it improves the
accuracy of private sector inflation forecast, the negative result on welfare is a con-
sequence of the central bank having objectives other than price stability. With
multiple macroeconomic goals, releasing internal forecasts before the public has
currently formed expectations of future shocks, and thus future inflation, can ac-
tually impair overall stabilization efforts.
The result about the destabilizing effect of early disclosure of forecasts goes through
for some alternative specifications, as long as there is full information regarding
central bank preferences. In the case of the New Keynesian model, the results go
through for a loss function that includes interest rate stabilization objective, on top
of inflation and output; or if the central bank targets nominal income growth, in-
stead of inflation and output, as proposed by some economists. Moreover, whether
policy is conducted under discretion or some form of commitment is inconsequen-
tial to the main result. Our conjecture is that the results also apply if we drop
rational expectations and assume in line with the adaptive learning literature that
the private sector and/or the central bank adaptively learn about the structure of
the economy, adjusting their forecasts with the arrival of new data. All that is
needed for our results is that the central bank has superior forecasts about future
supply shocks.
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Appendix Expected Inflation under a Policy of
Limited Commitment














βk[(1− λAc)ut+k − λBcut+k+1]
= (1− λAc)ut − λBcEpt ut+1 + β[(1− λAc)Ept ut+1 − λBcEpt ut+2] + · · ·
Since the shocks are white noise, private sector inflation expectations when the
central bank fully discloses the value of ut+1 is given by
Ept πt+1 = (1− λAc)ut+1






Following Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2000), this chapter modifies the
policy problem of chapter 2 in two ways. First, the model includes unobserved
shifts in the central bank’s output target. This introduces an inflation bias as the
output target can differ from the natural rate, which for simplicity is normalized
to zero. In addition, the timing of events is such that the central bank chooses
its policy before private sector inflation expectations are set. The public observes
central bank policy decisions that respond in part to the central bank’s private
information. In principle, this implies that the private sector can infer in part the
output target from observed central bank actions.
With these modifications, it turns out that the relevance of disclosing forecasts
of future shocks is not clear cut and depends on specific assumptions about the
unobserved output target. Specifically, the central bank is better off by withholding
its private information about future shocks if the random shift in output target is
directly revealed at the time the future shocks are realized. Otherwise, if the output
target is not revealed in subsequent periods, but is inferred from observed policy
decisions of the central bank, then disclosure policy is irrelevant for current period
outcomes. In both cases, however, advance disclosure is not optimal.
As will be shown below, the reason lies in the strong dependence of one-period-
ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank actions, which induces the
central bank to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent periods. Knowing
this incentive, the private sector does not incorporate its forecasts of future shocks
in forming expectations of next period’s inflation.
However, as in the full information benchmark of the previous chapter, in equilib-
rium, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy
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choices. If disclosure is not optimal, the central bank can abstain from responding
to its own forecasts of the cost-push shocks.
Geraats (2001) shows how disclosure of central bank forecasts can be beneficial
when the public also faces uncertainty about the central bank’s inflation target.
The intuition is that disclosure of forecasts affect the incentives of the central bank
to create surprises, as loss of credibility becomes a concern to the central bank
in a multi-period framework. This incentive effect depends on the public’s ability
to make inferences about the unobserved inflation target based on its observed
current central bank actions. The more information it receives about central bank
forecasts of current shocks, the better the public is able to infer the unobserved
inflation target and thus the central bank’s intentions. It is then in the interest of
the central bank to invest in reputation in the early periods in order to have more
flexibility in the future in responding to shocks.1
Yet, desirability of disclosing current period shocks is disputed when forward-
looking considerations take prominence, as in the New Keynesian view of the
transmission mechanism (Jensen, 2000). Supposing unobserved output target as
the source of inflation bias, Jensen (2000) shows how releasing forecasts of current
shocks distorts current stabilization policy even though it solves the credibility
problem of the sort mentioned in the previous paragraph. If the public observes
central bank policy decisions before forming inflation expectations, a high degree of
transparency about current shocks makes inflation expectations become extremely
sensitive to the central bank’s current stabilization actions. Confronted with very
sensitive inflation expectations, policy tilts heavily toward inflation stabilization at
the cost of making output very volatile. Thus disclosing internal forecasts could be
undesirable for a central banker who enjoys good initial reputation.
There is one important common feature of the above cited papers. If, from the
outset, the central bank’s targets for inflation and output are common knowledge,
then its forecasts of current period shocks can be perfectly inferred from its mone-
tary policy decisions. The reason is that, even if the public does not observe current
period shocks directly, the central bank reacts to those shocks, as they disrupt the
level of current inflation and output that the central bank wants to stabilize.2
1In a cross-section study using 87 countries Chortareas et al. (2002) find that publication
of forecasts reduces average inflation. Geraats and Eijffinger (2004) use time-series data on
several aspects of transparency for nine major central banks, based on an index of transparency
constructed by Eijffinger and Geraats, and conclude that higher transparency is associated with
lower short-term as well as long-term interest rates, thus lending support to the positive reputation
effects of releasing forecasts, as argued by Geraats (2001).
2Among other things, the paper by Geraats (2001) differs from Jensen (2000) in the effect
of direct revelation of the unobserved target. In Geraats (2001), this leads to worse outcomes
because the credibility problem would remain unresolved. This result seems at odds with the
recent calls for transparency about inflation goals (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). In Jensen (2000), direct
revelation of central bank’s output target may dominate indirect revelation through the release
of internal forecasts if the central bank has good reputation and stabilization policy has more
importance.
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3.2 A Three-Period Model
Suppose in period t the central bank has private information about the supply
shock ut+1 while ut is common knowledge. Somewhat similar to Jensen (2000), the




t πt+1 + λxt + ut t = 1, 2, 3 u1 = u3 = 0
In Jensen (2000), u1 is assumed to be private information of the central bank while
(implicitly) u2 is unknown as of period 1; its value is set to zero as period 2 is
interpreted to be the long-run.3 Since we are interested in analyzing future shocks,
suppose instead that in period 1, u1 is common knowledge (u1 = 0 for simplicity)
while u2 is the central bank’s private information. In Period 3, the economy reaches
a steady state, with u3 = 0, as period 3 represents the long-run.
Without loss of generality, ignore discounting and take the central bank loss func-
tion defined over three periods
U = L1 + L2 + L3
Lt = π
2
t + α(xt − x∗t )2 t = 1, 2, 3






t ∼ N(0, σ2).
Sequence of events and actions:
• Period 1: central bank knows u2 and chooses x1 → E1π2 formed → π1 deter-
mined
• Period 2: x∗2 and u2 realize, and private sector knows u2 → x2 chosen → E2π3
formed → π2 determined
• Period 3: (full information steady state) x3 chosen → π3 determined
A permanent shock to the output target occurs in period 2, and is private infor-
mation of the central bank. Shifts in the output target of the central bank may
represent political pressures on the central bank or changes in the composition of
the decision making committee of the central bank (see for e.g. Faust and Svensson,
2001). Thus in periods 2, the private sector faces uncertainty about the preference
shock and in period 1 about the central bank’s forecast of u2. As in Jensen, mone-
tary policy is discretionary, so the model is solved backwards starting from period
3Thus in Jensen only the game in period 1 is relevant for final outcomes.
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2. Since the policy horizon is finite and markets are forward-looking, a terminal
condition for inflation expectations must be assumed for period 3 (see Jensen (2000)
in this regard). As noted above, the economy stays in a full information steady
state from period 3 onwards, implying π3 = π4, E
p
3π4 = π4 and x3 = 0. Consistent









2 + α(x3 − x∗3)2]
with respect to x3. It is easy to get the solution for x3, and in turn for π3




These are the steady state values for output and inflation, featuring an inflation
bias as long as x∗3 > 0.
Next consider period 2. As we show below, it turns out that the welfare effects
of disclosing u2 in period 1 depends on how the game is played in period 2. We
consider alternative scenarios based on the private sector’s knowledge of x∗2 in
period 2. In the first case, the private sector directly observes the central bank’s
output target, and thus the central bank’s choice of x2 does not play a signaling
role about the output target. In the second case, the private sector has to infer
the output target from the central bank’s choice of x2, giving rise to signaling and
incentive effects. Thus the determination of Ep2π3, which follows from the solution
for π3 in (3.1) is crucial.
3.3 Period 2 Output Target Directly Revealed






3π4. In other words,
private sector inflation expectations are identical in periods 2 and 3. The solution
for x2 is similar to that in period 3, except for the fact that u2 is not necessarily
zero. Analogous to period 3, the solutions for x2 and π2 are









An implication of (3.2) is that, in period 1 inflation expectations depend on the
private sector’s forecast of u2. From period 1’s perspective both the central bank
4As Jensen rightly points out, the exact expression for the terminal condition is not that
important for the choice of disclosure policy made in period 1. The particular expression we have
chosen for the terminal period simplifies the algebra. This particular inflation expectations can
also be derived from an infinite horizon model with full information about the loss function of
the central bank.
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and the private sector expect x∗2 to take its mean value of zero. It follows that the











ks1 if u2 is not disclosed and the private
sector has to depend on its period 1 signal. Note that the problem faced by the
central bank in period 1 is identical to the benchmark model of chapter 2, with
common knowledge of the central bank’s preferences. Anticipating that private
sector expectations depend on disclosure policy, the central bank chooses a value
for x1 that minimizes the period 1 loss function.







The first order condition with respect to x1 gives:








On the other hand, with full transparency, x1 and π1 are affected by u2 via E
p
1π2.






and the solutions are:








A comparison of (3.3),(3.4) with (3.5),(3.6) shows that communicating u2 to the
private sector in period 1 makes inflation and output more volatile. This is in line
with the result in the full information benchmark (section 2.3 of chapter 2). Thus
preference shocks, if observable by the public, do not change the basic message
of the full information case without preference shocks. We think that a more
interesting case is when the central bank’s preference is not directly revealed to
the private sector. This gives rise to incentive effects as far as the central bank is
concerned, forcing it to react to private sector expectations, which in turn depend
on the actions taken by the central bank.
5One may wonder if the private sector could get a signal about u2 from the central bank’s
choice of x1. This is not possible as the central bank would never react to u2 in period 1.
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3.4 Period 2 Output Target Indirectly Revealed
Next consider the case where x∗2 is not directly revealed to the public. Then, this




2)/λ as the private sector has to forecast the value of x
∗. Since
the relevant state variables are x∗2 and u2, conjecture the following form for x2
x2 = h2u2 + hxx
∗
2 (3.7)
where the coefficients are yet undetermined. Since in period 2 the private sector
observes x2 and u2, it can make perfect inferences about x
∗
2 from a signal, s2,
constructed as follows:
s2 ≡ x2 − h0 − h2u2 = hxx∗2 (3.8)
It is straightforward to see from (3.8) that private sector expectations of x∗2 given




2 = Sxs2 where Sx ≡ 1/hx. Then Ep2π3 = αSxs2/λ,




Sxs2 + λx2 + u2)
2 + α(x2 − x∗2)2]




Sxs2) + λx2 + u2)(
α
λ
Sx + λ) + α(x2 − x∗2)]
Using the fact that Ec2s2 = hxx
∗
2, x2 can be expressed as a function of u2 and x
∗
2.
Then the undetermined coefficients must satisfy:
h2 = − λ
2 + αSx
λ(α + λ2 + αSx)
hx =
αλ2
αλ2 + (λ2 + αSx)2
The solutions can be found recursively, starting with the equation for hx, which
implies hx → 0.6 It follows, by definition, that Sx → ∞. This shows that private
sector expectations react very strongly to the signal s2 (which is related one-to-
one with central bank action x2), forcing the central bank not to respond to its
preference shock x∗2. Finally, the first equation gives the solution for h2:
h2 = −1
λ
6Note here that there is no role for disclosure of forecasts because u2 is common knowledge.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. The strong dependence of private sector
inflation expectations on output signals forces the central bank to care about its
reputation. Thus in contrast to the previous case, where the private sector has
full information about the output target, the fact that expectations are now very
sensitive to the policy action, x2, induces the central bank not to accommodate the
preference shock to its output target. Moreover, the central bank lets the output
gap fully absorb the cost-push shock.
One immediate implication of (3.9) is that disclosing central bank forecasts of u2
prior to the formation of inflation expectations in period 1 is harmless to period
1 outcomes of inflation and output. Disclosing u2 in period 1 does not affect
inflation expectations because of the common knowledge that the central bank
would completely offset the effect of u2 on π2.
The solutions for x1 and π1 in period 1 can easily be derived. First (3.9) implies




2)/λ = 0. Next, the central bank solves for the optimal level of
x1 that minimizes:
(0 + λx1 + u1)
2 + αx21
The equilibrium output and inflation in period 1 are then given by:






where the central bank optimally stabilizes period 1 shocks. Inflation expectations
are firmly anchored at zero due to the anticipated behavior of the central bank,
which stabilizes period 2 inflation completely. Thus in this case early disclosure of
u2 to the private sector in period 1 is harmless to the central bank’s welfare loss.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter modifies the analysis in the previous chapter by incorporating unob-
served preferences. In addition to asymmetric information about future cost-push
shocks, we assume, following Faust and Svensson (2001), that the central bank’s
output target is private information. Shifts to the output target give rise to the
standard inflation bias and associated credibility problem. The idea is that bet-
ter knowledge about cost-push shocks can help the private sector make better
inferences about the unobserved output target. It turns out that the effects of
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transparency about future cost push shocks depends on whether the central bank’s
output target is common knowledge or indirectly revealed from future policy ac-
tions.
The main result of this chapter is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future
shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as it impairs
stabilization of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when there is
no credibility problem or the central bank’s output target is common knowledge.
When there is uncertainty about the central bank’s current output target, and
this uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance disclosure does
not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong dependence of
one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank actions, which
induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent peri-
ods.
With respect to the signaling role of current policy actions about internal forecasts
of cost-push shocks, the results of the previous chapter continue to hold. Forecasts
of future shocks do not influence the setting of current policy if the public is not
aware of them; the central bank responds to current shocks only.
Obviously, there are some limitations of our analysis, limitations that are also
shared by the literature on disclosure policy of central bank forecasts. First, the
central bank is assumed to observe private sector expectations without error. Intro-
ducing observation errors would put the central bank at a disadvantage, and with
very large errors, the central bank may even be forced to be transparent about its
private information. Second, there is no strategic manipulation of expectations by
the private sector, although it knows that the central bank is responding to private
sector expectations. If the private sector knows that the central bank reacts to
private sector expectations, strategic behavior becomes more important. Third, on
the part of the central bank there could be an incentive to manipulate its private
information and truthful revelation may not be feasible. As Romer and Romer
(2000) have noted, even if central banks disclose their internal forecasts to the
public in a timely manner, it is not clear if they would report their true forecasts,
or if they would adjust them so as to simply follow the markets. Fourth, the anal-
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Output Stabilization
Some central banks have a reputation for being secretive. A justification for that
behavior that we find in the literature is that being transparent about its operations
and beliefs hinders the central bank in achieving the best outcome. In other words,
a central bank needs flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. Using
a forward-looking New Keynesian model, we find exactly the opposite. A central
bank that is conservative improves output stabilization by being transparent about
the procedures it uses to assess the economy and, especially, about the forecast
errors it makes. Under certain conditions transparency by a conservative central
bank also improves interest rate stabilization. We also find that higher transparency
makes it optimal for the central bank to be more conservative as the benefits
from higher transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more
conservative is the central bank.
4.1 Introduction1
Monetary policy makers broadly agree that communication is a very important
part of their business. Communication gives central bankers a tool to shape pri-
vate sector expectations, which are crucial for effective monetary policy. Blinder
(1998) argues that openness and communication with the public improve the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy as a macroeconomic stabilizer because: ”Central banks
generally control only the overnight interest rate, an interest rate that is relevant
to virtually no economically interesting transactions. Monetary policy has impor-
tant macroeconomic effects only to the extent that it moves financial market prices
that really matter like long-term interest rates, stock market values, and exchange
rates.”
1An earlier version of this chapter (co-authored by Sylvester Eijffinger and Marco Hoeberichts)
has already been published as a CEPR Discussion Paper.
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Most theoretical studies of central bank transparency assume some kind of informa-
tional asymmetry between the central bank and the private sector. In particular,
the central bank has an informational advantage about its own goals (e.g., Cukier-
man and Meltzer, 1986; Geraats, 1999; Jensen, 2000; Eijffinger et al., 2000a; Faust
and Svensson, 2001) or the state of the economy (e.g., Cukierman, 2001; Geraats,
1999; Jensen, 2000; Gersbach, 2003). Within this class of models, the issue of
whether it is desirable to communicate private information of the central bank
(goals, intentions or forecasts) is far from being settled. A reading of the literature
shows that the desirability of communication depends on the specific nature of the
model and its information structure.
In all these studies, it is assumed that monetary authorities can observe and re-
spond directly to private sector expectations. While it is unquestionable that cen-
tral banks can hide their true intentions, and there is some evidence that they have
superior information about the economy (see for e.g. Romer and Romer, 2000),
we think it is unrealistic to presume that policy makers have precise knowledge of
market expectations. A more realistic setting, in the spirit of Tarkka and Mayes
(1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2002), among others, has to assume that the
central bank’s assessment of private sector expectations is imperfect. Tarkka and
Mayes (1999) have incorporated this assumption in a model that features Lucas-
type transmission mechanism while Evans and Honkapohja (2002) analyze imper-
fect observability of private sector expectations in the context of simple monetary
policy rules under adaptive learning. Evans and Honkapohja (2002) point out
that although survey data on private forecasts of future inflation and output are
available to central banks, there are apparent concerns about the accuracy of this
data.
This paper studies a case where the information is asymmetric in two ways. First,
the private sector has superior knowledge about its own expectations of future infla-
tion and output. The central bank sets its policy based on an imperfect assessment
of these private sector expectations. Likewise the private sector can not perfectly
observe these assessments made by the central bank unless the central bank pub-
lishes them. If it wishes the central bank can provide information about the way
its assessment is produced and thereby make it easier for the public to infer the
judgment errors made by the central bank (see Tarkka and Mayes, 1999). Our aim
is to shed light on the implications of communication by the central bank regard-
ing its assessments on private sector expectations and finally on macroeconomic
outcomes. It should be borne in mind that the aim of central bank communica-
tion is to reduce uncertainty on the part of the private sector, since these errors
are also reflected in the setting of interest rate policy. The presumption is that
even if the variance of the assessment error is exogenously fixed, communication of
these errors to the public can change public expectations such that under certain
conditions overall stabilization is improved.2
2Expectation formation is the result of a complicated process and involves constantly changing
judgments, that is “information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular model”
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We look at the effect of communication on the macroeconomic variables that we
are mainly concerned with in this model: the rate of inflation and the output gap.
Assuming the performance of the economy is measured by a weighted sum of the
variability in the rate of inflation and the output gap, the main result is that by
communicating with the public its assessments errors, the central bank improves
the variability of output at the expense of the variability of inflation, leading to a
tradeoff. This tradeoff also has normative implications for policy. As will be shown
later, a central bank that is sufficiently conservative (in the sense of Rogoff, 1985)
improves society’s welfare by communicating its assessment of market expectations
of inflation and output.
4.2 The Model
Since the role of communication is more important in a forward-looking framework,
we base our analysis on the forward-looking New Keynesian model. A detailed
treatment of this model can be found in several recent papers that address monetary
policy, including Clarida et al. (1999) and King (2000). The two basic structural
relationships (one for inflation and the other for the output-gap) come from a
log-linear approximation to a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium model
where aggregate behavior is a result of explicit optimization by households and
firms. There is monopolistic competition in the product market and firms face
nominal price rigidity, thus giving monetary policy the ability to influence economic
activities in the short run.
Inflation is determined by a forward-looking Phillips equation:
πt = βE
p
t πt+1 + λxt + ut (4.1)
where π is the inflation rate, x is the output gap, and u ∼ N(0, σ2u) reflects a
cost-push shock to inflation, which is identically and independently distributed (in
short i.i.d.). The parameter β captures the discount factor while λ is related to the
average frequency of price changes and the elasticity of product demand. These
parameters satisfy 0 < β < 1 and λ > 0 . The superscript p in Ept πt+1 stands
for private sector expectations. Thus current period inflation depends on private
sector expectations of future inflation, current period output gap and the cost-push
shock. The equation for inflation is derived from firms’ pricing decisions, assuming
that not all firms can change their prices in any given period.
The output gap is governed by a forward-looking IS equation, which is a log-
linearized Euler equation associated with households’ intertemporal consumption
(Svensson, 2005). It is thus natural to assume that assessments of the forecasts of other parties
is fraught with errors. See also Mankiw et al. (2002) for an empirical evidence on the existence
of substantial disagreements regarding expectations.
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and saving decisions. It is given by:
xt = E
p
t xt+1 − φrt + vt (4.2)
where r is the real interest rate and v ∼ N(0, σ2v) is an i.i.d. demand shock
that captures preference shocks or expected changes in government expenditure.
The parameter φ is an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and
satisfies φ > 0. Thus the current period output gap depends on private sector
expectations of next period’s output gap, the real interest rate and the demand
shock.
Finally, the real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation, which links the
nominal interest rate with the real interest rate.
rt = it − Ept πt+1 (4.3)
where i is the nominal interest rate. Combining (4.2) and (4.3) one can rewrite




t xt+1 − φit + φEpt πt+1 + vt (4.4)
In each period the central bank optimizes after making an assessment of private
sector expectations. It sets it that minimizes the expected value of it’s period t






where α is the relative weight on output stabilization and superscript c stands for
central bank.
4.3 Equilibrium under Full Information
Before analyzing optimal policy under asymmetric information, it is useful to con-
sider a simpler, baseline scenario where the central bank has full information about
the economy and observes private sector expectations without error. In this case,
even if it does not directly observe current inflation and output, the central bank
can infer about them from private sector expectations, the prevailing interest rate,
and the two shocks.
Following much of the literature, the model is solved assuming that monetary
policy is conducted under discretion.3 The optimality condition in terms of the
3Clarida et al. (1999) argue that it is realistic to assume a discretionary monetary policy.
46
Communication, Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy
target variables (thus the name targeting rule) can be derived easily by minimizing




According to (4.6), in each period, the central bank contracts (expands) current
output in response to a higher (lower) rate of current inflation, with the degree of
response depending on the α and λ. Combining the targeting rule with (4.1), (4.2)

















The rate of interest responds optimally to private sector expectations and the two
shocks. It is straight forward to derive the rational expectations solution by solving









Thus the dynamics of actual inflation depend on currently held private sector expec-
tations about next period’s inflation and on the current realization of the exogenous
shock ut.
To solve for Ept πt+1 and derive the rational expectations equilibrium, note first
that the only relevant state variable is ut. Using the commonly used method of
undetermined coefficients,4 first take a guess for the solution taking the following
form:
πt = θut (4.9)
from which private sector rational expectations follow
Ept πt+1 = θE
p
t ut+1 = 0 (4.10)





4McCallum (1983) emphasizes solving the model using only the fundamentals of the economy
(in this case ut), thereby avoiding bubble solutions. McCallum calls this the Minimal State
Variables (MSV) method.
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where consistency of rational expectations imply θ = α/(α + λ2).
To complete the rational expectations solution under full information, use (4.11)
in the optimality condition to get the solution for output
xt = − λ
α + λ2
ut (4.12)
Thus under full information, equilibrium inflation and output are functions of the
cost-push shock. Moreover, as long as α > 0 the impact of this shock is partially
absorbed by inflation and partially by output.
4.4 Assessment Errors and Disclosure
To this point the central bank was endowed with perfect knowledge of the state of
the economy and in particular regarding private sector expectations. A more real-
istic setting, in the spirit of Tarkka and Mayes (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2002), among others, is that the central bank’s assessment of private sector expec-
tations about the future output gap and the future rate of inflation is imperfect.
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) discuss the issue of observability of current private
expectations in the context of the adaptive learning literature. They point out that
although survey data on private forecasts of future inflation and output are avail-
able to central banks, there are apparent concerns about the accuracy of this data.
Although most experts would agree that it is very hard for the central bank to ac-
curately measure the public’s expected output gap, opinions differ about the extent
to which the central bank is uncertain about the public inflationary expectations
(see, however, Mankiw et al., 2002).
One may choose a general setup, where the central bank makes an assessment error
in both private sector inflationary expectations and output gap expectations (where
variances of these errors may be different). However, as shown in Appendix A, our
qualitative results are not changed by focusing only on output gap expectations.
To capture asymmetric information, suppose private sector output forecasts and
the central bank’s assessment of those forecasts are related by
Ect xt+1 = E
p
t xt+1 − wxt (4.13)
where superscript c denotes central bank forecasts. Since for now the central bank
is assumed to observe inflation expectations wπt = 0 for all t (Appendix A extends
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where the innovations are independently and normally distributed with ηxt ∼
N(0, σ2η) and ρ is a measure for the degree of persistence of the assessment er-
rors, satisfying 0 < ρ < 1. Assessment errors can be persistent if the central bank
only sluggishly adjusts its procedures.
Similar to the full information setting, monetary policy is discretionary but now
the central bank optimizes period by period based on its internal assessment of
private sector expectations. Moreover, since the central bank does not observe
current inflation and output, the optimality condition is written with the actual
values of inflation and output in (4.6) replaced by the forecasts of these variables.




where the central bank’s expectation of the Phillips equation is based on its assess-
ment of private sector inflationary expectations5
Ect πt = βE
c
t πt+1 + λE
c
t xt + ut (4.16)
Using (4.16) in the optimality condition (4.15)







Likewise, taking the central bank’s expectation of the IS relation, (4.2)
Ect xt = E
c
t xt+1 − φit + φEct πt+1 + vt (4.18)


















It can easily be seen that (4.19) has a similar form as its full information counter-
part, (4.7). The only difference lies in the expectational terms. Due to imperfect
information about price sector output expectations, the central bank uses its own
(internal) forecasts when setting the rate of interest. At the same time, unless they
are disclosed by the central bank, the private sector does not observe the central
bank’s forecasts nor the current assessment errors.
5We get the optimality condition (4.15) by minimizing the expected value of (4.4) subject to
the central bank expectation of the Phillips curve, which is (4.16) below.
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Ect πt+1 is only a noisy forecast of E
p
t πt+1, which means that the central bank com-
mits forecast errors and associated control errors. With (4.13) in mind, (4.19) can









Ept πt+1 + (E
p






so that the policy rate it is affected by the current assessment error, w
x
t . The
public understands the structure of information asymmetry in the economy and so
by using (4.20) in (4.2), and the resulting equation in (4.1), it can infer that the
actual dynamics of output and inflation is a function of private sector expectations
and the assessment error.
xt = − βλ
α + λ2















An interesting feature of (4.21) and (4.22) is that both expressions are free of the
term Ept xt+1. The reduced form solutions are found by first solving for E
p
t πt+1
using (4.22) and conditional on available information. Equation (4.22) differs from
the full information counterpart, (4.8), by the additional term λwxt , which captures
assessment errors reflecting our asymmetric information setting. Note also that,
even if there were no shocks to inflation (ut = 0) inflation and output would still
be stochastic owing to the central bank’s assessment errors.
4.5 Communication and Expectations
In forecasting future inflation, the public uses its knowledge of past assessment
errors (in light of their persistent nature) and any information about current errors
that the central bank has disclosed.6 We assume that the private sector gets a






where from (4.14) the assessment error is normally distributed with a given finite
variance, wxt ∼ N(0, σ2wx), and σ2wx = 11−ρ2 σ2ηx.
The degree of communication is measured by the quality of the central bank’s
disclosed information about its assessment of the public’s state of mind. With the
6A more general situation arises when past and present assessment errors are hidden variables
so that the private sector uses a more general form of Kalman filtering to get optimal forecasts.
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variance of the assessment errors, σ2wx, exogenously fixed, a fuzzy account of the
assessment errors by the central bank leads to large noise variance, σ2εx, since it
becomes difficult for the public to infer the unobservable assessment error from
disclosed information. Here the public depends completely on available central
bank models, procedures, and judgements that produce internal inflation forecasts
to make inferences about the assessment errors. In a more complicated scenario
one may allow the public to deduce or infer the central bank’s private assessment
errors from observing the central bank’s interest rate decisions.7
As in standard signal extraction problems, (4.23) represents an observation equa-
tion, where the input signal wx is contaminated by an independent noise term, εx,
whose variance, σ2εx, is affected by the central bank’s disclosure policy. Since the
central bank controls the signal-to-noise ratio through its communication policy,
one can think of the central bank as choosing τ where σ2εx = τσ
2
ηx and 0 ≤ τ < ∞
(see e.g. Faust and Svensson, 2001). If it opts for noiseless communication with
the public, the central bank sets τ = 0, while choosing τ →∞ captures the other
extreme, where the central bank chooses not to communicate at all. See also Ap-
pendix B where τ is related to the capacity of a communication channel, a concept
borrowed from information theory.
The public’s optimal predictor of wxt can be solved using the Kalman filter, where
(4.14) is the transition equation and (4.23) is the observation equation. As wxt−1 is
in the public’s information set, the steady state solution to the optimal predictor
for wxt is (see e.g Sargent (1987b) and Faust and Svensson (2001))
wxt|t ≡ Ep(wxt |sxt , wxt−1) = (1−K)ρwxt−1 + Ksxt (4.24)
where K ≡ P
P+σ2ε
is the Kalman gain (0 ≤ K ≤ 1). Here, P is the conditional
variance of the optimal predictor and is given by8
P =










((1− ρ2)τ − 1)2
4





where we have used σ2ε = τσ
2
η. Then K can be rewritten as
K =
2
1 + τ(1− ρ2) +
√
4τ + (1− τ(1− ρ2))2
(4.26)
7When the public is uncertain about central bank goals, (in addition to uncertainty about
the assessment errors), communication can play a different role. In this case Faust and Svensson
(2001) define transparency as ”how easily the public can deduce central bank unobserved goals
and intentions from observables.”
8P is the limit of the conditional variance of the predictor, Pt = Ep(wxt − wxt|t)2 which is
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Observe that there is a monotonic relationship between K and τ .9 Thus the optimal
choice of the degree of communication can be analyzed in terms of K, from which
the optimal choice of τ follows from (4.26).
Equation (4.24) says that in forming expectations about the current assessment
error of the central bank, the private sector takes a weighted average of its signal
sxt and a forecast ρw
x
t−1 based on the AR(1) series. The weighting factor K in turn
depends on the quality of central bank communication. Obviously when the public
receives no signal, (K = 0), the best available forecast of wxt is given by ρw
x
t−1.
4.6 Solving the Model
As before, we solve the model by applying the method of undetermined coefficients.
First, we conjecture that πt depends on the cost-push shock, ut, last period assess-
ment error, wxt−1, and its innovation, η
x
t , and the noise that is introduced by the







t + Bπ7ut (4.27)
Then from this follows private sector inflation expectations assuming knowledge of
the signal sxt , the AR(1)-structure of w
x
t and its previous realization w
x
t−1.
Ept πt+1 = Bπ2w
x
t|t = Bπ2((1−K)ρwxt−1 + Kst) (4.28)
Essential here is that the public, using the signal of current period error and its
knowledge of the autoregressive process, is able get an optimal forecast of the un-





















Consistency of RE requires equalizing the coefficients of (4.29) with those of (4.27).
Bπ2 =
ρλ(α + λ2)
(1− βρ)α + λ2
Bπ4 =
αβρλK
(1− βρ)α + λ2
9Note that when there is no persistence in w, (4.24) collapses to E(w|s) = Ks = 11+τ s,
thus forecasts depend only the current period signal. In this case, E(w|s) = w if τ = 0 while
E(w|s) = 0 if τ →∞.
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Bπ6 = λ +
αβρλK




Observe that with respect to communication the relevant coefficients Bπ4 and Bπ6
are both nonnegative and directly proportional to K. Thus inflation has more vari-
ability with higher degree of transparency.10












α + λ2(1− βρ)−1
Bx4 = − βρλ
2K
(1− βρ)α + λ2
Bx6 = 1− βρλ
2K
(1− βρ)α + λ2
Bx7 = − λ
α + λ2
Equation (4.30) makes it clear that output (like inflation) responds positively to
current innovations to the assessment error ηxt but (unlike inflation) it responds
negatively to the current observation noise εxt .
Next using the reduced forms of (4.29) and (4.30), we can show the effect of chang-







































10Note that Bπ7 and Bx7 (see below) are not functions of K.
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from (4.23) and (4.26), respectively.
It is not difficult to show that increasing the value of K unambiguously raises the
variability of inflation while it reduces the variability of the output gap.11 Thus
increasing K (higher degree of transparency) improves the performance of output
at the expense of inflation, and vice versa.
4.7 When Does Society Benefit from Central Bank
Communication?
In order to analyze the effect of communication by the central bank about the
assessment errors, we allow for the possibility that the society differs from the
central banker in the way it weighs the relative benefits from inflation and output
stabilization. Moreover, society may have additional social goals, in this case,








where αs and qs represent society’s concern about output and interest rate stabi-
lization (relative to inflation), respectively. Taking the unconditional expectation
of (4.33), where the unconditional means of π, x and i are equal to the target
(zero), we have12







In the following analysis we first study the case where qs = 0 and allow the possi-
bility that αs 6= α. As we show below, it turns out that given society’s preference
αs, and an appointment of a sufficiently conservative central banker, (α < αs),
communication makes the society better off.
What we have in mind is a situation where the central bank decides on interest rate
policy based on its own weight on output stabilization while the society assigns a
higher weight on output stabilization (the central bank is then weight-conservative,
as in Rogoff (1985)). Formally, given αs we can assign a value for α such that
communication is worthwhile for society’s welfare. The intuition behind this result
is as follows. Take, for instance, a positive assessment error in period t. That
means the central bank underestimates the expected level of next period’s output
gap. The policy it has planned is therefore too loose and the interest rate it plans
11From (4.31) and (4.32) the partial derivatives of the coefficients of σ2ηx w.r.t K are positive
and negative, respectively.
12Note that, as was shown in chapter 2, equation (2.5), for a discount factor very close to one,
we can approximate the intertemporal loss function by the expected value of the per-period loss
function.
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to set too low (see (4.20)). If the public is aware of the fact that the procedure
used by the central bank leads to an underestimation of the expected output gap
(i.e. this error is communicated) the public will expect this error to persist in the
future (this follows from the AR(1) form in (4.28)). It will therefore have higher
inflationary expectations. This in turn is picked up by the central bank (with an
assessment error, though) and it makes policy tighter than without communication.
The opposite reasoning holds for a negative assessment error.
The coefficient of σ2ηx in (4.31) monotonically increases with K while that in (4.31)
monotonically decreases with K. The optimal value of K from society’s point
view can be calculated in principle, but it turns out to be a very complicated
expression. We thus consider the extreme cases of no communication K = 0 and
full communication K = 1. For this case, take the difference
E[Lst ]K=1 − E[Lst ]K=0 =
βρλ2




Q = 2(α− αs)(α + λ2)− βρ(α2 − αs(2α + λ2))
Observe that since the coefficient of σ2u does not depend on K, this term vanishes
from (4.35). Given the structural parameters of the economy, the sign of the right
hand side of (4.35) depends on the sign of Q, that, in turn, depends on the value of
α relative αs. For example, if the central banker shares the same preferences as the
society, αs = α, we have Q = αβρ(α + λ
2) > 0, so that communication is welfare
decreasing. It is then clear that when society has a central banker who shares the
society’s loss function (i.e. the central banker is neither conservative nor liberal
compared to society), publication of central bank assessments actually makes the
society worse-off. This result also shows that if left to his own decision (in other
words, if he is independent in deciding upon publication of forecasts) the central
banker would prefer not to reveal his forecasts. Thus in our setup there arises a
situation where communication may not be desired by a central banker but may
benefit the society. Proposition 1 below summarizes the result.
Proposition 1 Suppose the public has no preference for interest rate stabilization,
(qs = 0). Then communication about the central bank’s assessment error of output





2λ2 + α(2− βρ)
λ2(2− βρ) + α(2− 2βρ) > 1
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Proof: From (4.35)




2λ2 + α(2− βρ)
λ2(2− βρ) + α(2− 2βρ)
Since the term on the right hand side of the inequality sign is greater than one,
the proposition says that for the society to benefit from transparency, it must have
appointed a central banker who is sufficiently conservative. The positive effect
of communication on stabilization of the output gap is stronger when the central
banker is more conservative (small α). On the other hand stabilization of the output
gap contributes more to social welfare if society puts more weight on output gap
stabilization (large αs). Thus what matters is the ratio of αs to α; society benefits
more from communication the higher the degree of conservativeness of the central
banker. In summary a society that has appointed a very conservative central banker
can make itself better off by instructing the central banker to be transparent to
the public by publishing the bank’s official forecasts.
As an extension of the above analysis, we ask under what conditions communication
turns out to be welfare improving when society’s welfare depends not only on the
variability of inflation and output but also on the nominal interest rate. 13 For this
purpose let us fix the level of αs such that
αs =
2λ2 + α(2− βρ)
λ2(2− βρ) + α(2− 2βρ)α (4.36)
This means that under the case without an additional interest rate goal for the
society (i.e. qs = 0), society would be indifferent to central bank communication.
Proposition 2 below gives the condition under which communication improves social
welfare when we allow the society to care about interest rate stabilization.
Proposition 2 Suppose society has a preference for interest rate stabilization,
(qs > 0), and αs is given by (4.36), then communication about the central bank’s
assessment error of output gap expectations improves society’s welfare if
φ <
(2− ρ)(1− βρ)α + (2− ρ(1 + β − βρ))λ2
ρλ(α + λ2)
Proof: Assume qs > 0 and (4.36) holds. Then a higher value of K increases
society’s welfare if and only if σ2i decreases. It is easy to show that in equilibrium,
σ2i is inversely proportional to K if and only if the inequality condition is satisfied.
Note that the right hand side of this inequality condition is positive and finite.
Given our assumption that φ > 0, what the condition requires is that φ should
13For discussions of interest rate stabilization as related to instability in financial markets and
financial crises, see, for example, Cukierman (2001), p. 61 and the references there in.
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not be too large. This makes sense since the effect of more communication on
the variability of the nominal interest rate depends on the degree to which private
sector expectations of the next period’s inflation and output respond to the current
assessment errors (see the central bank’s reaction function (4.20)). It turns out that
as φ gets smaller, private sector expectations of output and inflation (see (4.28))
respond less strongly to the (current) assessment error on output expectations.
Another important result of the model concerns the relationship between the de-
gree of transparency and conservativeness of the central bank. The fact that trans-
parency affects the variability of inflation and output in opposite ways has conse-
quences for the optimal degree of conservativeness. For the case without interest
rate stabilization goal for the society, the following proposition asserts that a higher
degree of transparency increases the optimal degree of conservativeness.
Proposition 3 Suppose (qs > 0) and (K = 0). Then communication about the
assessment error will increase optimal conservatism of the central bank if the per-
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Note that under the benchmark case where qs = 0, Proposition 3 requires no




|K=0,,α=α∗ < 0 iff ρ < ∞
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that increased communication (from the zero
level) improves stabilization of the output gap. Therefore, better communication
(larger K) makes it optimal for the central bank to become more conservative
(smaller α).
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4.8 Concluding Remarks
It is sometimes argued that central banks need to be secretive in order to main-
tain flexibility, which enables them to stabilize the economy. In a standard New
Keynesian model we arrive at an opposite result. By communicating and being
transparent about its procedures that lead to assessment errors of private sector
expectations, the central bank is better able to stabilize output gaps than when
its assessment errors come as a surprise to the public. The inflation rate, however,
will become more volatile. The reason is that the public’s reaction to the errors
will cause the bank to adjust its interest rate in the direction that helps to stabilize
the impact of the error on the output gap. In this case, aggregate demand policy
can not be used to stabilize the effect of inflation expectations on current inflation.
A crucial element in our analysis is that, with communication by the central bank,
the public is able to forecast the error that the central bank will make in assessing
private sector expectations. In our welfare analysis we showed that a sufficiently
conservative central bank improves society’s welfare by communicating its assess-
ment of private sector expectations. This holds in the benchmark case where society
cares only about inflation and output stabilization and in a case where we allow
the society to have interest rate stabilization goal on top of inflation and output.
Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between communication and central bank
conservativeness. It turns out that when the assessment errors on output gap
expectations are not too persistent, a central bank deciding to be more transparent
can afford to be more conservative since the benefits from higher transparency in
terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative is the central bank.
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Appendix A Assessment Errors on Output and
Inflation Expectations
In this section we show that including assessment errors regarding private sector
expectations of future inflation yields the same qualitative results as in the main















We can now plug (A.1) in (4.2) and the resulting expression in (4.1) to get
xt = − βλ
α + λ2





















Next, solve (A.3) by applying the method of undetermined coefficients. We con-














t + Bπ7ut (A.4)
Then from this follows private sector expectations analogous to the main text.
Ept πt+1 = Bπ1E(w
π
t |sπt , wπt−1) + Bπ2E(wxt |sxt , wxt−1) (A.5)
= Bπ1((1−K)ρwπt−1 + Ksπt ) + Bπ2((1−K)ρwxt−1 + Ksxt )
Next substituting (A.5) in (A.3) and simplifying we get
πt =
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Consistency of RE requires the matching of the coefficients in (A.6) with those of
(A.4):
Bπ1 =
ρλ(αφ + λ(β + φλ)
(1− βρ)α + λ2
Bπ2 =
ρλ(α + λ2)

















Now with these set of coefficients for the equilibrium inflation process, we can
say something about the effect of changing K (the degree of transparency) on the
























where we have made use of the relation σ2wj = σ
2
ηj/(1 − ρ2) and σ2εj = 1−KK σ2wj for
j = π, x. It is not difficult to show that increasing the value of K unambiguously
raises the variability of inflation. How about the effect of K on output variability?







t −Bx4εxt + Bx5ηπt −Bx6ηxt + Bx7ut (A.8)
where






α + λ2(1− βρ)−1
14Note that Bπ7 and Bx7 (see below) are not functions of K.
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Bx5 = φ +
βλ(1−KBπ1)
α + λ2
Bx6 = 1− βλKBπ2
α + λ2
Bx7 = − λ
α + λ2
Equation (A.8) makes it clear that output (like inflation) responds positively to
current assessment errors (wπt and w
x
t ) but unlike inflation it responds negatively

























From (A.9), we observe that, unlike inflation, the variability of output is negatively
related to K. Thus it appears that increasing K improves the performance of output
at the expense of inflation.
All the relevant B’s either monotonically decrease or monotonically increase with
K. We consider only the extreme cases of no communication K = 0 and full
communication K = 1. For this take the difference
ELsK=1 − ELsK=0 =
βρλ2(αφ + λ(β + φλ))2









Q = 2(α− αs)(α + λ2)− βρ(α2 − αs(2α + λ2))
Observe that the coefficient of σ2u does not depend on K; thus this term vanishes
from (A.10). Given the structure of the economy, the sign of (A.10) depends on
the sign of Q that in turn depends on the relative sizes of α and αs. Therefore it
turns out that the general case that includes inflation rate assessment errors has
the same condition as the simpler case we considered in the main text.
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Appendix B Information Transmission
Through a Limited Capacity Channel
In the main text, we took a short cut and assumed that through its communication
policy the central bank controls the signal-to-noise ratio by choosing τ in σ2ε = τσ
2
η,
where the value of σ2η is exogenously fixed but commonly known.
In this appendix we show how the short cut used in the main text can be moti-
vated. To accomplish this goal, we makes use of the notion of ”channel capacity”
borrowed from the literature on information theory that was first developed by
Shannon (1948). The capacity of a noisy channel is typically related to informa-
tion processing constraints. This constraint places a lower bound on the maximum
possible reduction of noise in the signal extraction problem that private agents
solve. In particular, the variance of the noise is a function of the capacity of the
channel that agents use to encode the input signal into an output signal. The
variance of the noise can be expressed in terms of the exogenously given variance
of the input signal. This simplifies the algebra as the only parameter in the signal
extraction that one needs to keep track of is the capacity of the channel.
Information theory has recently been applied to economics by Sims (1998, 2003).
Sims looks at macroeconomic implications of decisions by agents that are con-
strained by information processing. Adam (2003) follows Sim’s approach in a study
of optimal monetary policy when firms have private information about shocks hit-
ting the economy. In the framework that is analyzed here, the central bank commu-
nicates about its assessment of expectations to the public through an information
channel that may be subject to limited capacity. The idea is that the central bank
provides the public with the models and procedures used in the central bank’s
assessments.15
The private sector constructs its observation equation that produces st, which is
observed as a result of wt being contaminated with a noise εt whose variance the
central bank can influence indirectly by its choice of the capacity of the channel of
communication, C. The private sector is able to extract information about wt such
that the noise generated, εt, is designed to have a minimum variance. This makes
the signal extraction problem a simple function of the primitive parameter C.
To see this point more clearly, a brief derivation follows. In dealing with the
information channel with limited capacity, information theory defines a measure of
uncertainty of a random variable, called entropy.16 The entropy of a random input





15Announcements and published reports are also possible sources of information regarding the
central bank’s assessment of expectations.
16This measure has several attractive properties compared to other measures of uncertainty
(see Cover and Thomas (1991) for a textbook treatment).
17Time-subscripts are dropped for clarity.
62
Communication, Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy
where p(w) is a probability density function of w. Shannon has shown that given
the variance, σ2w, H(w) is maximized when p(w) is a normal density function. In





Assume w is normal, and introduce a second random variable, s. If w and s are not
independent, conditioning on s reduces the entropy of w. The information about
w obtained by observing s, is called the mutual information, denoted by I(w, s).
It is given by
I(w, s) = H(w)−H(w|s)
In our case the public uses observations on s to inform itself about the input signal
w. The capacity of the communication channel C places an upper bound on the
maximum attainable mutual information,
I(w, s) ≤ C
It turns out that I(w, s) attains a maximum, so that I(w, s) = C, if the private
sector is able to construct its signal s in such a way that the noise ε is normal
and independent of the input w. This results in a minimum noise variance for a
given level of entropy. We assume that the public can encode the input signal such
that the minimum noise variance is achieved. This implies that the measurement
equation is s = w + ε, and since w and ε are normal, s is also normal. Moreover,
based on the measurement equation, I(w, s) can easily be calculated.18
First, using a basic theorem from information theory (see, for instance, Cover and
Thomas, 1991) we have the following equivalence relation
I(w, s) = H(w)−H(w|s) = H(s)−H(s|w)
In words, the amount of uncertainty reduction for the two jointly distributed vari-
ables is the same whether we use observations on s to infer about w or vice versa.



















18Note that the measurement equation has the same form as in standard signal extraction,
where typically assumes that the variance of ε is exogenously fixed. By contrast, here the mea-
surement equation is not assumed a priori, but is a result of optimal coding under a limited
capacity channel.
19From equation (4.23) it is easier to compute the conditional probability distribution for s|w
than for w|s.
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Optimal information processing by the private sector implies that channel capacity












where σ2w and C are primitive parameters. It follows that
σ2ε =
σ2w





where τ = 1
(1−ρ2)(e2C−1) .
Obviously, from equation (B.1) and (B.2), the (minimum) variance of the noise due









Strict Inflation Targeting and
Passive Learning
5.1 Introduction1
One of the fundamental problems in the design of monetary policy is the existence
of uncertainty about the true transmission mechanism, running from policy in-
struments to final target variables. Besides uncertainty associated with exogenous
shocks, (often called additive uncertainty), important parameters in the economic
structure are usually unknown to monetary authorities and may change over time
in an unpredictable manner.
This chapter and the next fit in the recently revived research on the role of param-
eter uncertainty in optimal monetary policy, first analyzed by Brainard (1967). In
particular, it follows some recent studies that deal with the issue of how aggres-
sive monetary policy should be in uncertain economic environment where there is
a possibility to learn over time about unknown parameters in the economic sys-
tem by using monetary policy instruments to generate data that improves future
parameter estimation and in turn control of the system.
Our work builds on the backward-looking model of inflation and output determina-
tion popularized by Svensson (1997) for monetary policy analysis, where inflation is
affected by lagged aggregate demand, which in turn depends on the lagged short-
term real interest rate controlled by the central bank. Svensson (1997) remarks
that in a more elaborate model, a term structure can be incorporated. Doing so
makes the model more realistic as monetary policy is conventionally viewed as
running from short-term interest rates managed by central banks to longer term
rates that influence aggregate demand (Goodfriend, 1998). This chapter works in
that direction by introducing the term structure of interest rates in an otherwise
1An earlier version of chapter 5 (co-authored by Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling) has
already been published as a CEPR Discussion Paper and Bank of Finland Discussion Paper.
67
Chapter 5. Strict Inflation Targeting and Passive Learning
backward-looking model. By including the term structure, we have a richer ver-
sion of the transmission mechanism. Moreover, we introduce imperfect information
and learning about the term structure of interest rates that could have potential
consequences for the conduct of optimal policy.
5.2 Information Asymmetry, the Term Structure
and Monetary Policy
The term structure relates short-term and long-term interest rates via the ex-
pectations hypothesis, where the private sector forms expectations of next period
long-term rates while the central bank has perfect control of the short-term rate.
The interaction of the two parties determines current long-term rates that deter-
mine the level of aggregate spending. For instance, Goodfriend (1998) points out
that this perspective had been exposed by John Hicks’s expectations theory of
the term structure, where ”a central bank’s leverage over the longer term rates
comes from the fact that the market determines these as the average expected level
of short rates over the relevant horizon (abstracting from a term premium and
default risk).”2
Under symmetric information between the private sector and the central bank,
Svensson’s characterization of inflation forecast targeting can be extended so as to
include the effect of the term structure, and with it, forward-looking private sector
expectations. Then, the extended model has the feature that, at the time of making
its interest rate decisions, the central bank needs information on private sector
expectations of the one-period-ahead long-term interest rate (see Eijffinger et al.,
2000b). More importantly, however, one can introduce information asymmetries in
the term structure relationship as a result of the central bank’s inability to observe
private sector expectations perfectly. Moreover, the case of limited information
concerning private sector expectations of the long rate gives rise to multiplicative
parameter uncertainty so that optimal control by the central bank affects the speed
of learning about the unknown parameter and vice versa.
The incentive to learn about the term structure relationship emerges due to asym-
metric information, where the central bank does not have full information about
private agents’s expectations of the long-term interest rates and thus needs to learn
about them over time using the latest available data and a forecasting function.
The nature of the asymmetric information is such that it induces the central bank
to learn the private sector’s forecasts, which are based on a commonly known fore-
casting rule. In particular, although it understands that forecasts of the long-term
2Goodfriend also discusses an alternative theoretical perspective of the term structure, one
that is based on the Fisher decomposition of the nominal bond rate into expected inflation and
an expected real return. In this case, he says ”working in the other direction, the long bond rate
contains a premium for expected inflation and, thus, is an indicator of the credibility of a central
bank’s commitment to low inflation.”
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interest rates are a function of the current state of the economy, the central bank
does not know the parameter in the forecasting rule.
We think it is quite reasonable that the central bank has imperfect knowledge of
private sector expectations. Actually recent papers on adaptive learning and the
performance of simple monetary policy rules take imperfect observability of expec-
tations as a realistic scenario. For example, Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) study
determinacy and stability properties of New Keynesian monetary policy models
when inflation forecasts are heterogenous and agents are learning adaptively.3 They
note that central banks typically observe private sector inflation expectations with
error and that these observation errors can be so large that central banks must rely
on their own (internal) forecasts of inflation.
In the adaptive learning literature, central bank learning about unknown parame-
ters of interest is implemented using recursive least-squares, whereby beliefs about
the parameters are updated in each period with the arrival of new information
about the economy. But this does not go further than incorporating the effects
of these updating procedures on the actual law of motion of the economy. Even
though one may argue that the hypothesis of adaptive learning relaxes the stronger
assumption of rational expectations, and is thus more realistic, it abstracts from
the challenge faced by the central bank in real time with the simultaneous problem
of controlling the economy and estimating (learning about) important structural
parameters. By contrast, what makes active learning more interesting is that it
recognizes the fact that the arrival of new information is partly a result of policy
actions of the central bank and that the behavior of the central bank is affected by
this fact.
5.3 Related Literature
Within the inflation forecast targeting framework, Svensson (1999) allows for mul-
tiplier uncertainty in the dynamic linear model of Svensson (1997) and finds that,
for a strict inflation targeting central bank and abstracting from learning issues, the
optimal interest rate rule is less aggressive to new information than that implied by
a policy based on certainty equivalence, a policy that ignores such uncertainty, and
sets the level of the instrument based on the latest available estimate of the policy
multiplier. That is, multiplier uncertainty calls for a more gradual adjustment of
the conditional inflation forecast towards the target. His result is in line with that
found in a generic static linear model, first pointed out by Brainard (1967).4 The
reason for a more cautious policy is due to the fact that the conditional variability
3The object in the adaptive learning literature is whether simple monetary policy rules that
take into account learning considerations lead to what is called expectational stability (E-stability
for short) of the rational expectations equilibria.
4At the time, Brainard’s result was an important contribution to the then existing literature
that ignored multiplicative uncertainty.
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of the target variable, here inflation, depends positively on the policy instrument,
and by being cautious, the policy maker reduces the impact of the variance of the
unknown policy multiplier on the variance of the target variable.5
However, Schaling (2004) calls for a more aggressive policy response in a frame-
work that modifies Svensson (1997) with a non-linear Phillips curve, which gives
rise to uncertainty in the policy multiplier even if the model has only additive
demand shocks.6 Under strict inflation targeting, he shows that policy is more ag-
gressive than implied by certainty equivalence. Thus under multiplier uncertainty,
Brainard’s result does not always go through when there are inherent non-linearities
in the economy.
A drawback of these studies is that optimal policy is conducted on a period by
period basis, as there is no role for active learning. This is the case if one assumes
that the unknown parameters are randomly drawn independent of past realizations
so that parameter uncertainty is renewed every period. As a result, this scenario
leaves no scope for the policy maker to learn about the unknown random parameter
from past data.
Several recent studies have revived the issues of active learning and optimal mon-
etary policy under multiplier uncertainty.7 The literature typically constructs the
problem of learning and control around a simple regression model where the ex-
planatory variable is also the control variable, a policy instrument such as the
interest rate, whose coefficient has to be estimated and at the same time decisions
have to be made about the appropriate level of the instrument that minimizes the
expected loss from the variability of the dependent variable, say inflation, around a
desired target level. Here, the policy maker has the opportunity to learn about the
unknown parameters by actively generating information. In particular, the cen-
tral bank can affect its own learning possibilities through its current choice of the
policy instrument. But in doing so it sacrifices short-term goals to carry out exper-
iments.8 In this case, one has to differentiate between three policy rules– certainty
equivalence, myopic, and optimal (Prescott, 1972). The first two rules ignore the
dynamic link between learning and control. While the certainty equivalence rule
ignores parameter uncertainty, the myopic rule allows for uncertainty surround-
ing the unknown parameters. On the other hand, the optimal policy incorporates
active learning.9
5In what follows, the terms cautionary, less aggressive, less responsive and less activist are
used interchangeably.
6The non-linear Phillips curve is assumed to be convex in output. This means that starting
from say a zero steady state inflation, a positive output gap is more inflationary than an equal
but negative gap is deflationary.
7Early economic applications of active learning and control include a monopolist firm that
experiments with price and sacrifices current expected profits in order to learn about its demand
curve In this case, the process to be controlled is deterministic but unknown to the decision
maker. This raises naturally the question of whether learning converges in the limit to the truth.
8Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) call this ”sacrificing current reward in exchange for information.”
9Active learning raises two issues: one is related to the computationally oriented literature,
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A careful reading of this strand of literature shows that most studies assume the
presence of uncertainty in the policy multiplier. The policy multiplier can be mod-
eled as the coefficient on the money supply (Bertocchi and Spagat, 1993; Balvers
and Casimano, 1994), the rate of interest (Wieland, 1998; Ellison, 2003), or infla-
tion (Yetman, 2002; Ellison and Valla, 2001). A common feature of these studies
is that the linear economic process subject to central bank control is static, as in
Brainard (1967). Thus all dynamics in the economy are only due to central bank
learning.10
Under uncertainty in the policy multiplier, experimentation may require the cen-
tral bank to be more responsive to new information on the state of the economy
(thus higher variability of the policy instrument). This turns out be the case in
Bertocchi and Spagat (1993), Balvers and Casimano (1994) and Wieland (1998),
who argue that monetary policy should be more responsive to new information
and actively seek to generate information even if there are costs in terms of short-
term volatility in the target variable. Although the problem is not formulated in
terms of monetary policy instrument and targets, Beck and Wieland (2002) also
reach a similar conclusion for a decision maker that cares about parameter uncer-
tainty.11 This conclusion undermines the basic Brainard (1967) result that calls
for more cautious policy (implying a lower variability of the policy instrument).
What drives these recent results (calling for a more active policy) is the possibility
that the central bank can learn about the unknown parameter and thus improve
performance in the future, a feature which is absent in the static model of Brainard
(1967).
However, Ellison and Valla (2001) argue in favor of a more cautionary policy under
active learning by appealing to strategic considerations. They show that strategic
interactions between the central bank and the private sector introduce additional
costs associated with activist policy. More specifically, while activist monetary
policy may generate valuable information, it can lead to volatile inflation expecta-
tions that in turn hinder the central bank from holding inflation and output stable
around their targets. Ellison and Valla (2001) thus restore the main message of
Brainard (1967), although for reasons related to optimal learning.
Our model, although linear, differs from most of the above mentioned studies in
two respects. First, the structural equations in our model are dynamic even if one
assumes that there is no learning by the central bank. This is due to the presence of
endogenous persistence (inertia) in the economy in the sense that future economic
conditions depend in part on the current state of the economy.12 Second, while
which started originally in disciplines such as in control engineering and later adapted to economic
applications (e.g., Prescott, 1972). The focus is the comparison of the three alternative decision
rules. The second issue is about the asymptotic properties of the beliefs and actions of the decision
maker under optimal Bayesian learning (e.g., Kiefer and Nyarko, 1989).
10Exceptions are (Wieland, 1998; Beck and Wieland, 2002).
11Of course, the target and instrument variables in Beck and Wieland (2002) can readily be
adapted to a monetary policy setting.
12See e.g., Clarida et al. (1999) for the use of the term endogenous persistence in inflation.
71
Chapter 5. Strict Inflation Targeting and Passive Learning
the literature typically studies uncertainty about a policy multiplier, the nature of
information symmetry in our term structure equation implies that the persistence
parameter in the linear process is unknown to the central bank. In a generic model,
Beck and Wieland (2002) analyze uncertainty in the policy multiplier when there
is endogenous persistence in the state variable.
For a linear process, Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) have shown that if the variable that
is multiplicative to the unknown parameter does not converge to a constant, beliefs
converge with probability one to the truth. In our case, this condition is fulfilled
since the exogenous random shocks prevent the path of the state variable, which is
multiplicative to the unknown persistence parameter in the dynamic process, from
settling down to a constant steady state. Neither can policy (which is subject to
control lags) fully stabilize the state variable since the random shocks are unpre-
dictable at the time of policy setting. Thus beliefs converge with probability one to
the correct values in the limit and current actions of the central bank do not hin-
der the long run properties of its beliefs (see also section 5.9). With this in mind,
we concentrate on characterizing the degree of policy activism under alternative
decision rules.13
The analysis under learning is conducted under two alternative scenarios. The
first assumes that the central bank decides on policy based on a signal about pri-
vate sector expectations, while in the second scenario, the central bank’s regression
model is based on a semi-reduced form equation derived from the structural equa-
tions. In both cases, the central bank is involved in filtering incoming data on the
economy, which helps it improve its knowledge of the unknown parameter. In the
limiting case where the random demand and supply shocks have zero variances,
the semi-reduced equation becomes deterministic and there is no need for learning.
When the signaling equation is active, parameter updating is possible if the state
variable is initially away from its target (zero). Sooner or later learning stops since
the deterministic state variable moves towards a constant (zero) steady state value
(see also section 5.9).
5.4 Plan of chapter 5 and 6
The analysis in chapter 5 is conducted for a monetary policy regime that cares only
about inflation variability, that is, strict inflation targeting. One can then compare
the results from this exercise with the benchmark model of Svensson (1997). Our
The persistence in inflation is endogenous in the sense that current inflation depends partly
on last period’s inflation. This contrasts with persistence in inflation that arises as a result of
autoregressive behavior in the exogenous shocks driving inflation.
13By contrast, in a static model with uncertainty about the policy multiplier, which has been
considered in most studies, if the policy instrument converges too quickly then beliefs may fail to
converge to the correct values as it becomes difficult to estimate the parameter due to very little
or no variability in the instrument. Thus present actions of the central bank are important for
convergence properties of limit beliefs.
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structural equations are similar to those of Eijffinger et al. (2000b), which also
extend Svensson (1997) using the term structure equation but without learning
considerations.
The remainder of chapter 5 is structured as follows. We first present the inflation
forecast targeting framework and discuss the transmission mechanism that includes
the term structure of interest rates. Next, the optimal policy rule is derived under
perfect knowledge as a benchmark. Then we extend the framework by introducing
imperfect knowledge and passive learning. The analysis is conducted under strict
inflation targeting, where policy completely stabilizes predictable fluctuations in
inflation, while actual (observed) fluctuations are only due to the initial impact of
unpredictable shocks and forecast errors as the result of uncertainty in the unknown
parameter. We conclude the chapter with a preliminary discussion of optimal policy
under active learning. We also touch upon the dynamics of passive learning and
convergence of beliefs and using simulations we illustrate that beliefs ultimately
converge to the truth.
Chapter 6 builds on the same set of equations and notion of information asymmetry
as in chapter 5 but allows for
• a flexible inflation targeting regime and
• active learning by the central bank with uncertainty about the term structure.
The main question is the performance of alternative decision rules for the pol-
icy rate, the short-term interest rate. As mentioned previously, we differentiate
between the three policy rules: certainty equivalence, myopic policy, dynamically
optimal policy, where the first two separate the estimation and control part of the
problem and are categorized under passive learning in the sense of disregarding
the dynamic link between current decisions and future beliefs about the unknown
parameters. Under the optimal policy, the central bank recognizes the tradeoff
between estimation and control, and that current policy actions and economic out-
comes influence the speed of learning by providing information that may improve
future performance.
5.5 The Policy Problem
In this section we describe the inflation forecast targeting framework, with the
transmission mechanism that incorporates the term structure of interest rates. First
the current period rate of inflation is determined by its lagged level and the lagged
output gap.
πt+1 = πt + α1zt − ηt+1 (5.1)
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where z is the (log of) the output gap with its coefficient α1 > 0. The output gap
is defined as the difference between actual output and potential output, which is
conveniently normalized to zero, and η is a normally distributed white noise supply
shock.
The output gap is autoregressive and is affected by the long-term real rate:
zt+1 = β1zt − β2Rt + dt+1 (5.2)
where R is long-term real rate, d is a white noise demand shock that is also assumed
to be normally distributed. Moreover, the two coefficients satisfy the restriction
β1 > 0 and β2 > 0. This relationship is similar to the one used by Rudebusch
and Svensson (2002). The differences are that here the output gap depends on the
long-term real interest rate rather than the short-term real interest rate, and that
they consider an additional lagged z term.
Finally, the short-term real interest rate (rt), which can perfectly be controlled by
the central bank,14 and the long real rate are related by the expectations theory of
the term structure
rt = Rt −D(ÊtRt+1 −Rt) (5.3)
where ÊtRt+1 denotes private sector (private sector) expectations (where the hat
sign ’ˆ’ is appended to denote possibly nonrational private sector expectations) of
next period’s long real rate.15 Here rt represents the real yield to maturity on a
one-period bond which is traded on the interbank money market. This yield must
be equal to the (one-period) real holding period return on a long-term bond. The
parameter D is defined such that D + 1 is equal to what is known as Macaulay’s
duration (see Eijffinger et al. (2000b) for details). For our purposes it turns out to
be convenient to rewrite (5.3) so that the current long real rate is expressed as a
linear combination of rt and ÊtRt+1:
Rt = (1− k)rt + kÊtRt+1 + ζt (5.4)
where k ≡ D/(D + 1). We have added a normally distributed white noise term ζt,
where ζt ∼ (0, σ2ζ ), to capture unobserved term premium. One may postulate that
the significance of ζt increases with k.
16 Thus we may implicity define a function
ζt = kξt where ξt is another white noise shock. Then ζt → 0 if k → 0 since in that
case the term premium vanishes by construction, (ζt = 0 for all t). In that case, the
14The central bank has perfect control over the real short rate, rt, because rt = it − Etπt+1
where Etπt+1 is predetermined at time t.
15This will be relevant when discussing central bank learning under imperfect knowledge.
16Of course, there is no a priori reason for choosing a linear relationship. One might as well
assume that ζt is proportional to k2 or use any monotonic relationship that implies limk→0 ζt = 0.
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duration of the long-term bond is equal to one and there is no distinction between
short and long-term interest rates.
The presence of unobserved shocks in the term structure is not that essential when
the central bank directly observes ÊtRt+1. Under perfect knowledge, we set ζt = 0
for all periods without loss of generality. On the other hand, the presence of
unobserved shocks becomes relevant when we examine asymmetric information
between the central bank and the private sector, namely, when the central bank
can not directly observe ÊtRt+1 (see section 5.8).




kj(1− k)(it+j − πt+1+j) (5.5)
It remains to specify the preference of the central bank. The central bank chooses










(πτ − π∗)2 (5.6)
subject to (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4). Here, π∗ is the central bank’s inflation target and
δ is the discount rate with (0 < δ < 1). The expectations operator Et refers to
the central bank’s expectations conditional on the information set in period t. It
is obvious that the derivation of the optimal short rate depends on the assumed
information structure, including model and data uncertainty faced by the central
bank.
5.6 Similarity with the New Keynesian Model
Before we proceed to solve the model for an inflation targeting central bank, it is
worthwhile to point out the similarity between this chapter’s model, implied by
equations (5.1) to (5.4), and the forward-looking New Keynesian (FLNK) model
that we employed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In those chapters we saw the importance of
forward-looking inflation and output expectations in the transmission mechanism.
Of course, if the term structure equation is switched off, (i.e., k = 0), then there is
no distinction between short and long-term interest rates, and there is no role for
forward-looking private sector expectations. This takes us back to the backward-
looking model of Svensson (1997), which differs markedly also from the micro-
founded FLNK models.
17Since Etπt+1 is predetermined, we write the optimization problem in terms of choosing
{rτ}∞τ=t.
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As pointed out by Clarida et al. (1999), in the FLNK model, the IS equation
is obtained by log-linearizing the consumption Euler equation that arises from
households’ optimal saving decision. Translated into this chapter’s notation, the
New Keynesian IS equation is given by:
zt = Êtzt+1 − β2(it − Êtπt+1) + dt (5.7)
This equation differs from equation (5.2) mainly because current output depends
on expected future output as well as the (ex ante) short real interest rate. The intu-
ition behind equation (5.7) is that, since households (consumers) prefer to smooth
consumption, expectation of higher consumption in the next period (associated
with higher expected output) leads them to want to consume more today, which
raises current output demand. This implies that higher expected future output
raises current output. In turn the negative effect of the real rate on current output
reflects intertemporal substitution of consumption. In this respect, the interest
elasticity, β2, corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. So, ab-
sent a term structure equation, the IS curve of the FLNK model differs in two ways
from the purely backward-looking model of Svensson (1997). First, current output
depends on expected future output rather than on past output, and second, the
parameter β2 is micro founded, namely it is no longer a free ad hoc parameter but
is equal to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.




[−β2(it+j − πt+1+j) + dt+j] (5.8)
According to Clarida et al. (1999), equation (5.8) illustrates the degree to which
beliefs about the future affect current aggregate activity within the FLNK model.
The output gap depends not only on the current real rate and the demand shock,
but also on the expected future paths of these two variables.
At this stage it is interesting to compare equation (5.8) with the IS equation in our
model that includes the forward-looking term structure equation. To keep things
simple, set β1 = 0 in our IS equation (5.2) and ignore the term premium. Then,
using equation (5.4) in equation (5.2), and taking note of equation (5.5), we have:
zt+1 = −β2(1− k)Êt
∞∑
j=0
kj(it+j − πt+j+1) + dt+1 (5.9)
Comparing (5.9) with (5.8) from Clarida et al. (1999), we see that in (5.8) the
current level of activity depends on private sector expectations about future short
real interest rates and the demand shock. In our model - with the term structure
switched on, (k > 0), the future level of output depends on beliefs about future
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short real rates.18 The ’dependent variable’ is future rather than current output
because of the control lag of monetary policy. Current period policy affects the
next year’s level of output, not the present level, as in Clarida et al. (1999). So,
apart from the fact that beliefs about the future do not include the demand shock,
the only difference between our IS curve and the IS curve in the FLNK model is
the one-year control lag of monetary policy.
So far the comparison has been made for simple versions of the two models. A simi-
lar comparison can also be made when both models incorporate a more complicated
interaction of forward and backward-looking elements. For example, a good em-
pirical fit for inflation based on the FLNK model usually includes lagged inflation,
resulting in what is known as a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. The hybrid
variant reflects some inertia in the rate of inflation and nests the purely FLNK
model considered here (see Clarida et al., 1999).
5.7 Optimal Policy under Perfect Knowledge
Under a strict inflation targeting regime, the central bank minimizes the intertem-
poral loss function (5.6) taking into account the dynamic equations (5.1), (5.2) and
(5.4). To get some straightforward results, this section assumes that the central
bank can observe and respond directly to private sector expectations and moreover
that the private sector and the central bank have rational expectations.19 In this
section, we also set ζt = 0 for all t without loss of generality.
The timing of events is such that the central bank chooses its interest rate policy
after private sector expectations are set. In the terminology of game theory, the pri-
vate sector is a Stackelberg leader and the central bank is a Stackelberg follower.
As the Stackelberg leader, the private sector sets ÊtRt+1 in the knowledge that
the central bank, the Stackelberg follower, will treat private sector expectations
as given. The private sector understands the central bank’s optimization problem
and works out the central bank’s interest rate rule, r(πt, zt, ÊtRt+1); it then uses
this information when setting ÊtRt+1. The central bank then observes the real-
izations of zt, πt, and ÊtRt+1 and chooses rt (through the choice of it, given that
Êtπt+1 = Etπt+1 is predetermined). In a Stackelberg equilibrium, the best response
function, r(πt, zt, ÊtRt+1), minimizes the monetary authority’s intertemporal loss
given ÊtRt+1. At the same time, private sector expectations are rational given the
interest rate rule.
Sequence of events in period t
zt, πt realize → private sector sets → central bank chooses
ÊtRt+1 rt = r(zt, πt, ÊtRt+1)
18It is easy to see that if the term premium were included, the future level of output would also
depend on forecasts of future term premiums.
19So, the central bank knows how much policy is ’in the pipeline’ according to financial markets.
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By definition, under strict inflation targeting, there is no other goal besides inflation
stabilization. Moreover, under full information on model parameters and private
sector expectations, the additive shocks are the only sources of uncertainty facing
the central bank; thus one can invoke certainty equivalence. With no tradeoffs
in the loss function and with the presence of only additive shocks, the dynamic
optimization problem is equivalent to period-by-period optimization, whereby strict
inflation targeting implies setting rt such that expected inflation two-period ahead
is at the desired target. The first-order condition in terms of expected inflation is
thus (see Appendix A for details)20
Etπt+2 = π
∗ (5.10)
Thus, optimal policy for a strict inflation targeting regime defined by (5.6) implies
inflation forecast targeting in the sense of Svensson (1997). That is, the best
the central bank can do is to set the short rate such that it expects inflation two-
period ahead to be on target. The first-order condition, together with the structural
constraints, lead to a closed form solution for the short-term real interest rate:
rt =
1





1− k ÊtRt+1 (5.11)
This rule is similar to simple (non-optimal) Taylor-type rules, which are widely
used for policy analysis, with the exception that now policy also responds directly
to ÊtRt+1, the private sector’s forecast of the long real rate. This modification is
a result of the term structure equation that has been embedded in an otherwise
backward-looking model (see also Eijffinger et al., 2000b, 2004). It is easy to check
that if k = 0 and the term structure equation vanishes, the policy rule collapses to
a version of the Taylor rule analyzed by Svensson (1997) (hereafter the Svensson-
Taylor rule).21
An interesting characteristic of this solution is that the central bank’s optimal
choice of rt is inversely related to private sector expectations about its future short
rates. For example, if the private sector expects rates to go up (down) in the
future, as a consequence current real short rates are lowered (raised) today. The
property that if the private sector expects future short rates to go down the central
bank raises current short real rate (or talks about raising it) reminds us of the
old joke about the Bundesbank (BuBa): ”The BuBa is just like cream, the more
you stir it, the thicker it gets.”22 The reason for this inverse relationship is that
20See also Svensson (1997) and Eijffinger et al. (2004). Even though the first-order condi-
tion in terms of Etπt+2 is equivalent to that in Svensson (1997), our optimal level of the short
rate responds to three state variables– πt, zt, and ÊtRt+1, which are part of the central bank’s
information set. In Svensson (1997) the state variables are πt and zt.
21Taylor rules are often written in terms of the it. Given the definition of rt one can easily
derive the optimal level of it from (5.11).
22In addition, the Bundesbank always considered the long-term interest rate as a reflection of
its credibility.
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the central bank’s inflation forecast– given the current period inflation rate and
the output gap– depends on the present level of the real long-term interest rate.
So, an optimal inflation forecast implies an optimal level of the current long real
rate. Since the optimal long real rate (consistent with strict inflation targeting) is
a weighted average of the current ex ante optimal short rate r∗t and ÊtRt+1, i.e.
R∗t = (1 − k)r∗t + kÊtRt+1, where according to equation (5.11) a higher value of
ÊtRt+1 necessitates a lower value of r
∗
t , and vice versa.
23
Next the four equation system is solved for a rational expectations equilibrium.
Inserting the reaction function (5.11) in the term structure (5.4) implies that Rt




(πt − π∗) + 1 + β1
β2
zt (5.12)
Importantly, this solution shows that the effects of private sector expectations of
the long rate are completely offset when the central bank can observe and respond
to those expectations. We can of course derive the exact form of those expectations.
Inserting (5.12) in the output equation gives the reduced form solution:
zt+1 = − 1
α1
(πt − π∗)− zt + dt+1 (5.13)
Next, forwarding (5.12) one period and using equations (5.13) and (5.1) we get:
Rt+1 = − β1
α1β2
(πt − π∗) + β1
β2
zt + ut+1 (5.14)
where ut+1 ≡ 1+β1β2 dt+1 − 1β2 ηt+1 is a composite white noise shock, independent of
policy and the state of the economy. Taking expectations as of time t gives:
ÊtRt+1 = − β1
α1β2
(πt − π∗)− β1
β2
zt (5.15)
This result represents the rational expectations solution under symmetric infor-
mation, where private sector expectations are consistent with the solution for the
long-term real interest rate implied by strict inflation targeting. Alternatively, we
can express rt in reduced form by plugging (5.15) into the reaction function (5.11):
rt =
1 + kβ1
α1β2(1− k)(πt − π
∗) +
1 + β1(k + 1)
β2(1− k) zt (5.16)
23In other words, if the private sector expects a looser monetary policy in the future, this leads
to a tighter policy stance today to compensate.
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As can be seen from (5.16) the ex ante real rate, rt, is now expressed in terms of
current inflation and output.24 In this way we can compare the behavior of rt in
(5.16) with the Svensson-Taylor rule that results by setting k = 0. We can easily
check that when 0 < k < 1 and the term structure is relevant, rt becomes more
sensitive to changes in the states πt and zt. Moreover the higher the value of k,
the more volatile rt. The intuition for this result is as follows. If k increases the
term structure says that private sector expectations become more important in
determining Rt, a variable that directly affects aggregate demand. To offset the
decrease in the policy leverage on Rt, the central bank needs to be more aggressive
in responding to changes in πt and zt.
5.8 Imperfect Knowledge and Passive Learning
The previous section looked at a benchmark case of perfect knowledge where the
central bank perfectly observes and responds to private sector expectations of the
long real rate. Although the model extends Svensson (1997), endowing the cen-
tral bank with perfect knowledge of private sector expectations is hardly realistic.
Central banks typically observe private sector expectations with error and that
these observation errors can be large (Evans and Honkapohja, 2002). In practice,
the challenge for any central bank is that financial markets are sophisticated in
analyzing and predicting future monetary policy actions of the central bank. This
increased degree of sophistication makes it harder for the central bank to observe
private sector expectations without error. It is thus natural to relax the assump-
tion of perfect knowledge by introducing uncertainty with regards to private sector
expectations.25
Suppose that the private sector’s forecasting function for the long real rate takes
the same form as the rational expectations solution under full information, equation
(5.15). That is expectations respond to information on the current period state
variables- inflation and output. Specifically,
ÊtRt+1 = γwt (5.17)
where we have defined a new variable wt ≡ −(πt + zt) and for the purpose of
tractability we have set α1 = 1 and π
∗ = 0. The nature of imperfect information
is such that, the central bank knows the private sector’s forecasting rule, but not
the actual value of γ. Let ct denote the best forecast of γ and pt the variance of ct,
(the degree of confidence placed upon ct), of which more will be said later.
26
24Eijffinger et al. (2000b) also derive a similar reaction function (in ex post terms) for the case
of flexible inflation targeting.
25We continue to assume that the central bank knows the structural model of the economy,
including the parameters.
26Under imperfect information, the exact value of γ is not crucial for the results that follow.
From the perspective of the central bank, the unknown parameter γ can take any real number.
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By positing a simple forecasting function for the private sector, we abstract from the
interaction of optimal monetary policy and rational expectations on the part of the
private sector. This way, our formulation of the learning rule of the private sector
follows the recently revived literature on adaptive expectations, which assumes that
the private sector behaves adaptively (see for e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
In this case, unlike rational expectations, adaptive learning reduces the burden of
computing the equilibrium outcomes of a game between the central bank and the
private sector. In a fully specified model, one has to solve for private sector ex-
pectations that takes into account the fact that the central bank is learning about
the parameter γ. Since the state variables include the central bank’s parameter
estimates and associated uncertainty, private sector expectations also need to in-
corporate this fact when forming expectations, which in turn should feed into the
central bank’s optimal control problem. These considerations would make the prob-
lem more realistic but at the cost of high computational complexity. Due to this
reason Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Yetman (2002) also assume adaptive
private sector expectations.
When the central bank conducts policy based on passive learning, by construction
it disregards the potential tradeoff between estimation and control. In other words,
the central bank simply ignores the effect of current policy actions on the degree of
precision of future estimates of the unknown parameter, thereby treating control
and estimation separately. Formally, the passive learning policy first calculates ct
and pt and then takes these to be fixed parameters at the stage of optimization,
which means that when choosing policy, the dynamic process of these estimates (so
called updating equations) are ignored. Likewise, before choosing rt+1 in period
t + 1 the central bank updates its belief about γ to ct+1, ignoring the fact that it
will have to update this estimate in the future.27 In this way the central bank fails
to internalize the effect of current actions on future beliefs.
Certainty equivalence is a special case of a passive learning policy since it ignores
pt by assumption. Thus, the policy maker does not incorporate pt even if the effect
of pt on the loss function could in principle be reduced by an appropriate choice of
rt.
28 In this case, the sequence of events can be described as follows:
Sequence of events in period t
zt, πt realize → private sector sets → central bank chooses
ÊtRt+1 = γwt rt = r(zt, πt, ct)
so that the certainty equivalence policy responds to ctwt, the best forecast of γwt.
In other words, ct simply replaces the true parameter γ in the interest rate rule.
29
27In the sense of Sargent (1999), passive learning implies that in any period t the central bank
pretends that its current estimate ct will apply forever, as if it is the true parameter. But the
central bank’s updating of its estimate in period t+1 falsifies this pretense.
28Note that having full confidence in ct is equivalent to assuming pt = 0.
29In general, with flexible inflation targeting, rt = r(zt, πt, ct, pt). See chapter 6.
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1 + β1 + β2kct
β2(1− k) zt (5.18)
So far nothing has been said regarding the estimation procedure for ct and pt. The
next two sections discuss alternative ways of dealing with asymmetry information
and associated estimation of the unknown parameter. In both procedures, the
central bank eventually learns γ for the reason given in section 5.3, namely that γ
is the coefficient of the state variable wt, which never settles down as it depends
on exogenous stochastic shocks. Thus, the choice of a procedure is inconsequential
to the ability of the central bank to learn the persistence parameter eventually.
5.8.1 Learning Based on a Signal
Following Eijffinger et al. (2004) assume that the central bank receives a noisy
signal yt about private sector expectations.
30 The signaling equation takes the
following form:
yt = ÊtRt+1 + εt = γwt + εt (5.19)
where ε is a measurement (observation) error, assumed to be independently and
normally distributed with mean zero and bounded variance, σ2ε . The only informa-
tion available to the central bank when it sets policy at time t is current and past
values of yt and wt. In this setting the central bank cannot observe separately the
two components (γ and εt), even ex post. A limiting case of (5.19) is the perfect
knowledge scenario where σ2ε = 0.
Sequence of events in period t
zt, πt realize → private sector sets → central bank observes yt
ÊtRt+1 = γwt and chooses rt
Here ct denotes the estimate of γ based on the model (5.19). Then the central
bank’s best guess of private sector expectations would be ctwt. If the central bank
proceeds by first estimating the model (5.19) and then choosing its interest rate
given ct, we have (5.18).
30A real world counterpart of signal processing can be that central banks collect information
on private sector interest rate expectations (say from surveys), which is then taken as a signal of
the true private sector expectations.
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The method by which the revised estimate of γ is obtained may be described as a
filtering process, which maps the sequence of prediction errors into a sequence of
revisions (see Appendix B).
ct+1 = ct + κt+1(yt+1 − ctwt+1)
pt+1 = pt − κt+1wt+1pt (5.20)
where κt+1 ≡ wt+1ptF−1t+1 is commonly referred to as the Kalman gain, the weight
assigned to new information coming from the latest forecast error, yt+1 − ctwt+1.
The Kalman gain in turn depends on the conditional variance of yt+1, given by
Ft+1 ≡ w2t+1pt + σ2ε . As can be seen from (5.20), wt+1 is a component of the
Kalman gain and thus affects the conditional variance of the parameter estimate,
pt+1. Due to the presence of autoregressive behavior in wt+1 and pt+1, changes in
the current state of the economy, wt, have persistent effects.
The updating equations in (5.20) represent the learning channel through which a
policy decision made in period t, rt, affects the state variable of period t+1, wt+1,
and consequently, beliefs about the unknown parameter (i.e. ct+1 = c(wt+1) and
pt+1 = p(wt+1)).
From (5.20), we see that ∂κt+1/∂σ
2
ε < 0. If the amount of noise that is contami-
nating the signal diminishes, more weight will be given to new information in the
prediction error, (yt+1 − Etyt+1 = yt+1 − ctwt+1), relative to the previous estimate
ct. Evans and Honkapohja (2002) point out that a policy rule based on a signal
may be optimal if the measurement error σ2ε is very small. In this case, the policy








This rule has the same form as the rule under perfect knowledge, (5.11), but where
ÊtRt+1 is replaced with yt. Note also that, if the variance of the noise is large, the
performance of the rule based on (5.22) turns out to be poor; in that case, optimal
signal extraction leads to the passive learning rule (5.18).
5.8.2 Learning Based on a Semi-reduced Form Equation
We now describe the setting of monetary policy under passive learning in a way
that is comparable to chapter 6, which examines the numerical solution for optimal
policy under active learning.31 First, since the central bank is assumed to have full
knowledge of the functional form (5.17), it knows that the term structure equation
under imperfect knowledge is,
Rt = (1− k)rt + kγwt + ζt (5.22)
31Here we abstract from signaling considerations.
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Observe that the unobserved term structure shock, ζt, injects additional uncertainty
and prevents the central bank from inferring, in any period, the value of γ from
(5.22).32 Next, substituting equation (5.22) in the IS and Phillips curves gives,
wt+1 = γ̃wt − β1zt + β̃rt + νt+1 (5.23)
where β̃ ≡ β2(1 − k) and νt+1 ≡ β2ζt − dt+1 + ηt+1 is a composite white noise
shock. The persistence parameter γ̃ ≡ 1 + β2kγ > 0 is unknown to the central
bank because of the unknown parameter γ coming from equation (5.17).33
Let c̃t denote an estimate of γ̃. Now, since γ̃ = 1+β2kγ, after c̃t has been estimated,
ct can be inferred indirectly from ct = −(1− c̃t)/kβ2.34 Thus we see that here the
procedure estimates γ in two steps. Of course, as noted before, under certainty
equivalence, the central bank has, by definition, full confidence on its parameter
estimate c̃t and indirectly ct. Thus the functional form of the interest rate rule
is still given by (5.18), bearing in mind that now we have a new procedure for
estimating ct.
One may, therefore, argue that with the new procedure, there are no substantive
changes regarding the interest rate rule, as it is almost identical to the one given
by equation (5.18). The difference lies in the procedure (regression equation and
corresponding data) used for estimating ct. Here, the central bank uses equation
(5.23) (where wt is the dependent variable as of period t) and data up to and
including wt, rt−1 and zt−1, while in the signaling case, there is an assumed signaling
equation with the signal, yt as the dependent variable and wt as the explanatory
variable. Note also that besides wt and zt, the policy instrument, rt, appears as
an explanatory variable in equation (5.23). By contrast, the signaling equation
(5.19) depends only on wt. Section 5.10 discusses the convergence properties of the
parameter estimate under passive learning and for both estimation procedures.
In the case where the central bank uses the regression equation (5.23) to estimate
the unknown γ̃ arising from unobserved private sector expectations, the latest data
32This is true even if the central bank knows the parameter k, and has data on the yield curve
(rt and Rt) and the current state of the economy, wt.
33In fact equation (5.23) is the constraint that the central bank faces in setting rt that minimizes
the variability of πt+1. Thus ultimately, the central bank is interested in getting an estimate of
the composite persistence parameter γ̃. To see this, rewrite the right side of the Phillips curve
in terms of wt+1, πt+2 = −wt+1 − ηt+2. Since in period t the central bank can not influence
the additive supply shock, ηt+2, minimizing the variability of πt+2 is equivalent to minimizing
the variability of wt+1; and so one can focus on the variable wt+1. With the additive shock as
the only source of uncertainty in the model, the first order condition under perfect knowledge,
bearing in mind that now π∗ = 0, continues to hold under certainty equivalence. That condition
is Etπt+2 = 0, which can now be rewritten as Etwt+1 = 0. Using (5.23), we can easily back out
the interest rate rule consistent with the first order condition.
34Although at the outset (5.23) may look like a non stationary process due to the possibility
γ̃ > 1, we have to keep in mind that rt is not an exogenous variable. Rather, its process is derived
from optimal control where it responds inversely to wt and directly to zt so as to stabilize wt+1.
Thus one can assess the (non) stationarity of (5.23) only after taking this feedback effect into
account in the reduced form equation for wt+1.
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as of period t+1 would be (wt+1, wt, zt, rt). Analogous to the previous section, the
updating equations for ct+1 and its variance pt+1 are
35,36
c̃t+1 = c̃t + κ̃t+1(wt+1 − c̃twt + β1zt − β̃rt)
p̃t+1 = p̃t − κ̃t+1wtp̃t (5.24)
where κ̃t+1 ≡ wtp̃tF−1t+1 is the Kalman gain. But now, F−1t+1 is the conditional
variance of wt+1, that is Ft+1 ≡ w2t p̃t + σ2ν . Note that (5.24) represents a different
learning channel. Here, rt affects wt+1, and consequently, c̃t+1 = c(wt+1) but, unlike
the signaling case, p̃t+1 is predetermined and known since p̃t+1 = p(wt) and not
p(wt+1).
In this setting, policy choices in terms of rt influence the data generation process, in
particular, the sequence of {wt}. In turn, the parameter estimate and its variance,
which characterize the beliefs of the central bank, depend on the data generated.
From the principle of least squares estimation the precision of the estimate c̃t de-
pends positively on the sample variance of wt. That is, one gets a more precise
estimate (in other words, a smaller value of p̃t) when the sample variance of wt
increases, and vice versa. We recognize that the current choice of monetary policy
rt affects wt+1, and via the dynamic equation, wt+j, for j = 2, 3, 4, .... This rela-
tionship between rt, wt+1 and p̃t+2 raises a potential tension between the urge to
minimize current period expected loss from variability in wt+1, (the control part),
and the incentive to get a more precise estimate of the degree of persistence in the
economy that would help improve future outcomes (the learning part).
5.9 Passive Learning and Convergence
Obviously one may wonder as to whether the passive learning policy enables the
central bank to learn the true parameter in the limit. This question is relevant
because as we noted above the variability of the data wt matters for efficient es-
timation of unknown coefficient γ. Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) have shown that a
policy based on parameter learning may have consequences in terms of the limit
behavior (convergence) of beliefs and policy actions. In particular, for a linear
regression model without persistence in the state variable, where the policy multi-
plier is unknown and has to be estimated, they show that beliefs may not converge
to the truth if policy actions converge very quickly. Similarly, Kiefer and Nyarko
(1989) show that beliefs would converge with probability one to the truth if actions
do not converge.
In our case, the linear process for inflation is dynamic, as current period inflation
depends partly on the previous period’s level of inflation. Moreover, current policy
35See also Appendix B.
36If the unknown parameter is time-varying, the updating equations can easily be adapted to
allow for this variability via the Kalman filter (see for e.g. Harvey, 1992).
85
Chapter 5. Strict Inflation Targeting and Passive Learning
does not have complete control over future inflation since the latter is continually
hit with unobserved shocks. Current policy can only offset the effects of the pre-
dictable components. In other words, the data sequence {wt} never settles down, as
it is constantly hit by new unpredictable shocks (see equation (5.23)). Thus beliefs
about the unknown parameter γ in (5.19) or (5.23) will converge with probability
one to the truth. The upshot is that as long as the policy maker can not com-
pletely stabilize wt+1, the sequence {wt} remains stochastic even in the limit, thus
generating enough sample variability for estimating the coefficient of persistence.37
Using numerical values for the known parameters in the model, Figures 5.1 il-
lustrates the convergence of the estimate of the persistence parameter under the





























Figure 5.1: Convergence of c̃t under the semi-reduced form equation and rt = r
p
t
Our simulations generate 10,000 observations of the parameter estimate and its
variance. There is convergence to the true parameter in the passive learning case,
although the speed of convergence can be slow. As Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) have
shown in a Bayesian updating sense, beliefs converge to the truth with probability
1 if policy actions (which are multiplicative to the unknown parameter) do not
converge. Using similar reasoning, the parameter estimate in our case converges
to the truth since the sequence {wt} does not converge in the limit, as the process
for wt is constantly hit by unpredictable exogenous shocks. For this reason, those
observations of c̃t and p̃t far in the distant future are not shown.
Again, in the limiting case where the random demand, supply and term structure
shocks have zero variances, the semi-reduced equation becomes deterministic. If
(5.23) is deterministic, the central bank can easily infer the value of γ̃ at time t+1
37See also Appendix B.
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after observing wt+1.
38 Of course the issue of optimal policy becomes uninteresting
if there are no shocks that inject dynamics into the system due to belief updating
about the unknown parameter. One can also make a similar argument in the case
where the signaling equation, (5.19), is used to estimate the unknown parameter,
γ. If the demand and supply shocks have zero variances, the right hand side vari-
able, wt, in (5.19) will also be deterministic. Then, parameter updating becomes
impossible if wt settles down to a constant value and there are no random shocks
that constantly move it away from its resting point.
5.10 The Way Forward: Active Learning
Under strict inflation targeting and active learning policy, the cost of experimen-
tation is higher short run variability in the target variable, (inflation). This is true
whether the uncertain parameter is multiplicative to the policy instrument or to
the state variable (in our case, the persistence parameter).
When there is uncertainty about the policy multiplier, experimentation or probing
is associated with more variability in the policy instrument since without variabil-
ity in the policy instrument precision of the parameter estimate is very low. Along
the same lines, when there is uncertainty about the persistence parameter, a more
precise estimate requires more sample variability in the state variable, which is mul-
tiplicative to the parameter. But what this means for the variability of the policy
instrument (whose coefficient is known with certainty) is not clear a priori. This
is because we have more variability in wt+1 when rt responds more aggressively or
less aggressively (compared to the rule under passive learning) to new information.
The main thing to note in terms of the learning equation, (5.19) or (5.23), is that
more (short-term) variability in the sequence {wt} (that in turn improves precision
of the parameter estimate) is achieved if the central bank fails to fully stabilize
predictable movements in wt+1 by responding too little or too much compared to
the certainty equivalence rule. Under strict inflation targeting, the passive learning
rule completely stabilizes any predictable variations in wt+1.
The value of experimentation in terms of speeding up learning about the true
parameter can be shown by two simple exercises. In these exercises, rt deviates
from its level under passive learning policy for the first 50 periods. Initial beliefs
are set as follows: (c̃0 = 1.2, p̃0 = 0.6), and the parameters are γ = 0.4, β1 = 1,
β2 = 1, k = 0.5, σu = σε = 0.3.
First, for 50 periods, the central bank deviates from the passive learning rule by
38To see this, take (5.23) one period backward and subtract the resulting expression from (5.23),
which gives wt+1 −wt = γ̃(wt −wt−1) + β̃(rt − rt−1) (ν is now treated as a constant in equation
(5.23)). It is then easy to infer the value of γ̃ when wt+1 is available in period t + 1. If the
demand and supply shocks are constants but the term structure shock is assumed to be random,
then νt will also be random. What is relevant for the learning dynamics is that νt+1 be a random
variable which can not be observed by the central bank.
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setting rt equal to twice the level given by the certainty equivalence rule r
p
t . In
other words, the central bank deliberately over reacts to new information about
the state of the economy. Second, the central bank follows a rule that reacts less
aggressively than is implied by (5.18), say, setting rt equal to zero irrespective of
the state of the economy.
5.10.1 Policy Deviations under the Semi-reduced Form
Figure 5.2 displays, respectively, a series of 100 realizations of the parameter esti-
mate, c̃t, and its sample variance, p̃t, under the more aggressive rule. Under this
rule, the real interest rate deviates a lot from its equilibrium or neutral level (which
here is normalized at zero), compared to the passive learning rule, (Figure 5.1). A
simple comparison of Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 shows that convergence under the
more aggressive rule is considerably faster. This can be seen more clearly from
the right side of Figure 5.2, where the variance p̃t converges to zero fairly quickly,


























Figure 5.2: Convergence of c̃t under the semi-reduced form equation and rt = 2r
p
t
Similar patterns are observed for the case where rt is much less aggressive, (Fig-
ure 5.3). Under this rule, the variability of wt+1 goes up compared to that based
on passive learning. By setting rt = 0 for the first 50 periods, the central bank
fails to offset the predictable effects on wt+1 of past and present shocks (reflected
in the current period state, wt), so that the short-term performance of the econ-
omy deteriorates. On the other hand the increase in the variance of the sequence
{wt} enables the central bank to speed up the convergence of c̃t to the true value,
ultimately improving its control of inflation in the distant future.
Although not shown here, we find that the larger the deviation of a contemplated
rule from rpt , the faster the speed of convergence of the parameter estimate.
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Figure 5.3: Convergence of c̃t under the semi-reduced form equation and rt = 0
5.10.2 Policy Deviations under Signaling
Here we repeat the exercise in the previous section for the case where estimation
of the unknown parameter is based on the signaling equation. The properties of
the parameter estimate and its variance under the signaling equation are similar to
the previous section, where estimation was conducted using the semi-reduced form
derived from the structural equations. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the results
that correspond to, respectively, a more aggressive and less aggressive interest rate
policy relative to the certainty equivalence rule, (5.18).39
Of course there are costs of experimentation in terms of short-term volatility in
the target variable, here inflation, as the central bank purposely allows additional
inflation variability. The tradeoff that arises from experimenting with this rules
shows the need to derive an optimal reaction function for rt that takes into account
the benefits and costs of probing. An optimal policy weighs long-term gains from



























Figure 5.4: Convergence of ct under the signaling equation and rt = 2r
p
t
39To be consistent on notations, in this case initial beliefs are given by (c0 = 0.5, p0 = 0.25).
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Figure 5.5: Convergence of ct under the signaling equation and rt = 0
Chapter 6 gives the full numerical solution to the central bank’s control and esti-
mation problem.
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Appendix A Optimal Policy under Perfect Knowl-
edge
The central bank chooses {rτ}∞τ=t so as to minimize (5.6) subject to (5.1), (5.2)
and (5.4). We can reformulate the optimization problem as choosing the indirect







(πτ − π∗)2 (A.1)
subject to
xt+1 = xt + ut + ξt+1 (A.2)
where xt = Etπt+1 is the new state variable, and for now ut = α1Etzt+1 is the new





− δt(xt − π∗)2 − δt+1µt+1(xt+1 − xt − ut − ξt+1)
]
(A.3)
The first order conditions (with respect to the control and state variables) are
∂L
∂ut
= δEtµt+1 = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂xt
= −(xt − π∗)− µt + δEtµt+1 = 0 (A.5)
First, from equation (A.4), it follows that Etµt+1 = 0.
40 Then, (A.5) gives µt =
−(xt − π∗) ⇒ Etµt+1 = −(Etxt+1 − π∗) = 0. The first order condition is then
Etxt+1 = π
∗. Since by definition Etxt+1 = Etπt+2, the condition can be written as
Etπt+2 = π
∗, as given by (5.10) in the main text.
40Note that this implies that the constraint (A.2) is not binding, which is not surprising given
that the loss function has only one argument and the constraint includes only additive shocks.
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Appendix B Recursive Updating of Beliefs
We derive the updating equations for sample estimates, ct and pt, based on the
stochastic model yt = γwt + εt, where γ is an unknown constant and εt is mean
zero i.i.d normal noise variable. The derivation follows Pollock (2002), and is based
on the calculus of conditional expectations and associated method of moments.
Let x and y be random variables whose joint distribution is characterized by well-
defined first and second-order moments E(x), E(y), E(x2), and E(yx). Let us define
V (x) = E(x2) − [E(x)]2; C(y, x) = E(yx) − E(y)E(x). Suppose the conditional
expectation of y after knowing the realization of x is a linear function of x, given
by E(y|x) = α + βx, where α and γ are fixed parameters. Taking unconditional
expectations and invoking the law of iterated expectations, one can show that
α = E(y)− γE(x) and γ = C(y,x)
V (x)
.41 Then it follows that (see Pollock (2002, p.4),
E(y|x) = E(y) + C(y, x)[V (x)]−1[x− E(x)]. (B.1)
V (y|x) = V (y)− C(y, x)[V (x)]−1C(y, x) (B.2)
With these preliminaries, we now turn to our stochastic model. Suppose (ct−1, pt−1)
have already been estimated. Before observing the value of yt, these estimates may
represent prior beliefs in the sense that we may attribute a prior distribution to
γ ∼ N(ct−1, pt−1), where the mean is ct−1 = E(γ|Ωt−1) and the variance pt−1 =
V (γ|Ωt−1) = E[(γ − ct−1)2]. This way of assigning a distribution to γ is in the
spirit of a Bayesian prior. The aim is then to derive the estimates ct = E(γ|Ωt)
and pt = V (γ|Ωt) = E[(γ − ct)2] based on yt and such that we make the best use
of the priors (ct−1, pt−1). First, along the same lines of (B.1)
E(γ|Ωt) = E(γ|Ωt−1) + C(γ, yt|Ωt−1)[V (yt|Ωt−1)]−1[yt − E(yt|Ωt−1)] (B.3)
where Ωt = {Ωt−1, yt} = {Ω0, y1, ..., yt}, with Ω0 = {c0, p0, σ2ε}.42 Moreover,
• E(yt|Ωt−1) = ct−1wt is the prediction of yt before learning its value;
• yt − E(yt|Ωt−1) = (γ − ct−1)wt + εt is the prediction error;
• V (yt|Ωt−1) = E[(yt − E(yt|Ωt−1))2] = w2t pt−1 + σ2ε is the variance associated
with the prediction error; and
41For α, this involves multiplying E(y|x) by the marginal density function of x, f(x), and then
integrating with respect to x, which by the law of iterated expectations gives E(y). For γ, first
multiply E(y|x) by xf(x) and integrate with respect to x to obtain the joint moment E(xy).
42With normal initial priors, one can derive a sequence of conditional distributions N(yt|Ωt−1)
for t = 1, 2, ...
92
Communication, Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy
• C(γ, yt|Ωt−1) = E[(γ − ct−1)(yt − ct−1wt)] is the covariance of γ and yt con-
ditional on prior information. By substituting for yt, the covariance becomes
E[(γ − ct−1)2wt + (γ − ct−1)εt] = pt−1wt.
Then using these results in the recursive equation (B.3) gives:
ct = ct−1 + pt−1wt(w2t pt−1 + σ
2
ε )
−1(yt − ct−1wt) (B.4)
If we define F−1t ≡ w2t pt−1 + σ2ε , the Kalman gain is κt = F−1t pt−1wt. Analogous to
(B.2), the updating equation for pt is:
V (γ|Ωt) = V (γ|Ωt−1)− [C(γ, yt|Ωt−1)]2[V (yt|Ωt−1)]−1 (B.5)
Again, after similar substitution of the components of (B.5) we have:
pt = pt−1 − p2t−1w2t F−1t (B.6)
Finally, to arrive at (5.20) of the main text, simply forward (B.4) and (B.6) one
period. It is also straightforward to use similar steps as above and derive the
updating equations for the semi-reduced equation (5.23).
Appendix C Convergence of the Parameter Es-
timate under Learning
In this appendix we examine the question of convergence of the parameter estimate
c̃t to γ̃ under least squares learning.
Under imperfect knowledge, the central bank is assumed to understand the fact
that private sector expectations are state dependent. Although expectations take
the form ÊtRt+1 = γwt, the weight placed on is unknown to the central bank. We
saw how this information asymmetry gives rise to a constraint that relates wt+1,
(≡ −πt+1− zt+1), to wt, zt and rt, that is, wt+1 = γ̃wt +β1zt + β̃rt + νt+1. The only
unknown parameter in this constraint is the composite parameter, γ̃ ≡ 1 + kβ2γ.
Thus defining the left hand side of the regression model as yt+1 ≡ wt+1−β1zt− β̃rt,
we note that γ̃ can be estimated by running a regression of yt+1 on wt:
yt+1 = γ̃wt + νt+1 (C.1)
This equation can then be used to obtain an estimate in period t, c̃t, by using past
and present data that includes (yt, wt−1). Then, from the central bank’s point of
view, the perceived value of yt+1 is c̃twt.
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To establish convergence under least squares learning, first we formulate the dy-
namics of learning by the central bank as a stochastic recursive algorithm. Let
Vt ≡ t−1 ∑t−1j=0 w2j . Then the central bank’s updating of its estimate can be written
in recursive least squares
c̃t = c̃t−1 + t−1V −1t wt−1(yt − c̃t−1wt−1)
= c̃t−1 + t−1V −1t wt−1(wt−1[T (c̃t−1)− c̃t−1] + νt) (C.2)
Vt = Vt−1 + t−1(w2t−1 − Vt−1) (C.3)
where yt = γ̃wt−1 + νt = T (c̃t−1)wt−1 + νt and T implicitly defines a mapping
from the perceived law of motion (PLM) (based on c̃t) to the actual law of motion
(ALM), γ̃. Of course, the function γ̃ = T (c̃t−1) is a constant, because no matter
what one perceives γ̃ to be, it is not influenced by the perception.
To use the method of stochastic recursive algorithm, one must first put the system
in a standard form, which allows only lagged values of V on the right hand side
of the system (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for details). Thus define another
variable S such that St−1 = Vt and the system now is rewritten as follows
c̃t = c̃t−1 + t−1S−1t−1wt−1[wt−1(γ̃ − c̃t−1) + νt] (C.4)




(w2t − Vt−1) (C.5)
where now wt appears in the updating equation for St because of the redating of
Vt. The system can now be written in standard form with the following definition
of variables: θt = (c̃t, St), Xt = (wt, wt−1, νt), and gt = t−1.
θt = θt−1 + gtQ(θt−1, Xt, t) (C.6)
where the two components of Q are:
Qc(θt−1, Xt(θ), t) = S−1t−1wt−1(wt−1[T (c̃t−1)− c̃t−1] + νt) (C.7)
Qs(θ, Xt(θ), t) = (
t
t + 1
)(w2t − St−1) (C.8)
The function Q expresses the way in which the vector of estimates, θt−1, is revised
in line with the latest available data. Here, Xt is the state vector that includes
the effects of wt , wt−1 and νt, and gt is a deterministic sequence of ’gains’– i.e. a
non-increasing sequence of positive numbers– satisfying limt→∞ tgt = 1.
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We are interested in the conditions under which limt→∞ θt = θ̃, where θ̃ solves either
EQ(Xt, θ̃) = 0 in the case that Xt is drawn from a distribution that is stationary
or limt→∞ EQ(Xt, θ̃) = 0 in the case that Xt is asymptotically stationary. In our
case, the path of the explanatory variable in the regression equation, wt, is not
exogenous since the central bank engages in controlling the path of wt, and thus
the data generating process. We recognize that following the decisions of the central
bank regarding its instrument, rt, we can easily derive the actual law of motion for
wt
wt+1 = (c̃t − γ̃)wt − νt+1 (C.9)
where (c̃t − γ̃)wt is the (state dependent) additional control error arising from
uncertainty about γ̃. Because of this feature, in real time Xt is a function of θt−1.
The technique of standard stochastic recursive algorithm (SRA), also known as
stochastic approximation, has established that the limiting behavior of the sequence
{θ} in real time, determined by the stochastic difference equation (C.6), can be




t→∞EQ(θ, X̄t(θ)) = h[θ(τ)] (C.10)
where X̄t(θ) denotes the dynamics of Xt when we fix the real-time estimate θt−1 at
θ. The right hand side term is evaluated with respect to the asymptotic stationary
distribution of {Xt} and τ denotes ”notional” or ”artificial” time (see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), pp. 31). The stochastic approximation result states that if the
ODE is locally stable around γ̃, then γ̃ is a possible limit point of the SRA (see
p.36 of Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
The easiest way to proceed is to look at the two components of Q separately. For
the first component, which gives the revisions to c̃t−1, by fixing the values of c and
S and evaluating the expectation over Xt we get




−1Ewt−1(wt−1[T (c̃)− c̃] + νt)
= (T (c̃)− c̃)S−1Ew2t−1 (C.11)
Analogously, evaluating the second component of Q gives







= Ew2t − S (C.12)
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where Ew2t , the unconditional second moment of wt, is equal to Ew
2
t−1 if the series
{wt} is stationary, which holds if c̃t − γ̃ is less than one in absolute value. That is
c̃t is sufficiently close to γ̃ (the fixed point of interest). The reason is that since we
are interested in local convergence, it is necessary that in deriving the ODE, the
process (C.9) be asymptotically stationary.






(T (c̃)− c̃) (C.13)
dS
dτ
= σ2 − S (C.14)
This system is recursive, so that we can solve the second equation for S, and then
use the result in the first equation to find the limit of c̃. The second equation
implies S → σ2 from any starting point (it is globally stable). In other words,
σ2
S
→ 1, provided S is different from zero along the path. Hence, the stability
of the differential equation system is determined entirely by the stability of the
non-homogenous equation for c̃, which has the fixed point
dc̃
dτ
= 0 ⇒ c̃ = γ̃ (C.15)




Flexible Inflation Targeting and
Active Learning
6.1 Introduction
As discussed under the introduction to chapter 5, the term structure of interest
rates constitutes an important transmission channel in the monetary transmission,
(that is from monetary policy to the economy), by linking the short-term interest
rate to the long-term interest rate. The motivation for learning was shown to
arise from the assumption that monetary authorities face uncertainty about private
sector expectations of the long-term interest rate that is part of the term structure
relationship. We then discussed how a passive learning policy is conducted in an
inflation forecast targeting framework, leaving the full analysis of active learning
and flexible inflation targeting for the present chapter.
The numerical analysis in this chapter builds on the model of chapter 5 and con-
siders the possibility of active learning by a monetary authority about the term
structure of interest rates. Regarding the private sector, we maintain the assump-
tion in the previous chapter, namely, that private sector expectations are formed
adaptively. This simplifies the analysis so that one can focus on the role of central
bank learning in the inflation forecast targeting framework of Svensson (1997). An
appealing feature of our model is that, even though private sector expectations are
initially non-rational, they become rational in the limit as the central bank learns
the persistence parameter and the equilibrium solution is identical to that of the
perfect knowledge case.
6.2 Beliefs and Learning
At the time policy actions are taken (in terms of selecting the level of rt) the central
bank does not perfectly observe the realization of ÊtRt+1. Evans and Honkapohja
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(2002) point out that in general if one introduces small measurement (observation)
errors, a policy based on a signal may continue to be optimal in sense that the
deviation from the perfect information case in terms of the resulting welfare loss
caused by observation errors is negligible (see equation (5.22) of chapter 5, where
the interest rate rule responds directly to the signal on private sector expectations).
With large measurement errors, however, the policy rule that reacts to the available
signal about ÊtRt+1 can be very costly. In that case the central bank may choose
to get a better forecast of ÊtRt+1 by running its own regression. In chapter 5, we
saw that the central bank understands that private sector expectations take the
following form:
ÊtRt+1 = γwt (6.1)
In practice the main problem for a central bank is that private sector agents– finan-
cial analysts, investment bankers etc.– have become more and more sophisticated
in analyzing and predicting monetary policy actions of the central bank. This in-
creased degree of sophistication of the private sector makes it harder for the central
bank to observe expectations with a good degree of precision. In fact observation
errors on private sector expectations could be high.1
Since the central bank understands the forecasting rule of the private sector, sub-
stituting (6.1) into the term structure equation and in turn the IS and Phillips
equations gives the actual law of motion for wt+1 ≡ −(πt+1 + zt+1) (see chapter 5).
In the previous chapter, we saw that the transmission mechanism is such that at
time t, controlling the variability of πt+2 is equivalent to controlling the variations
in wt+1, as the two differ only by an additive shock to inflation two period ahead.
We remember that the actual law of motion of wt+1 is given by:
wt+1 = γ̃wt − β1zt + β̃rt + νt+1 (6.2)
where β̃ ≡ β2(1−k) > 0 and ν is a composite shock, that is a linear combination of
the structural shocks to inflation, output and the term structure. The persistence
parameter γ̃ ≡ 1+β2kγ > 0 is unknown to the central bank because of the unknown
parameter γ (see chapter 5 for details).2 Actually, (6.2) is the constraint that the
central bank faces in setting rt optimally and, ultimately, what matters for policy
is an estimate of γ̃, denoted by c̃t, based on (6.2). Note that as in the learning and
control literature, the constraint (6.2) also serves as a regression model to estimate
the unknown persistence parameter.
1Since potentially γ could be time varying, it may be appropriate to have γt with assumptions
about its time series properties. Following Beck and Wieland (2002) it is possible to consider a
random walk process.
2Note that under perfect knowledge, given these positive parameters, the central bank lowers
rt when wt go up (i.e. when πt + zt goes down).
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When active learning by the central bank is involved, the optimization problem
usually gets complicated as the number of state variables increases (due to what
is known as the ”curse of dimensionality”). In our case, besides the state variable
wt, the current output gap, zt, also appears as a state in equation (6.2). Together
with the beliefs about the mean and variance of the persistence parameter, there
would be four state variables in the model. The dual control literature usually uses
a constraint similar to (6.2) but with β1 = 0 so that next period’s state variable,
wt+1, depends on the policy instrument, rt, and possibly lagged values of the state
variable; see Beck and Wieland (2002). In our case, setting β1 = 0 reduces the
number of state variables to three. This makes the dynamic equation comparable
to that considered by Beck and Wieland (2002):3
wt+1 = γ̃wt + β̃rt + νt+1 (6.3)
Note that in the model of chapter 5, if β1 = 0, the perfect knowledge, rational
expectations solution gives ÊtRt+1 = (β1/β2)wt = 0. This is inconsequential to the
way learning is modeled under imperfect knowledge. The reason is that from the
point of view of the central bank, the incentive for learning arises from the fact that
γ is some unknown parameter, and not from its specific value. In any case, the
motivation for central bank learning comes from the knowledge of the functional
form of (6.1), where in the case β1 = 0, the central bank would be assumed to lack
information about the true γ being actually zero.
As before, when period t + 1 arrives, the central bank updates its estimate by
including the latest available data (wt+1, wt, rt) in the regression equation (6.3).
Using the widely used method of recursive least squares we have the following
updating equations for c̃t and its variance, denoted by p̃t (see for e.g. Beck and
Wieland, 2002; Pollock, 2002).4
c̃t+1 = c̃t + κt+1(wt+1 − c̃twt − β̃rt)
p̃t+1 = p̃t − κt+1wtp̃t (6.4)
where κt+1 ≡ wtp̃tF−1t+1 is commonly referred to as the Kalman gain, which is the
weight assigned to new information coming from the forecast error wt+1−c̃twt−β̃rt.
The Kalman gain in turn depends on the conditional variance of wt+1, (based on
information in period t), given by Ft+1 ≡ w2t p̃t +σ2ν . As can be seen from (6.4), the
current state of the economy, wt is part of the Kalman gain, and affects the path
of the conditional variance of the parameter estimate, p̃t+1. Due to the presence of
autoregressive behavior in wt+1, changes in the current state of the economy, wt,
3In Beck and Wieland (2002), the only unknown parameter is by assumption β̃, which is
multiplicative to the control variable rt.
4If the unknown parameter is time-varying, the updating equations can be modified to allow
for this variability via the Kalman filter; see for instance Sargent (1999) and Beck and Wieland
(2002).
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have direct effects on the variability of wt+1, and consequently on the variability of
wt+2, wt+3, ....
5
The updating equations in (6.4) capture the idea that central bank learning pos-
sibilities about the unknown parameter is influenced by policy decisions made in
period t, rt. The channel work as follows: rt affects the state variable in period t+1,
wt+1, and consequently, beliefs about the unknown parameter (i.e. c̃t+1 = c(wt+1)
and p̃t+2 = p(wt+1)). The link between current and future policy choices is estab-
lished because expected future interest rate decisions by the central bank depend
on the expected future state of the economy. From the principle of least squares
estimation the precision of the estimate c̃t+2 depends positively on the variance of
wt+1. One gets a more precise estimate (in other words, a smaller value of p̃t+2)
when the variance of wt+1 increases, and vice versa. Since we recognize that the
current choice of monetary policy rt affects Etwt+1, and given predetermined Ft+1,
the coefficient of variation, defined by the ratio
√
Ft+1/Etwt+1 is also a function of
rt. This relationship between rt, wt+1 and p̃t+2 raises a potential tension between
the urge to minimize current period loss from variability in rt (the control part)
and the need to get a more precise estimate of the degree of persistence in the
economy that would help improve future outcomes (the learning part).
Under flexible inflation targeting, the central bank conducts monetary policy by
adjusting the nominal interest rate, and with predetermined inflation expectations,
perfectly controls the short-term real interest rate.6 The central bank chooses













t ), λ > 0 is the relative weight assigned to the loss from the
variability in rt, the control variable.
7 As before, the discount rate is denoted by δ,
(0 < δ < 1). The expectations operator Et refers to the central bank’s expectations
conditional on information set in period t. Note that when λ → ∞, the central
bank engages in full stabilization of rt, i.e., rt = 0 for all t.
8
In a strict inflation targeting regime with passive learning, the central bank mini-
mizes the inter-temporal loss function (6.5) setting λ = 0 and taking into account
5The assumption that the shock is normally distributed with known variance is standard in
the learning literature. If the prior belief also have a normal distribution, then the posterior belief
is a normal distribution. This property of the posterior belief is convenient when dealing with
numerical computations (see Appendix B).
6Of course the central bank directly controls the nominal rate, but because of the control lags,
the one-period ahead expected inflation is predetermined, so that the central bank has perfect
control of the real short rate.
7This follows the learning and control literature. See Beck and Wieland (2002) for a detailed
discussion.
8In chapter 5, section 5.10, we did a simulation to see the consequences for parameter learning
of a constant interest rate rule of the form rt = 0, implemented for some initial periods.
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the linear dynamic equation (6.3). The optimization problem would give solutions
for rt analogous to the previous chapter, as the problem is solved period-by-period
and the first-order condition sets the conditional expectation of inflation two-period
ahead equal to the desired target. As we will see below, this is no longer true with
flexible inflation targeting (λ > 0) as future losses and the discount rate play a role
in the choice of the current policy rate.
6.3 Passive Learning: Certainty Equivalence vs.
Myopic
Before considering the role of active learning in optimal policy, this section solves
for optimal policy under passive learning. There are two subcases under passive
learning– one that ignores parameter uncertainty (certainty equivalence rule) and
the other incorporates parameter uncertainty (myopic rule). Both rules are passive
in nature because they ignore the link between policy choices today and future
learning that is apparent from the updating equations. From the vantage point
of the current period the central bank’s belief is not expected to be updated in
the future, implying that when choosing current policy, it anticipates the initial
belief (c̃t, p̃t) to remain fixed for all future periods. Consequently, in both cases,
the non-linear updating equations drop out of the optimization problem.9
The certainty equivalence rule is a special case of the myopic policy rule since under







2 + Ft+1 (6.6)
where Etwt+1 = c̃twt + β̃rt and under the myopic policy Ft+1 = w
2
t p̃t + σ
2
ν . On
the other hand, under certainty equivalence, p̃t = 0 ⇒ w2t p̃t = 0, and so Ft+1 is




2 + σ2ν (6.7)
Thus the difference in the way the conditional variance, Ft+1, is treated is also
reflected in the solution of the dynamic control problem under each case (see below).
9Of course, when next period arrives, the bank updates its belief but then expect it to remain
fixed from that period on.
10Remember, by assumption the additive shock νt+1 is i.i.d. and thus uncorrelated with period
t estimation error, γ̃ − c̃t.
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6.3.1 The Certainty Equivalence Policy (CER)
Under certainty equivalence the central bank ignores parameter uncertainty. In
other words, the central bank is fully confident about its estimate c̃t so that its
current belief is given by (c̃t, p̃t) = (c̃t, 0). We can also think of this situation as
the limiting case of the updating equations, where p̃t = 0 implies that c̃t+1 = c̃t.
Thus, the state c̃t does not change and is independent from the policy instrument.









subject to the linear constraint (6.3). Importantly, with the non linear updating
equations ignored, the problem is linear-quadratic, and the derivation of the op-
timal level of rt is similar to that under perfect knowledge. To get the certainty
equivalence rule, one usually proceeds in two steps. First, solve for the optimal
rule assuming perfect knowledge of γ̃ and second, simply replace γ̃ by its recent
estimate c̃t. Alternatively, first replace γ̃ by its recent estimate c̃t in the linear
constraint (6.3) and then solve the optimization problem taking the estimate as
a fixed parameter. In any case, we can rewrite the above minimization problem
using recursive dynamic programming and then use the ’guess and verify’ method
on the value function as in Svensson (1997).
With this in mind, one can write the Bellman equation associated with the mini-
mization of (6.8).11
V (wt) = min
rt
[L(wt, rt) + δEtV (wt+1)] (6.9)
subject to (6.3) with γ̃ replaced by its certainty equivalence estimate c̃t, which at
the stage of optimization is understood by the central bank to be a fixed parameter
(and not a state variable). Because of the resulting linear-quadratic structure of
the minimization problem, the value function will be quadratic in the state wt.




where the two coefficients remain to be determined. If (6.10) is correct, it follows
that:






11Note that the value function in the Bellman equation does not have time subscript. This is
because in infinite horizon problems, we are interested only in the unique time invariant value
function, V, and associated unique, stationary policy rule, that result from repeated iterations on
the Bellman equation starting from any bounded continuous V0 (e.g. V0 = 0). Convergence of the
value function is guaranteed due to the contraction mapping theorem (see Sargent, 1987a). For
linear-quadratic control problems, convergence is achieved in a single iteration if V0 is quadratic.
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where Etw
2
t+1 follows from equation (6.7). Using (6.11) in (6.9) and taking the first
order condition, we get
λrt + µβ̃δ(c̃twt + β̃rt) = 0 (6.12)
which can easily be solved for rt to give:
rt = − µδc̃tβ̃
λ + µδβ̃2
wt (6.13)
It is important to observe that, even though we have placed a time subscript
on c̃t, as far as passive learning is concerned, c̃t should be thought of as a fixed
parameter (not a state variable) and it is not expected to be affected by the current
policy choice. This is the sense in which forecasting and control are separated by
construction.12
In order to identify µ, first differentiate (6.10) with respect to wt:
Vw(wt) = µwt (6.14)
Next, invoking the envelope theorem on the Bellman equation (6.9), and taking
note of (6.13):
Vw(wt) = wt + δµc̃t(c̃twt + β̃rt) = f(µ)wt (6.15)
where f(µ) ≡ 1 + λδc̃2t µ/(λ + δβ̃2µ). For the conjectured value function (6.10)
to be correct, it is required that the coefficients of (6.14) and (6.15) have to be
equalized:13
µ = f(µ) (6.16)
Rearrange (6.16) to get the following quadratic equation for µ:
δβ̃2µ2 + [λ− δ(β̃2 + c̃2t λ)]µ− λ = 0 (6.17)
12Thus, due to the sequential nature of decision making, the updating of the parameter estimate
is kept in the background.
13Alternatively, one can work directly with the value function. Substitute (6.13) in (6.9) and
match the resulting coefficients with those in the conjectured value function (6.10).
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It is easy to check that limµ→0 f(µ) = 1 and limµ→∞ f(µ) = 1 + λc̃2t /β̃
2. Thus a






































where superscript ’ce’ stands for certainty equivalence. We see that the estimate
of the persistence parameter, c̃t, which from the perspective of period t is not
expected to be updated in the future (as per passive learning), affects the value of
the coefficient µce. For future reference, note also that µce → 1 as λ → 0.
The solution (6.18) is similar to equation (B.6) of Svensson (1997), except that
in Svensson (1997) the persistence parameter is known for certainty (and simply
set equal to 1) and flexible inflation targeting is defined in terms of inflation and
output stabilization. To see the effect of λ on policy responsiveness to wt, rewrite
(6.13), (bearing (6.18) in mind) so that rt = −c̃twt/(φ + β̃), where φ = λ/(µceδβ̃);
∂φ/∂λ > 0.14 Thus given c̃t, rt is less responsive to wt as λ increases. Moreover, as
λ → 0, φ → 0 and rt = −(c̃t/β̃)wt (strict inflation targeting). On the other hand,
as λ →∞, φ →∞ implying rt = 0 (full stabilization of rt).
6.3.2 The Myopic Policy (MR)
A myopic policy rule differs from certainty equivalence only because the myopic
policy takes account of the current degree of uncertainty in the current estimate
of the persistence parameter (thus p̃t > 0). The central bank continues to ignore
the fact that current policy can affect future beliefs and so treats c̃t and p̃t as fixed
parameters, implying that the only state variable from the central bank’s point of
view is wt.
15 The conjecture for the value function is then the same as (6.10) and
the first order condition with respect to rt will take the same form as (6.12). The
difference is that now the coefficient µ will be a function of p̃t as well as c̃t.
In identifying µ, we remember that in (6.11), Etw
2













from which it is easily seen that ∂φ/∂λ > 0.
15One can also think of c̃t and p̃t as state variables. However, these states do not change
and are independent from the policy instrument. This means that, when optimizing, the terms
κt+1(wt+1− c̃twt− β̃rt) and κt+1wtp̃t on the right hand side of the updating equations drop out.
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The counterpart of (6.15) is now









Thus following the steps analogous to the previous section, we match the coefficients
of (6.14) and (6.19),










where the certainty equivalence case arises if p̃t = 0, that is if one disregards
parameter uncertainty. In finding the solution for µ that satisfies (6.21), we note
that the expression on the right side of the equation is identical to the corresponding
term under certainty equivalence, but on the left hand side of the equation, the
coefficient on µ is 0 ≤ 1−δp̃t ≤ 1 if p̃t is not too large. This holds if, say, the initial
parameter uncertainty is such that p̃0 ≤ 1, which is actually not that restrictive if
c̃0 is also not too large. In this case, the prior belief (c̃0, p̃0) such that p̃0 = c̃0/2
implies high initial uncertainty (see Beck and Wieland (2002)). This means that if
we restrict the central bank’s belief such that c̃0 ≤ 2, we can reasonably assume as
well that p̃0 ≤ 1.16 With this in mind, we can easily observe that when parameter
uncertainty is taken into account, the fixed point for µ, denoted by µm, will be
larger or equal to its fixed point under certainty equivalence, µce, (see Figure 6.1).
The fixed point under the myopic rule is based on the dashed line from the origin
and is larger than the fixed point under the certainty equivalent rule (based on
the solid line from the origin). Thus the myopic policy is more aggressive that the
certainty equivalent rule.
As before, to get the solution for µ, rewrite (6.21):
Aµ2 + Bµ− λ = 0 (6.22)
where A ≡ (1 − p̃tδ)δβ̃2, B ≡ (1 − p̃tδ)λ − δ(β̃2 + c̃2t λ). We can check that if
p̃t → 0, then A → δβ̃2 and B → λ− δ(β̃2 + c̃2t λ), which are the coefficients under
the certainty equivalence rule.
16For e.g., in Beck and Wieland (2002) the prior belief about the unknown parameter is charac-
terized by a mean of 0.5 and variance 0.25, so that the central bank faces considerable uncertainty.
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Figure 6.1: Comparing µce = µce(c̃) and µm = µm(c̃, p̃)

















µm ≥ 1 as long as the initial value of p̃0 is not too large. We know that p̃t goes
down in magnitude over time as more data about w and r arrive. This is true even
for policy under passive learning. See chapter 5 for a discussion of convergence
under learning.
Unlike the case of certainty equivalence, limλ→0 µm = 1/(1 − δp̃t). The myopic
case collapses to the certainty equivalence only if p̃t → 0, which also implies that
µm = µce → 1.
Remember that the central bank knows the policy multiplier, β̃, with certainty.
On the other hand, when choosing its interest rate under the myopic policy, the
central bank behaves as if its initial belief, including p̃0 > 0, will not be updated. In
other words, the policy maker currently thinks that he will live with an uncertain
estimate now and in the future. This perception somehow exaggerates actual future
uncertainty because it neglects the fact that as time goes by, the precision of c̃ will
increase (p̃ will decline) with the arrival of new economic data.
What is then the intuition behind a more aggressive rule under the myopic policy?
The control problem is dynamic, so the bank expects to incur losses from variability




ν). Since as of period t the central
bank does not internalize the effect of policy on future beliefs, we have p̃t+1 = p̃t





2 + p̃tFt+1 + σ
2
ν , which shows the benefits
from a policy that sets Etwt+1 closer to zero. It follows that, given λ > 0, from
the perspective of the myopic policy rt responds more strongly to deviations of wt
so that Etwt+1 is closer to the target w
∗ (zero) than implied under the certainty
equivalence rule.17
17Note that pt scales up the component of the loss function associated with the variability
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CER vs MR
λ = 0 λ > 0
policy rule rt CER=MR CER 6= MR
It is important to note that policy at time t can affect only Etwt+1, which corre-
sponds with the expected loss under certainty equivalence. On the other hand, the
conditional variance, Ft+1, is independent of rt since pt and wt are predetermined
as of time t. In the case where λ = 0, the myopic rule collapses to the certainty
equivalence rule. This result is different from the classic study by Brainard (1967)
and other related papers, where the policy multiplier is assumed to be unknown, so
that policy can affect the conditional variance component, and the certainty equiv-
alence principle breaks down even when the control variable (policy instrument)
does not enter the loss function. What we have shown in this section is that, as
long as λ > 0 the myopic rule differs from the certainty equivalence for the case
where the persistence parameter is unknown while the policy multiplier is known
with certainty.
6.4 Optimal Policy under Learning
We now formalize the active learning problem, in which the central bank can not
separate estimation and control, as future beliefs about the persistence parameter
depend on the whole history of the state variables and the rate of interest choices
of the central bank, including the current one. Under optimal policy, the policy
maker can take actions now such that wt+1 is more informative and contributes to
a more precise future estimate of the persistence parameter.
As before, the central bank chooses a sequence of current and future short-term







δτ−tLτ |(wt, p̃t, c̃t)
]
(6.24)
But now, the constraint is not just the linear Phillips curve (6.3) but also (and
importantly) the non linear updating equations (6.4). The effect of current policy
on future beliefs becomes visible from the Bellman equation associated with the
dynamic programming problem (6.24) (see Beck and Wieland, 2002):
V (wt, c̃t, p̃t) = min
rt
[L(wt, rt) + δEtV (wt+1, c̃t+1, p̃t+1)] (6.25)
of wt+1. The presence of pt does not matter under strict inflation targeting since the policy
instrument is set such that Etwt+1 = 0. By contrast, with flexible inflation targeting, λ > 0
implying that Etwt+1 6= 0. The presence of pt then requires a more aggressive policy that drives
Etwt+1 closer to zero.
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subject to (6.3) and (6.4). The second term on the right side of (6.25) is the
expected discounted loss from period t + 1 onwards, with time t + 1 state vector
(wt+1, c̃t+1, p̃t+1) depending on current period policy actions and state vector via






wt+1, c(wt+1, c̃t, p̃t, wt, rt), p(p̃t, wt)
)
f(wt+1|.)dw (6.26)
where f(w|.) is the conditional density function of wt+1. Even if it has to control
a linear process (6.3) and its loss function is quadratic in the two arguments, the
policy maker faces a non-linear constraint because of the updating equations. Thus
the dynamic programming problem falls outside the linear-quadratic formulation
that is usually assumed in many economic applications. Fortunately, using a stan-
dard contraction mapping argument, Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) have shown the
existence of a stationary policy and a unique value function that solve the dynamic
programming problem. It is thus possible to use numerical dynamic programming
methods to approximate the value function and associated policy rule. Judd (1998)
describes extensively the numerical methods for solving Bellman equations, while
Wieland (1998), and Beck and Wieland (2002), among others, apply these methods
to optimal policy under parameter uncertainty.
As pointed out by Wieland (1998), a drawback of this procedure is the so-called
curse of dimensionality, which sets in as the number of state variables becomes large.
The reason is that the number of computations increases geometrically with the
number of state variables in the optimization problem, which in turn undermines
the precision of the numerical approximation. This will not pose a problem for us
since we only have three state variables, c̃t, p̃t and wt.
6.5 Some Numerical Results
Having described the main elements of the policy problem under active learning,
we now present some numerical results. We first present our results for benchmark
values for the weight on interest rate stabilization, λ, the policy multiplier, β̃, the
discount factor, δ, and the variance of the composite exogenous shock, σ2ν . Then
we compare these results with those derived for alternative parameter values.
Parameter configuration
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Possible initial beliefs for c̃ are as high as 1.4 and as low as 0.2, while the beliefs
about the variance p̃ range from 0.1 to 0.7. The relative degree of confidence in an
estimate measured by the coefficient of variation,
√
p̃/c̃, takes its lowest value at
(c̃0, p̃0) = (1.4, 0.1) implying
√
p̃/c̃ < 0.23. In this case, the uncertainty associated
with c̃ is quite small. As will be shown below, given the parameter configuration,
the role of parameter uncertainty in inducing an active learning policy decreases
with the coefficient of variation. Moreover, to get an idea of how initial beliefs about
the degree of uncertainty surrounding the parameter estimate matters for policy,
16 alternative pairs of (c̃0, p̃0) are considered from the sets c̃0 ∈ {0.2, 0.6, 1, 1.4} and
p̃0 ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}. All the figures shown below have (πt +zt) on the horizontal
axis. This follows from the definition πt + zt = −wt. Using the original variables
πt and zt helps to interpret the results in terms of inflation and output gap.
6.5.1 Results under Baseline Parameters
In this section, we compare the three decision rules- certainty-equivalent, myopic
and dynamically optimal rules- given the benchmark parameter values and the
central bank’s initial beliefs about the unobserved persistence parameter. Figure
6.2 shows the response of interest rate rt to deviations of the state wt from its target
level of zero, for a specific belief characterized by the mean c̃0 = 1 and variance
p̃0 = 0.5.
Since monetary policy is conducted under a flexible inflation targeting regime,
(λ > 0), there is a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and the short real rate. In
this case, all three decisions rules do not completely offset the predictable impact of
wt on wt+1. With the model featuring autoregressive behavior, any random shock
to wt will then have a long lasting effect under the three policy rules. However the
degree of gradualism associated with a given level of λ differs from one decision
rule to another.
As we saw in the preceding section, the myopic rule is more aggressive than the
certainty equivalent rule for all levels of the state variable. The reason is that,
under the myopic policy rule, the central bank recognizes that, provided that there
is uncertainty surrounding the belief c̃0, in other words, p̃0 > 0, the contribution of
this source of uncertainty to the variability of wt+1 (and subsequently wt+2, wt+3,
...) increases with wt. In a dynamic setting, stabilizing wt+1 also helps minimize
the negative impact of this source of uncertainty. Thus the rate of interest has
to move more in response to wt compared to a policy that disregards parameter
uncertainty.
Now, as can be seen from Figure 6.2, for low to moderate deviations of the state
from the target, the dynamically optimal policy is even more aggressive than the
myopic one. But if the deviations are large, the optimal policy responds less ag-
gressively, even compared to the certainty equivalence policy. From the updating
equations, the larger the deviation of wt from zero (due to say an exogenous shock),
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the smaller p̃t+1 (implying that c̃t+1 is a more precise estimate) leading to a smaller
control error when setting rt+1. Thus, in contrast to the myopic policy, the ac-
tively learning central bank anticipates future improvements in policy performance
as |wt| increases. This shows that when realized exogenous shocks, νt, that ulti-
mately drive data generation for wt, are large there is less role for deliberate probing
by the central bank, more so the larger the deviation of wt from the target.
18





















Figure 6.2: The three decision rules for initial beliefs c̃0 = 1 and p̃0 = 0.5
The qualitative results shown in Figure 6.2 carry over to other possible initial
beliefs about the persistence parameter. In Figure 6.3, 16 alternative plots are
shown, each plot corresponding to a specific configuration of the initial belief, c̃0
and p̃0.
19 Perhaps not surprisingly, the three rules diverge with the magnitude of
p̃0 and c̃0. For example, when parameter uncertainty is small (say p̃0 = 0.1) and
there is a small degree of persistence in the economy (c̃0 = 0.2), the three decision
rules tend to be identical. At the other extreme, when both c̃0 and p̃0 are large,
there are clear divergences between the decision rules.
Next we examine how the incentives for the central bank to deviate from the
certainty equivalence and myopic rules may depend on other parameters of interest.
As can be expected, the three decision rules are affected by changes in β̃, λ and δ.
18At the same time, of course, Ft+1, the conditional variance of wt+1, increases with w2t but
this component of Etw2t+1 is independent of rt.
19Because the rate of interest responds symmetrically to positive and negative deviations of
the state variable from the target (i.e. zero), only positive deviations are shown in the plots.
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Figure 6.3: The three decision rules for alternative initial beliefs
Thus when analyzing the effect of changes in these parameters, it is not proper to
compare directly the optimal policies arising from each parameter setting. Rather,
one has to take the difference between the optimal and the myopic policies. On
the other hand, a change in σ2ν affects only the dynamically optimal policy. In this
case, we compare directly the dynamically optimal rules associated with each value
of σ2ν .
6.5.2 Policy under Less Volatile Shocks
First, we look at the effect of a decrease in the variance of the exogenous random
shock, σ2ν . In the benchmark case, the variance was set to 1, while now the variance
is reduced by half, standing at 0.5, which implies that, for a given policy path, the
economy is inherently more stable as it is subject to less volatile shocks. Note here
that unlike the optimal policy, the certainty equivalence and myopic rules are not
affected by σ2ν . So only the optimal decision rules for the two alternative values of
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Figure 6.4: Performance of optimal policy (σ2ν = 1 vs. σ
2
ν = 0.5)
In each panel of the figure the benchmark case (σ2ν = 1) is shown by the dotted
line while the solid line arises from the smaller variance of the shock (σ2ν = 0.5).
It is apparent from most of the panels, optimal policy is more aggressive when
the variance σ2ν decreases, that is when the shocks driving the wt process are less
volatile. This is especially the case with large values of c̃ and p̃ shown in the
lower right corner of the figure. The intuition is that, with low variability in the
shocks, optimal policy needs to actively manage data generation by increasing the
(conditional) coefficient of variation in wt+1, defined here as CV =
√
Ft+1/Etwt+1.
Since Ft+1 is predetermined, CV can be increased only by a lower value of Etwt+1,
which in turn requires a more aggressive response of rt to wt.
20
20Quantitatively, this difference is not large when c̃ or p̃ is small.
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6.5.3 Policy Cares More about Inflation Stabilization
Next, it is interesting to see how a different value of λ affects the incentives for
the design of optimal policy. We examine optimal policy when the weight placed
on interest rate stabilization, λ, decreases. Under the benchmark value λ = 0.5,
and policy gives considerable weight to losses arising from variability in the real
interest rate, rt.
Generally, as λ gets smaller, the central bank responds more aggressively to its
information, (πt+zt). As noted previously, this is true for the optimal policy as well
as the myopic and certainty equivalence rules, and is intuitively correct since if λ is
small, monetary policy gives high priority to stabilizing inflation at the expense of
a more volatile short real rate. When all the decision rules are affected by a change
in λ, it does not make sense to compare directly the dynamically optimal policies
for alternative values of λ. Rather we take the difference between the optimal and
the myopic, or between the optimal and the certainty equivalence rules, for a given
level of λ and see how this measure (i.e. the relative performance of the optimal
policy) is affected when λ takes another value. In this light, Figure 6.5 compares
the relative performance of the optimal policy under the two alternative value of λ
and for a wide range of initial beliefs.
In each plot, the solid line depicts the difference between the optimal and myopic
policies for λ = 0.1 while the corresponding measure for the baseline case, λ = 0.5,
is displayed using the dotted line. As can be seen from the figure, there are no
very clear results as the initial beliefs and the magnitude of the deviations in the
state variable seem to matter. In most of the plots, if (πt + zt) is close to zero, the
difference between optimal and myopic is less pronounced for λ = 0.1 since in this
case the myopic policy already generates enough data by aggressively minimizing
Etwt+1 (and thereby increasing CV given that Ft+1 is predetermined). The role of
experimentation increases with λ if deviations of (πt + zt) are relatively small.
When policy cares much less about inflation stabilization, experimentation is main-
tained only for small deviations of the state variable.
We get a different picture from the lower right corner, when c̃0 and p̃0 are large.
In this case, the effect of wt on Etwt+1 and Ft+1 is large. There is less role for
experimentation under λ = 0.5 because here the myopic rule is affected by the
initial beliefs more than the optimal policy. Moreover, the value of the state at
which we have a shift from a more aggressive to a less aggressive optimal policy
is smaller under λ = 0.5 than under λ = 0.1, where optimal policy remains more
aggressive over larger deviations of the state from the target.
As might be expected, we see from the upper left panels that the effect of changes
in λ on the extent of experimentation disappears for small values of c̃0 and p̃0, the
difference between the optimal policy and the myopic almost disappears. As a final
remark, we note here that similar results apply if we use the certainty equivalence as
the reference policy against which the performance of optimal policy is measured.
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Figure 6.5: Relative performance of optimal policy (λ = 0.1 vs. λ = 0.5).
6.5.4 The Effect of a Larger Policy Multiplier
Figure 6.6 shows how the degree of probing is affected by the size of the policy
multiplier, β̃ ∈ {0.5, 1}. The solid line is associated with a larger multiplier, β̃ = 1,
while the dotted line is associated with a smaller multiplier, β̃ = 0.5. From (6.2), we
know that β̃ ≡ β2(1−k); thus a smaller value of β̃ is associated with a weak leverage
of monetary policy on the current long real rate, (from the term structure equation,
the weight on the short real rate, (1 − k), decreases). In other words, as k gets
closer to one, the model becomes more forward-looking since the long term interest
rates will be determined mainly by movements in private sector expectations. Due
to this fact, the importance of learning increases as well. Since the long real rate in
turn determines aggregate demand with a one period lag and ultimately inflation
with two period lags, a change in monetary policy has only a small effect if β̃ is
small. This induces the central bank to be more aggressive in response to shocks
in order to have a considerable effect on the economy and stabilize inflation.
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So again using the difference between the optimal and the myopic policies as a mea-
sure of experimentation, the figure shows that, given small to moderate deviations
of πt + zt), experimentation decreases as the value of β̃ gets larger.
The plots in Figure 6.6 are very similar to those in Figure 6.4. Thus a larger policy
multiplier has effects on the degree of experimentation similar to a smaller weight
on interest rate stabilization. For most of the alternative initial beliefs, under the
larger value β̃ = 1 experimentation is maintained over large deviations of the state
from the target. The effect on the relative response of the optimal policy of a






   












   







   








   

























Figure 6.6: Relative performance of optimal policy (β̃ = 1 vs. β̃ = 0.5)
6.5.5 Policy Cares Less about the Future
The benefits from experimenting with the policy rate are in terms of reduced vari-
ability of the economy in the future from more precise estimates and improved
control associated with less uncertainty in the unknown parameter. Under flexible
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inflation targeting, optimal policy exploits the tradeoff between these future bene-
fits and current costs from large movements in rt. In this regard, one would expect
that the incentive to experiment increases as the central bank gives more weight
to expected future losses from variability in wt+τ and rt+τ , for τ = 1, 2, 3.... Thus
there is more tendency to probe for a relatively large discount factor (alternatively,
for a relatively small discount rate). Figure 6.7 confirms this intuition about the
effect of changes in the discount factor, δ, especially for large initial beliefs about
the persistence parameter.
In Figure 6.7, each plot shows the difference between the optimal and myopic
policies for two sets of values of the discount factor, δ ∈ {0.95, 0.75}. The baseline
value of 0.95 is shown by the solid line and is compared to the smaller value 0.75
given by the dotted line. With a smaller discount factor, the central bank cares less
about the future expected losses and thus policy tilts towards stabilizing current






   












   







   








   

























Figure 6.7: Relative performance of optimal policy (δ = 0.75 vs. δ = 0.95)
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6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we set out to extend the analysis of chapter 5 to a general case where
on the one hand monetary policy faces a tradeoff in stabilizing inflation as well as
the rate of interest, (the policy instrument), and on the other hand, the central
bank internalizes the effects of current policy choices on its learning possibilities
about an unknown degree of persistence in the economy.
We find that under flexible inflation targeting and uncertainty in the degree of
persistence in the economy, allowing for active learning possibilities has effects on
the optimal interest rate rule followed by the central bank. For a wide range of
possible initial beliefs about the unknown parameter, the dynamically optimal rule
is in general more activist, in the sense of responding aggressively to the state of
the economy, than the myopic rule for small to moderate deviations in the state
variable. On the other hand, for large deviations, the optimal policy is less activist
than the myopic and the certainty equivalence policies. This shows that the role
of optimal policy in generating variability (increasing the coefficient of variation
of the target variable) depends on the current state of the economy. When next
period’s state of the economy is expected to deviate a lot from the target due to
an unpredictable shock, and thus generates data on itself, optimal policy does not
need to increase the coefficient of variation of the next period’s state wt+1, while
it does so when the economy is hit by a very small shock and the state is close to
the target.
On the other hand, the myopic rule does not incorporate the future benefits from
large deviations of current state from the target and thus responds linearly and
more aggressively than the certainty equivalence rule. The intuition for the aggres-
siveness of the myopic rule lies in the fact that it takes account of the additional
source of uncertainty, which is compounded by the magnitude of the state variable,
as the unknown parameter is multiplicative to the current state. By acting more
aggressively to stabilize the predictable impact of current period shocks on future
aggregate demand and inflation, the myopic reduces the impact of uncertainty
associated with estimating the persistence parameter.
This feature of the myopic rule differs from what one might find when the source
of parameter uncertainty lies with the policy multiplier. In that case, policy under
myopic rule tends to be less aggressive than certainty equivalent. Uncertainty about
the policy multiplier forces the central bank to be cautious about using its policy
instrument freely to stabilize inflation. In our case, the analogous explanation is
that, with uncertainty in the persistence parameter, the central bank would like to
see less variability in the next period’s state variable. Under the myopic rule, this
can be achieved only if the policy rate responds aggressively to new information
about the state of shocks.
With very small weight on interest rate stabilization, the dynamically optimal
policy is still more aggressive than the myopic for small to moderate deviations of
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(πt + zt), though to a lesser extent than when interest rate stabilization is more
important. The reason is that the myopic policy is already aggressive enough when
inflation stabilization receive high priority. A larger policy multiplier, the coefficient
of the real rate, and a higher weight on inflation stabilization have similar effects
on the degree of experimentation. In the limit of strict inflation targeting optimal
policy is not affected by uncertainty in the persistence parameter.
As a final remark, we note that it is possible to have different assumptions about
how private sector expectations are formed. One may for example start out by
assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector. In our case, even
though expectations are non-rational in the short-run, they turn out to be rational
in the limit since the central bank learns the unknown parameter with probability
one. The solution of the model is the identical to the full information rational ex-
pectations equilibrium. Moreover, it is possible to allow for misspecification in the
central bank’s econometric model used to estimate the persistence parameter. The
role of misspecification has been analyzed for example in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).
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Appendix Numerical Dynamic Programming
The numerical approximation of the dynamically optimal policy under learning is
based on the Bellman equation (6.25).
The Bellman equation is non-standard because of the non-linear updating equa-
tions, which means no closed-form solution is available. Before solving for the
optimal value of rt, the central bank must first evaluate the expected continuation
value, which is a function of next period beliefs, and through the non-linear updat-
ing equations, depends on current period states, beliefs and central bank’s policy
instrument.
We compute the value function and the policy (reaction) function by repeated
iterations over (6.25) based on the dynamic programming algorithm of Beck and
Wieland (2002). The procedure is implemented by starting with an initial value for
V0 for all grid points over the state vector, (w, c̃, p̃), and solving the right side of the
Bellman equation for the optimal level of r at each grid point.21 As an initial guess
for V0 one can use the value function arising from the myopic policy and calculate
V1 by applying the operator T to V0 and update said table. Then the resulting
value function is used as the next guess in the iteration. This procedure continues
until convergence in value function is achieved. In particular, the iteration over the
Bellman equation is repeated until the difference between two successive iterates
is sufficiently small. It turns out that, the value function iteration can be slow to
converge, thus in order to speed up convergence, policy iterations are conducted
after each value function iteration.
Another issue in numerical approximation is interpolation. The grid points at which
the value function is calculated are discrete in number. In this case, the values
of the function in between grid points are approximated by linear interpolation.
The advantage of linear interpolation is that it preserves the shape of the function,
positivity and monotonicity. Thus, even though the algorithm only saves a discrete
approximation of V0, when computing values of V1, linear interpolation guarantees
that Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions are satisfied and the algorithm remains a
contraction mapping.
Of course, one expects to get multiple local maxima because of the non-convexities
introduced from the non-linear updating equations. A way to handle this problem is
to first undertake a rough grid search, then, based on the minimum found, a golden
section search. This procedure ensures that the global minimum is computed more
precisely.
The crucial steps in the numerical algorithm are related to evaluating the expected
continuation value, given the current state of the economy, wt, and the central bank
beliefs about the unknown degree of persistence in the economy, c̃t and associated
uncertainty, p̃t.
21The minimization step is not trivial as it requires repeated evaluation of an integral associated
with EtV (.).
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This step involves replacing next period beliefs, c̃t+1 and p̃t+1, by the non-linear
updating equations. The presence of non-linearity makes it difficult to evaluate the
integral (6.26).22
Since the random shocks and the prior beliefs about the unknown parameter are
assumed to be normally distributed, one can evaluate the integral numerically using
the Gauss-Hermite quadrature (GHQ). The GHQ evaluates the integral using a
discrete number of points, n, called nodes, with the weights on the nodes optimally
chosen to achieve good precision (see Judd, 1998).
Generally, given a normally distributed random variable, Y ∼ N(ȳ, σ2), the expec-
tation of f(Y ) is given by:





where y is a particular realization of Y . By using the linear change of variables
x = (y − ȳ)/√2σ ⇔ y = √2σx + ȳ, implying dy = √2σdx, we can rewrite (A.1)
as follows:
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where xj and ωj are, respectively, nodes and weights in the GHQ. The nodes and
weights for alternative values of n are tabulated (see Judd (1998)).
This result can be adapted to our model, where conditional distribution of wt+1
is normal with mean c̃twt + β̃rt ≡ w̄t+1 and variance w2t pt + σ2ν ≡ Ft+1. The
expectation of V (w; .) is taken over all possible realizations of wt+1.
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See Judd (1998) for a detailed treatment of numerical dynamic programming tech-
niques. Wieland (1998) and Beck and Wieland (2002) also give a brief description
of the method.




Recently, two aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism (both related to
expectation formation) have attracted attention and form the basis for the current
thesis. The first aspect concerns the greater role of forward-looking expectations
in the design of monetary policy (see Blinder, 1998; Woodford, 1999; Svensson,
2003b). For instance, Blinder (1998) points out that monetary policy has important
macroeconomic effects only to the extent that it moves financial market prices that
really matter like long-term interest rates, stock prices and exchange rates, variables
which, by their nature, are forward-looking. Second, some authors have stressed
the importance of imperfect knowledge on the part of decision makers due to lack of
information about the true model, data uncertainty, or even computational limits of
decision makers, which may give rise to possible non-rational behavior, the so called
bounded rationality (see Sargent, 1999; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In that case,
decision makers have to form expectations while adapting to new environments and
with the arrival of new information about the economy. A crucial question is how
actions taken today may hinder or speed up agents’ learning possibilities. Moreover,
should monetary policy strategy take into account the learning constraints of the
private sector and the central bank itself. This thesis raises some issues related to
these two elements of policy design. The first three chapters analyze the desirability
of disclosing central bank forecasts while the last two chapters are devoted to
optimal learning and control under inflation targeting. A common feature of the
transparency and learning parts of the thesis is that forward-looking private sector
expectations are important for macroeconomic outcomes. Asymmetric information
between the central bank and the private sector is also a key maintained hypothesis
throughout the thesis.
7.1 Central Bank Forecasts and Communication
In recent times an increasing number of central banks have taken steps to be more
transparent. The list includes the central banks of the UK, Canada, Sweden, Aus-
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tralia, New Zealand, and Switzerland. In general, one may argue that transparency
improves the effectiveness of monetary policy (Blinder, 1998), help household and
business decision makers get a more accurate picture of future developments of
the economy and understand central bank actions (Mishkin, 2004), or reduces
the volatility of financial markets that is associated with speculation about policy
motives (Romer and Romer, 2000). However, despite these benefits, Romer and
Romer (2000) cite possible complications in implementing the immediate disclosure
of forecasts, saying that immediate disclosure could change the information content
of the forecasts since they would attract a lot of attention from the public. But
then why? Is it because disclosing information may worsen overall macroeconomic
stabilization?
In this thesis the role of transparency is analyzed within the context of central
bank forecasts and when inflation expectations are forward-looking. There is some
evidence that central banks have better information about the state of the econ-
omy and its future development than is available to firms and households (see for
e.g. Romer and Romer, 2000). Based on this maintained hypothesis, chapters 2
and 3 examine whether there is any rationale for disclosing private information
about upcoming shocks. Specifically, the issue concerns disclosure policy regarding
forecast of future shocks, as opposed to current period shocks that the literature
has stressed. The motivation for studying future shocks is that information about
these shocks is relevant in a world of forward-looking expectations (as in the mi-
crofounded New Keynesian framework).
Chapter 2 abstracts from credibility issues and finds that with full credibility, ad-
vance disclosure of future shocks is not desirable for a central bank with multiple
goals as expectations become more volatile with disclosure hindering current sta-
bilization effort. Chapter 3 modifies the analysis of chapter 2 and allows for unob-
served shifts in the central bank’s output target and associated credibility problems
(Faust and Svensson, 2001; Jensen, 2000). In addition, the central bank chooses its
policy before private sector inflation expectations are set so that the private sector
can infer the output target from observed central bank actions. It turns out that
when credibility is an issue, the relevance of disclosing forecasts of future shocks
is not clear cut and depends on specific assumptions about the unobserved output
target. To be specific, the central bank is better off by withholding its private
information about future shocks if the random shift in output target is directly
revealed (no incentive effects) at the time the future shocks are realized. On the
other hand, if the output target has to be indirectly inferred from observed policy
decisions of the central bank, then disclosure policy is harmless. The reason lies
in the strong dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on
central bank actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price
stability in subsequent periods. Anticipating this incentive effects, private sector
expectations of next period’s inflation remain stable and thus contribute to current
period stabilization efforts of the central bank.
A common result of chapter 2 and 3 is that unlike current period shocks, there is
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no inherent desire to offset the forecasts of future shocks because these shocks do
not have a direct impact on current inflation. This implies that even if current
actions of the central bank are observed, say in terms of the current interest rate
choice, the public can not infer the central bank’s forecasts.
Central banks may also lack information on private sector expectations and need
to depend on their own assessments of what these expectations are. Since the as-
sessments are private information of the central bank, it is interesting to analyze
the consequences of disclosing them to the public. This issue is the subject of
chapter 4, which stresses mutual uncertainty between the central bank and the pri-
vate sector. It aims to shed light on the implications of this symmetric uncertainty
and communication by the central bank for stabilization policy. Existing litera-
ture generally assumes perfect knowledge of expectations despite concerns about
the presence of large assessment errors (see Tarkka and Mayes, 1999; Evans and
Honkapohja, 2002).
Chapter 4 shows that communication of assessment errors improves output sta-
bilization at the expense of instability in inflation, thus leading to a variability
tradeoff. The intuition for this result is as follows: with full knowledge of assess-
ment errors, private sector expectations react in a way that induces the bank to
adjust its interest rate so that output (and aggregate demand) is stabilized. In
this case, aggregate demand fails to stabilize the effect of inflation expectations on
current inflation. The tradeoff also has normative implications for policy: a central
bank that is sufficiently conservative (as in Rogoff, 1985) improves society’s welfare
by communicating its assessments. This result also holds for a more general loss
function that includes interest rate stabilization if the interest rate multiplier is not
too large. Finally, we also show that a more transparent central bank can afford
to be more conservative since the benefits from higher transparency in terms of
output stabilization are greater the more conservative is the central bank.
7.2 Learning, Control and Inflation-Forecast Tar-
geting
A number of major central banks have adopted what is called inflation-forecast
targeting. The main features of this regime are extensively discussed in Svensson
(1997) and, with some extensions, in Svensson (1999), although the role of the
term structure and learning under uncertainty are left out. Chapter 5 and 6 ana-
lyze optimal policy under learning in an inflation-forecast targeting framework that
incorporates the term structure of interest rates. The model with the term struc-
ture is more elaborate and realistic as monetary policy is conventionally viewed as
running from short-term interest rates managed by central banks to longer-term
rates that influence aggregate demand (Goodfriend, 1998). More importantly, it is
shown that limited information concerning private sector expectations of the long-
term interest rates translates the central bank’s problem into one with parameter
123
Chapter 7. Summary and Conclusions
uncertainty, specifically uncertainty about the degree of persistence in output and
inflation. Then main interest is thus in the performance of alternative decision
rules based on passive learning (certainty equivalence and myopic rules) or active
learning (dynamically optimal rule). Active learning is especially interesting as the
central bank takes account of the simultaneous problem of controlling inflation and
estimating (learning about) the degree of persistence in the economy.
The reduced form equation implied by our structural equations differs in two ways
from the linear process considered in most studies. First, the reduced form equa-
tion is dynamic due to some inertia in the structural model where future economic
conditions depend in part on the current period conditions. Second, while the
literature typically studies uncertainty about a policy multiplier, the nature of im-
perfect information in our term structure equation implies that it is the persistence
parameter in the linear process that is unknown to the central bank.
Chapter 5 solves the passive learning problem under strict inflation targeting, where
monetary policy completely stabilizes predictable fluctuations in inflation. Here,
the dynamically optimal policy under learning does not deviate from the certainty
equivalent and myopic policies. Thus optimal policy separates estimation and
control. Chapter 6 extends the analysis of chapter 5 to a general case of flexible
inflation targeting with active learning where the central bank internalizes the
effects of current policy choices on its learning possibilities about the unknown
persistence parameter. When the rate of interest, which is the policy instrument,
enters the loss function, optimal policy deviates from the passive learning rules.
Moreover, the need for policy to generate higher relative variability in inflation
depends on the state of the economy. When inflation is expected to deviate a lot
from the target due to an unpredictable shock, the economy generates data on its
own so that policy does not need to actively generate data, while it does so when
the economy is hit by a very small shock. On the other hand, the myopic rule only
takes account of the additional source of uncertainty in the persistence parameter,
the effect of which is compounded by the magnitude of the state variable. Since it
does not internalize the future benefits in terms of parameter precision, it responds
linearly and more aggressively than the certainty equivalence rule.
This feature of the myopic rule differs from what one might find when the source
of parameter uncertainty lies with the policy multiplier, where the myopic rule
tends to be less aggressive than certainty equivalence. The reason is quite intuitive.
Uncertainty about the policy multiplier forces the central bank to be cautious about
using its policy instrument freely to stabilize inflation. In our case, the analogous
explanation is that, with uncertainty in the persistence parameter, the central
bank would like to see less variability in the next period’s state variable. Under
the myopic rule, this can be achieved only if the policy rate responds aggressively
to new information.
The incentive to deviate from the certainty equivalence policy diminishes for a
central bank that gives more attention to inflation stabilization. In that case, the
instrument rate can be set optimally to stabilize inflation without much concern
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about current and future volatilities in the rate of interest. In the limit of strict
inflation targeting optimal policy is not affected by uncertainty in the persistence
parameter. Thus there is more tendency to probe for a relatively large discount
factor (that is, small discount rate).
We note that it is possible to allow for specification errors in the central bank’s
econometric model used to estimate the persistence parameter. Moreover, one can
make alternative assumptions about how private sector expectations are formed,
for example assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector. But in
that case the model becomes much more intractable as private sector expectations
have to incorporate the active learning problem of the central bank, which does
not have a closed-form solution. An appealing feature of our model is that, even
though expectations are initially non-rational, they become rational in the limit as
the central bank learns the persistence parameter and the equilibrium solution is
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Dit proefschrift gaat in op twee onderwerpen gerelateerd aan het ”ontwerpen” van
monetair beleid: communicatie als instrument voor stabilisatiepolitiek enerzijds en
optimaal monetair beleid met een lerende centrale bank anderzijds.
In het eerste deel van het proefschrift wordt de rol van communicatie als instru-
ment voor stabilisatiepolitiek bestudeerd (hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4). Hoewel een
aantal belangrijke centrale banken stappen heeft gezet om hun voorspellingen over
de toestand van de economie openbaar te maken, geven bestaande theoretische
studies gemengde resultaten over de wenselijkheid van openbaarmaking. Hoofd-
stukken 2 en 3 dragen bij aan de bestaande literatuur (die betrekking heeft op het
openbaar maken van schokken in de huidige periode) door in te gaan op de on-
thulling van toekomstige inflatieschokken. Dit is met name interessant wanneer de
verwachtingen van de private sector rationeel zijn (zoals in het microgefundeerde
Nieuw-Keynesiaanse raamwerk het geval is).
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt aangetoond dat, in het geval van volledige geloofwaardigheid
van de centrale bank, het vooraf openbaar maken van toekomstige schokken niet
wenselijk is voor een centrale bank die meerdere doelstellingen heeft dan prijssta-
biliteit. Verwachtingen gaan in dit geval namelijk meer fluctueren bij de onthulling
van voorspellingen en werken zodoende de huidige stabilisatie-inspanningen tegen.
In hoofdstuk 3 is een verandering in de economische conjectuurdoelstelling van de
centrale bank mogelijk. Deze doelstelling is onbekend bij het publiek en kan dus
de geloofwaardigheid van de centrale bank aantasten. Het blijkt dat in dit geval de
wenselijkheid van openbaarmaking niet eenduidig is en afhangt van specifieke aan-
names met betrekking tot de onbekende conjectuurdoelstelling. De resultaten van
hoofdstuk 2 gelden ook wanneer de willekeurige verandering in de conjectuurdoel-
stelling direct onthuld wordt door de centrale bank (die dus geen prikkel heeft zijn
gedrag te veranderen) op het moment dat de schokken plaatsvinden. Anderzijds is
openbaarmakingbeleid onschadelijk als de conjectuurdoelstelling indirect afgeleid
moet worden van waarneembare beleidsbeslissingen. In dit geval zorgt de sterke
afhankelijkheid van de inflatievoorspellingen van de private sector van beleidsacties
ervoor dat de centrale bank zich in komende periodes uitsluitend op prijsstabiliteit
richt. Doordat de private sector op dit prikkel of ”incentive”-effect anticipeert, bli-
jven de inflatieverwachtingen van de private sector stabiel, hetgeen bijdraagt aan
de stabilisatie-inspanningen van de centrale bank.
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Een gezamenlijk resultaat van hoofdstukken 2 en 3 is dat, in tegenstelling tot
het geval van schokken in de huidige periode, er geen inherente wens is om de
voorspellingen van toekomstige schokken te bestrijden, aangezien deze schokken
geen directe gevolgen hebben voor de huidige inflatie. Dit betekent dat zelfs als
het publiek het huidige rentebeleid waarneemt, zij de voorspellingen van de centrale
bank niet kan afleiden.
Centrale banken schatten regelmatig de verwachtingen van de markten in. De in-
schattingen bevatten soms grote fouten, deze worden echter in de meeste bestaande
studies over het beleid van openheid genegeerd. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op het com-
municeren van inschattingsfouten in een raamwerk met rationele verwachtingen.
Het laat zien dat communicatie ervoor zorgt dat conjectuurstabilisatie verbetert,
maar dat inflatiestabiliteit verslechtert omdat inflatieverwachtingen zodanig rea-
geren dat ze de centrale bank bewegen tot een renteaanpassing om zodoende de
geaggregeerde vraag te stabiliseren. De bank slaagt er echter niet in om het directe
effect van inflatieverwachtingen op de huidige inflatie te verkleinen. Het normatieve
gevolg is dat een centrale bank, die voldoende conservatief is, de maatschappeli-
jke welvaart verbetert door zijn inschattingen te communiceren. Tevens wordt
aangetoond dat een meer transparante centrale bank het zich kan veroorloven om
conservatiever te zijn aangezien de voordelen van meer transparantie in termen van
conjectuurstabilisatie groter zijn naarmate de centrale bank conservatiever is.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift gaat in op optimaal beleid waarbij een cen-
trale bank leert binnen een raamwerk van ”inflation-forecast targeting” dat tevens
de termijn structuur van de rente bevat (hoofdstukken 5 en 6). Dit onderwerp
is vooral van belang omdat een aantal belangrijke centrale banken een beleid van
”inflation-forecast targeting” in gebruik hebben genomen. Een model dat tevens
de termijn structuur bevat is uitvoeriger en realistischer dan modellen die dit niet
incorporeren, omdat men in het algemeen van mening is dat het effect van monetair
beleid loopt via de korte rente, die door de centrale bank gecontroleerd wordt, naar
de lange rente, die de geaggregeerde vraag en de inflatie benvloedt. Wat belangri-
jker is, is dat wordt aangetoond dat beperkte informatie over de verwachtingen van
de private sector over de lange rente ervoor zorgt dat het probleem van de centrale
bank een probleem wordt met onzekerheid over parameters, namelijk onzekerheid
over de mate van persistentie in conjectuur en inflatie. In termen van berekeningen
zorgt de manier waarop onvolledige informatie in de vergelijking voor de termijn-
structuur wordt gemodelleerd ervoor dat de persistentie-parameter in het lineaire
proces onbekend is bij de centrale bank, terwijl de literatuur in het algemeen onzek-
erheid over een beleidsmultiplier bestudeerd.
Onze interesse ligt vooral in de prestaties van alternatieve renteregels met een
passief lerende centrale bank (zekerheidsequivalentie en kortzichtige regels) respec-
tievelijk, en een actief lerende centrale bank (een dynamisch optimale regel). Met
name een actief lerende centrale bank is interessant omdat de centrale bank dan
rekening houdt met de gelijktijdig optredende problemen van enerzijds het be-
heersen van de inflatie en anderzijds het schatten (en leren) van de mate van per-
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sistentie in de economie.
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op het probleem van passief leren met een strikte inflatiedoel-
stelling (”strict inflation targeting”), waarbij monetair beleid voorspelbare schom-
melingen in inflatie volledig stabiliseert. Hier wijkt het dynamisch optimale beleid
met een lerende centrale bank niet af van zekerheidsequivalent en kortzichtig beleid.
Optimaal beleid scheidt zodoende het schatten enerzijds en het beheersen van in-
flatie anderzijds. Hoofdstuk 6 breidt de analyse van hoofdstuk 5 uit naar het
algemene geval van een flexibele inflatiedoelstelling (”flexible inflation targeting”)
met een actief lerende centrale bank waarbij de bank het effect van huidige belei-
dskeuzes op zijn mogelijkheden om meer te weten te komen over de onbekende
persistentie-parameter internaliseert. Wanneer het beleidsinstrument, de rentevoet,
onderdeel is van de nutsfunctie van de centrale bank, wijkt optimaal beleid af van
de regels bij passief leren. Bovendien, de noodzaak voor een beleid om meer re-
latieve variatie in inflatie te genereren hangt af van de toestand van de economie.
Wanneer verwacht wordt dat door een onvoorspelbare schok de inflatie sterk afwi-
jkt van de doelstelling, genereert de economie zelf data zodat het beleid niet actief
data hoeft te genereren terwijl dit wel het geval is als de economie getroffen wordt
door een hele kleine schok. Anderzijds houdt de kortzichtige regel alleen reken-
ing met de extra bron van onzekerheid in de persistentie-parameter, waarvan het
effect versterkt wordt door de omvang van de toestandsvariabele. Aangezien de
centrale bank de toekomstige voordelen in termen van parameter precisie niet in-
ternaliseert, reageert ze lineair en agressiever dan in het geval van de regel met
zekerheidsequivalentie.
Dit kenmerk van de kortzichtige regel verschilt van wat men zou kunnen vinden
wanneer de bron van parameter onzekerheid bij de beleidsmultiplier ligt, waarbij
de kortzichtige regel in het algemeen minder agressief is dan zekerheidsequivalen-
tie. De oorzaak is vrij intutief: onzekerheid over de beleidsmultiplier dwingt de
centrale bank om voorzichtiger om te springen met zijn beleidsinstrument om in-
flatie te stabiliseren. In ons geval is de analoge uitleg dat, met onzekerheid over de
persistentie-parameter, de centrale bank liever minder variatie in de toestandsvari-
abele in de volgende periode ziet. Bij de kortzichtige regel kan dit alleen bereikt
worden als het beleid agressief op nieuwe informatie reageert.
De prikkel om van het beleid onder de zekerheidsequivalente regel af te wijken
neemt af voor een centrale bank die meer aandacht heeft voor inflatie stabilisatie.
In dat geval kan het instrument optimaal ingezet worden om inflatie te stabiliseren
zonder dat de bank zich veel zorgen hoeft te maken over de huidige en toekomstige
volatiliteit in de rentevoet. In het extreme geval van een strikte inflatiedoelstelling
(”strict inflation targeting”) wordt optimaal beleid niet benvloedt door onzekerheid
over de persistentie-parameter. Daarnaast is er een grotere neiging om te experi-
menteren wanneer de tijdsvoorkeurvoet relatief hoog is (relatief lage discontovoet).
Wel dient opgemerkt te worden dat het mogelijk is om specificatiefouten in het
econometrische model, dat de centrale bank gebruikt om de persistentieparameter
te schatten, toe te staan. Daarnaast kunnen alternatieve aannames gemaakt wor-
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den over hoe de private sector tot haar verwachtingen komt, bijvoorbeeld door ra-
tionele verwachtingen aan de kant van de private sector te veronderstellen. Echter,
in dat geval is het model veel moeilijker te analyseren omdat de verwachtingen van
de private sector het probleem van actief leren van de centrale bank moeten incor-
poreren, waardoor het model geen gemakkelijk hanteerbare oplossing heeft. Een
aantrekkelijk kenmerk van ons model is dat verwachtingen, ondanks dat ze initieel
niet rationeel zijn, in de limiet rationeel worden omdat de centrale bank te weten
komt wat de persistentieparameter is en de speltheoretische Stackelberg evenwicht
identiek is aan de oplossing in het geval van volledige informatie.
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